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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment 
in favor of Defendant/Appellee Kerry L. Knighton ("Knighton") based 
upon its interpretation that time did not become of the essence 
until fifteen days after the scheduled date of closing? The 
standard of appellate review for a grant or denial of a motion for 
summary judgment is review for correctness, with no particular 
deference afforded the District Court's decision. Walker Drug Co., 
Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995); Berenda v. 
Langford, 287 Utah Adv.Rep. 3, 5 (Utah 1996). This issue, as it 
relates to the fee award, was preserved in the District Court. (R. 
at 326). 
2. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment 
in favor of Knighton where there were material disputed facts over 
whether Knighton's performance was timely once it became legally 
undisputed that time was of the essence to perform the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement? The standard of appellate review for a 
grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is review for 
correctness, with no particular deference afforded the District 
Court's decision. Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 
P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995); Berenda v. Langford, 287 Utah Adv.Rep. 
3, 5 (Utah 1996). This issue, as it relates to the fee award, was 
preserved in the District Court. (R. at 326). 
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3. Can Knighton recover his attorneys' fees on appeal 
pursuant to the provisions of an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for 
the sale of certain real property which, under prevailing Utah law, 
has been extinguished by delivery and acceptance of the Warranty 
Deed? There is no standard of appellate review for an award of 
attorneys' fees; consequently, such review is within this Court's 
discretion. This issue was preserved in the District Court. (R. 
at 326). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are none. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
This case involves the failure of the defendants/appellees 
Kerry L. Knighton ("Knighton") and Ralph J. Marsh ("Marsh") to 
close upon the stated date of closing in an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement ("Agreement") which was executed by appellees and 
plaintiffs/appellants Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. Lott 
("Lotts"). 
The Lotts filed their Complaint on July 27, 1994, alleging 
breach of the Agreement. (R. at 1) . Knighton filed his Complaint 
on July 28, 1994, seeking specific performance against the Lotts. 
These two cases were later consolidated into the action the Lotts 
filed. (R. at 34) . The parties then filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. The following documents were filed: 
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a. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and Supporting 
Affidavit- (R. at 44-71); 
bp Lotts' Revised Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Supporting Rule 56(f) 
Affidavit- (R. at 128-155); 
C. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Rule 56(f) 
Affidavit. (R. at 178-190); 
d. Lotts' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 221-245); 
e. Knighton's Memorandum in Opposition to Lotts' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 249-270); and 
f. Lotts' Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Their 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 271-280). 
The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment were heard 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on June 22, 1995. (R. at 
351-396). On August 18, 1995, the District Court issued its Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 323-326). 
Included in this Order were the following provisions: 
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Time was not of the essence in the Agreement until after 
fifteen (15) days following the May 1, 1994, closing 
date; 
Plaintiffs, as seller, did not tender their performance 
of the Agreement; 
Plaintiffs were ordered to specifically perform the 
Agreement by signing and returning the Warranty Deed on 
the property to Knighton; 
Before the warranty deed was recorded, Knighton was to 
pay to plaintiffs the amount of the water assessment and 
all other assessments incurred after May 1, 1994, and 
paid by plaintiffs upon submission to Knighton of a copy 
of the assessment and evidence that it has been paid by 
plaintiffs; 
Defendants were awarded attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this matter in the sum of $8,845.50; 
If there was no appeal, the fees and costs awarded were 
to be offset against the down payment and the payments 
due under the promissory note since June 1, 1994. If 
there was an appeal, these offset provisions were to go 
into effect unless plaintiffs filed a supersedeas bond 
for the amount of the fees and costs awarded. 
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Pursuant to the District Court's Order, the Lotts delivered 
the Warranty Deed to Knighton on September 14, 1995, pursuant to 
escrow instructions containing an accounting for expenses and costs 
which Knighton was to pay before the Warranty Deed was recorded. 
However, sometime between September 14 and September 19, 1995, 
Knighton recorded the Warranty Deed despite the fact that he had 
not paid to the Lotts any of the costs or assessments the District 
Court ordered him to pay. (See Affidavit of Mark A. Larsen, 
attached as Exhibit "A"). 
The Lotts filed their Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court on September 15, 1995, and their Cost Bond on Appeal on that 
same date. (R. at 327-329; 330-331, respectively). The Lotts also 
filed a Notice of Posting of Supersedeas Bond on September 20, 
1995. (R. at 332-334) . The appeal was poured over to the Court of 
Appeals on November 7, 1995. (R. at 343). Knighton and Marsh 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Mootness and a Request for 
Attorneys' Fees. The Lotts filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Appellee's Motion. 
This Court entered its Order of Partial Dismissal on April 10, 
1996, dismissing the portion of the Lotts' appeal challenging the 
District Court's dismissal of the breach of contract claim, and 
leaving only the issue of the District Court's award of attorneys' 
fees under the Agreement to be determined in this appeal. This 
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Court denied Knighton and Marsh's request for attorneys' fees on 
appeal. (R. at 349-350). 
B* Statement of Facts. 
The Lotts owned certain real property involved in this action, 
which is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, known as Lot 
113, Hi-Country Estates, Phase II ("the Property11). (R. at 222, f 
1; R. at 44-45, f 2, 3). Ralph J. Marsh is Kerry L. Knighton's 
attorney and represented Knighton in the real estate transaction 
which is the subject of this lawsuit. (R. at 223-224, f 4; R. at 
44, f 1). 
Mrs. Lott spoke with Knighton several times during the 
negotiation of the sale of the real property which forms the 
subject matter of this lawsuit. These conversations began in late 
December of 1993 or early January of 1994. Mrs. Lott told Knighton 
the following, among other things: 
(a) A new water tank was being constructed to provide 
water to the Lotts' property, as well as others, and that 
the Lotts expected a water assessment in late Spring, but 
did not want to be responsible for paying it. 
(b) The vote for the water assessment was to take place 
in Spring of 1994. 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott wanted to close any sale within the next month, 
which they felt was reasonable because no outside financing was 
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necessary. Knighton said that any closing could not occur until 
Spring because he needed a survey of the property and a percolation 
test. He said he would order the test and survey immediately, but 
would like to extend the closing until May 1, 1994, to allow for 
inclement weather. Mr. & Mrs. Lott agreed, but reiterated their 
concerns about waiting that long. (R. at 134, 
f 1; R. at 178, f 1; R. at 222-223, f 1; R. at 250, f 1; R. at 76). 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott, as Sellers, and Kerry L. Knighton, as Buyer, 
entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement dated January 27, 
1994, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B". (R. at 135, f 2; 
R. at 178, f 2; R. at 223, f 2; R. at 250, f 2; R. at 77; R. at 
85) . 
Paragraph 8 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement establishes 
the closing for the sale of the subject property to occur no later 
than May 1, 1994. Furthermore, Paragraph Q of the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement establishes that time is of the essence for the 
closing of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
(R. at 137, J[ 9; R. at 179, f 9; R. at 227, f 14; R. at 252, f 14; 
Exhibit "A"; R. at 77; R. at 87). 
At Knighton's request, Mr. & Mrs. Lott agreed that the closing 
could occur through Knighton's attorney, Ralph J. Marsh. 
Previously, Mr. & Mrs. Lott had chosen Utah Title Company to be the 
closing agent. As a result, Knighton agreed to pay all closing 
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fees, as reflected by the removal of all closing fees from the 
Closing Statement attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of 
Dennis Lott. (R. at 135, J 3; R. at 178-179, f 3; R. at 223, f 4; 
R. at 250, f 4; R. at 77; R. at 85; R. at 94). 
When Knighton stated that he wanted to use Marsh as a closing 
agent, he also stated that Marsh would handle all ordinary work 
associated with the preparation for closing, as would any title 
company, which Mr. & Mrs. Lott were led to believe included 
obtaining a title report, as Utah Title would have done if it 
handled the closing. (R. at 135, f 4; R. at 179, f 4; R. at 224, 
1 5; R. at 250, f 5; R. at 77; R. at 85-86). 
The sale was contingent upon Knighton's successful completion 
of a percolation test and a survey on the property. On April 26, 
1994, Knighton informed Mr. & Mrs. Lott that the survey was not yet 
complete and that he would waive the percolation test, although Mr. 
& Mrs. Lott never received any such waiver in writing. (R. at 13 5-
136, f 5; R. at 179, f 5; R. at 85-86). 
The survey was never completed, even though it was a 
precondition to Knighton's obligation to perform under the 
Agreement. (R. at 224, f 6; R. at 251, f 6). 
By April 26, 1994, less than one week before the scheduled 
closing, Knighton had not obtained a title report. (R. at 224, I 
7; R. at 251, f 7) . 
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Knighton called Mr. & Mrs. Lott twice on April 25, 1994: the 
first time he called, Mr. Lott was not home, and the second time, 
at about 11:00 p.m., Mr. Lott told Knighton that Mr. Lott would 
call him the next night. On April 26, 1994, Mr. & Mrs. Lott called 
Knighton. They told him they were amazed that the title report had 
not been obtained. They told him to have Mr. Marsh obtain the 
title report because they were living 2,000 miles away from where 
the closing was going to occur, and they understood that the 
closing agent was supposed to handle this sort of matter. (R. at 
139, f 6; R. at 179, J 6; R. at 224-225, f 7; R. at 
251, f 7; R. at 86). 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott understand that it only takes 24 hours to 
obtain a title report, yet the title report was not obtained until 
May 2, 1994, one day after the scheduled closing. (R. at 137, f 8; 
R. at 179, f 8; R. at 225, fl 9; R. at 251, f 9; R. at 86). 
Although under the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott were responsible for obtaining the title insurance, 
Knighton and Marsh agreed to assume this responsibility because 
they resided in Pennsylvania and title insurance for the property 
could be obtained shortly after requesting it. Knighton and Marsh 
failed to obtain the title insurance in a timely manner. (R. at 
136, f 7; R. at 179, f 7; R. at 225, f 8; R. at 251, f 8; R. at 
86) . 
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On April 29, 1994, Knighton telephoned and told Mr. & Mrs. 
Lott that all was in order and the survey was complete, despite the 
fact that the survey was never completed. Knighton and Mr. Lott 
discussed the possibility of extending the closing date. Knighton 
told Mr. Lott this was not necessary, based upon advice he received 
from Marsh. (R. at 137, f 10; R. at 179, f 10; R. at 87). 
The Lotts desired a survey, which Knighton was required to 
obtain but failed to do, in order to protect them from any 
potential future claims regarding the boundaries of the property. 
The Lotts relied upon Knighton's representation that a survey had 
in fact been obtained, and did not obtain such survey themselves. 
(R. at 354-355; R. at 365; R. at 389). 
Knighton, however, did not tender performance by the agreed 
closing date of May 1, 1994. (R. at 137, f 10; R. at 179, f 10; R. 
at 78; R. at 87). 
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement did not close on May 1, 
1994, the agreed upon closing date, due solely to delays caused by 
Knighton or his attorney, Ralph J. Marsh. (R. at 137, f 11; R. at 
179, f 11; R. at 227, flfl 15, 16, 17; R. at 252, ff 15, 16, 17; R. 
at 78; R. at 87). 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott did not receive a copy of the documents they 
were required to execute pursuant to the terms of the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement until May 3, 1994, two days after the scheduled 
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closing. These documents were transmitted utilizing regular mail 
under cover of Marsh's letter dated April 29, 1994, a copy of which 
is attached as Exhibit "B" to Dennis Lott's Affidavit, (R. at 96), 
but that letter did not enclose copies of the requisite Note and 
Trust Deed contemplated by the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. (R. 
at 78; R. at 87). Mr. Lott immediately requested copies of the 
Note and Trust Deed, but did not receive them until May 9, 1994, 
eight days after the scheduled closing. (R. at 138, ff 13, 14; R. 
at 179, ff 13, 14; R. at 78; R. at 88). 
Knighton claims he delivered the money, the Promissory Note 
and the Trust Deed to his attorney's office on April 29, 1994, and 
signed all of the documents at that time. (R. at 49, R. at 39). 
The Trust Deed attached as Exhibit "D" to the Defendants' 
Memorandum admittedly appears to be signed by Mr. Knighton, and his 
signature is notarized by Ralph Marsh. The Trust Deed, however, is 
dated May 1, 1994, a Sunday, as is the notarization. (R. at 105). 
Paragraph C in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement makes Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott liable for all assessments up through the date of the 
closing. Marsh, acting as Knighton's agent, stated in a letter to 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott dated May 6, 1994, which they received on May 9, 
1994, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "C" to Dennis Lott's 
Affidavit, that "once the deed from [Mr. & Mrs. Lott] is recorded, 
all future assessments will be due from the new owner and [Mr. & 
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Mrs. Lott] will have no liability therefor." (R. at 100). Marsh's 
May 6, 1994, letter enclosed a copy of the Promissory Note and 
Trust Deed. Mr. & Mrs. Lott, however, were concerned that this 
subjected them to liability for any assessments which they knew 
would be levied after the agreed upon closing date of May 1, 1994, 
but before the recording of the Trust Deed. (R. at 138, f 15; R. 
at 179, f 15; R. at 228-229, f 20; R. at 252, f 20; R. at 78; R. at 
88) . 
After Mr. & Mrs. Lott received the Promissory Note and Trust 
Deed required by the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, they were 
required to seek the advice of counsel to determine the impact of 
assessments levied after the closing date of May 1, 1994, but 
before the recording of the Trust Deed. (R. at 139, f 16; R. at 
179, f 16; R. at 79; R. at 88). 
It took Mr. & Mrs. Lott approximately one week to contact 
attorneys in Pennsylvania and Utah. Based upon their advice, Mr. 
& Mrs. Lott sought a change in the wording of the Trust Deed for 
their own protection based upon the possibility of additional 
assessments occurring after the agreed-upon closing date. (R. at 
139, f 17; R. at 179, f 17; R. at 79; R. at 88-89). 
Only a minor change in the Trust Deed and Note was necessary 
to correct the problem created by Knighton's delay, and this 
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request was made to Knighton on May 16, 1994. (R. at 139, f 18; R. 
at 179, J[ 18; R. at 89). 
It apparently took Knighton until Friday, May 20, 1994, to 
contact Marsh concerning Mr. & Mrs. Lott's request, because, 
according to Knighton, Marsh was out of town. (R. at 139, J[ 19; R. 
at 180, f 19; R. at 79; R. at 89). 
When Mr. Lott spoke with Knighton on the telephone on May 23, 
1994, Mr. Lott told him that he was becoming increasingly 
frustrated by the delays and that, if the matter was not brought to 
closure immediately, Mr. Lott would call the whole thing off. 
Knighton acknowledged that the first payment under the Promissory 
Note was due in one week, on June 1, 1994. Knighton said, by 
June 1, 1994, the deal would be closed and Mr. & Mrs. Lott would 
receive the first payment. (R. at 140, f 20; R. at 180, f 20; R. 
at 230, f 25; R. at 253, f 25; R. at 89). 
On May 23, 1994, Knighton called Mr. Lott and asked him to 
call Marsh "so that we could get it right this time." (R. at 140, 
f 21; R. at 180, f 21; R. at 89). 
On May 24, 1994, Mr. & Mrs. Lott called Marsh on three 
separate occasions. Mrs. Lott called Marsh's office on two 
separate occasions, asked for Marsh and was disconnected. (R. at 
80) . Mr. Lott was finally able to "reach" Marsh on his third 
attempt after he arrived home from work that afternoon. (R. at 
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140, 5 22; R- at 180, f 22; R. at 230, ffl 26, 27; R. at 253, ff 26, 
27; R. at 89). 
When Mr. Lott spoke with Marsh on May 24, 1994, however, 
contrary to Knighton's representation, Marsh told him that, 
although he had been in and out of his office during the previous 
week, for the most part, he had been in his office. During this 
conversation, Mr. Lott requested that Marsh alter the documents so 
that Knighton was liable for all assessments levied after May 1, 
1994. (R. at 140-141, f 23; R. at 180, 
f 23; R. at 90). 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott did not receive the payment due under the 
Promissory Note due on June 1, 1994. (R. at 80; R. at 90). Marsh 
did not make the necessary change to the Trust Deed until June 7, 
1994. On that date, Marsh called Mrs. Lott and informed her that 
he finally had made the changes to the Trust Deed, had the Trust 
Deed ready and wanted to send it to Mr. & Mrs. Lott by facsimile. 
Mrs. Lott told Marsh that they were no longer willing to close 
because it had now been three weeks since requesting the change to 
the Trust Deed from Knighton and two weeks since Mr. Lott spoke 
with Marsh. Mrs. Lott informed Marsh that, since requesting the 
changes from Marsh, a $2,800 assessment was levied against the 
subject property, which Mr. & Mrs. Lott received and paid. Also, 
Mrs. Lott informed Marsh that, because the first payment on the 
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Promissory Note was due on June 1, 1994, and they neither received 
the payment or the corrected Trust Deed by that time, they assumed 
the deal was off. Mrs. Lott asked Marsh why it had taken so long 
to make the changes in the Trust Deed and Marsh told Mrs. Lott that 
it had taken him several days to make the change, several more days 
to have Knighton sign the corrected document and still more days to 
obtain Mr. & Mrs. Lott's telephone number to arrange for the 
facsimile transmission of the Trust Deed to the Lotts. Mrs. Lott 
told Marsh she did not believe the delays were reasonable. (R. at 
141-142, !H 24, 25; R. at 180, JI 24, 25; R. at 80-81). 
After Mrs. Lott spoke with Marsh on June 7, 1994, at 11:45 
p.m. (EDT) , Mr. Lott called Knighton. Mr. Lott informed him of the 
following: 
(a) Since requesting the changes in the Trust Deed three 
weeks ago, a $2,800 assessment was levied against the 
subject property, which Mr. & Mrs. Lott received and paid 
prior to the time they received the suggested changes in 
the Note and Trust Deed from Marsh. 
(b) Mr. & Mrs. Lott paid the assessment because, they 
were legally obligated to do so, and due to the extensive 
delays, they assumed Knighton no longer was interested in 
purchasing the property. 
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(c) Mr. & Mrs. Lott's basis in the property had now 
changed, changing the value of the property, and that the 
deal was off. 
(d) Mr. & Mrs. Lott would release the Earnest Money to 
Knighton. 
Knighton asked if Mr. & Mrs. Lott were interested in purchasing the 
survey of the property and told Mr. Lott that he would speak with 
Marsh and ask him "what had gone wrong." (R. at 142-143, f 26; R. 
at 180, I 26; R. at 90). 
Marsh did not make any changes to the Trust Deed until June 7, 
1994, two weeks after Mr. Lottos request. Mr. & Mrs. Lott received 
the proposed changes under cover of Marsh's letter dated June 9, 
1994, once again sent by regular mail, a copy of which is attached 
as Exhibit "D" to Dennis Lott's Affidavit. (R. at 105). By that 
time, both Messrs. Marsh and Knighton knew Mr. & Mrs. Lott had paid 
the water assessment. Nevertheless, the Trust Deed enclosed with 
Marsh's June 9, 1994, letter was inadequate to address Mr. & Mrs. 
Lott's concerns, stating in pertinent part: 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and 
assessments on the above property from May 1, 
1994, to the extent not already paid by 
Beneficiaries, to pay all charges and 
assessments on water or water stock used on or 
with said property from May 1, 1994, not to 
commit waste, to maintain adequate fire 
insurance on improvements on said property,to 
pay all costs and expenses of collection . . . 
and to pay reasonable trustee's fees . . . . 
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(Emphasis added.) Reading the altered, inadequate Trust Deed 
merely galvanized Mr. & Mrs. Lott's decision to go no further with 
the sale. (R. at 143, f 27; R. at 180, f 27; R. at 91). 
According to the terms of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott were extending $31,500 in credit to Knighton. Due 
to the extensive delays, and the cavalier manner in which the 
transaction was handled, it became apparent to Mr. & Mrs. Lott that 
Knighton was not a good credit risk. (R. at 143-144, f 28; R. at 
180, f 28; R. at 81; R. at 92). 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott have never indicated to anyone that they were 
waiving the provisions in the Earnest Money Agreement that time was 
of the essence and that, if the Earnest Money Sales Agreement did 
not close on or before May 1, 1994, that they were waiving their 
claim that Knighton breached the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
(R. at 144, f 29; R. 180, f 29; R. at 81; R. at 92). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The only issue to be addressed by this Court on appeal is the 
recoverability of attorneys' fees. The District Court clearly 
erred by awarding $8,845.50 in attorneys' fees to Knighton. The 
District Court's award can only be sustained if the Lotts did in 
fact breach the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. If the Agreement 
was not breached by the Lotts, there is no simply no basis for the 
District Court's award of fees to Knighton. Under the facts of 
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this case, a determination as to which party breached the 
Agreement, if any, simply cannot be made on summary judgment, as 
the District Court attempted to do. This is particularly true 
where, as here, there are material disputed facts regarding the 
timeliness of Knighton's performance once time did become of the 
essence. 
Although the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
established the closing date as May 1, 1994, and contained a time 
is of the essence clause, the District Court found, in 
contravention of prevailing authority and express contractual 
language, that the time is of the essence clause did not take 
effect until May 16, 1994. Furthermore, the Court found that 
Knighton did not breach the clause, despite the fact that, even 
under the Court's interpretation of the clause, Knighton was in 
breach of contract, as he was not ready to close the transaction 
until at least June 7, 1994, if the revised Trust Deed was 
adequate. Knighton's attorney's own correspondence indicated this 
was not acceptable. 
Depending upon how the time is of the essence clause is 
construed, Knighton breached the clause in at least two ways: 
1. If time is of the essence on May 1, 1994, the date of the 
scheduled closing, Knighton breached that provision because 
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• Marsh did not send the documents Mr. & Mrs. Lott 
needed to sign until April 29, 1994. These 
documents were transmitted by regular mail. 
• Mr. & Mrs. Lott did not receive the documents they 
were required to execute until May 3, 1994, two 
days after the scheduled closing. 
• Marsh's letter dated April 29, 1994, did not 
enclose copies of the requisite Note and Trust Deed 
contemplated by the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott were financing the transaction and 
could not sign documents transferring title without 
seeing the Trust Deed and Promissory Note. 
• Mr. Lott immediately requested copies of the Note 
and Trust Deed, but did not receive them until May 
9, 1994, eight days after the scheduled closing. 
• Based upon Marsh's cover letter dated May 6, 1994, 
and the enclosed Trust Deed, Mr. & Mrs. Lott 
understandably were concerned that they were 
subjected to liability for any assessments levied 
after the agreed upon closing date of May 1, 1994, 
but before the recording of the Trust Deed. The 
Trust Deed dated May 1, 1994, contains language 
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which only requires Knighton to pay the future 
assessments after the deed is recorded. 
2. If time is of the essence on May 16, 1994, fifteen days 
after the date of the scheduled closing, Knighton 
breached that provision because 
• Only a minor change in the Trust Deed and Note was 
necessary to correct the problem created by 
Knighton's delay, and this request was made to 
Knighton on May 16, 1994. This was an extremely 
simple change could only have taken a few minutes 
to accomplish. 
• Marsh did not make the necessary change to the 
Trust Deed until June 7, 1994, three weeks after it 
was requested. 
• The revised Trust Deed Mr. & Mrs. Lott received on 
June 9, 1994, did not protect Mr. & Mrs. Lott 
against assessments levied after May 1, 1994. 
Nor may Knighton recover his attorneys' fees on appeal. He 
recorded the Warranty Deed in September of 1995. Once the Warranty 
Deed is recorded, the doctrine of merger and the provisions of the 
Earnest Money Agreement itself extinguish the attorneys' fees 
provision contained in the Earnest Money Agreement. No further 
attorneys' fees can be awarded to Knighton. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE CLAUSE OF THE 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT REQUIRED THE 
SALE TO BE CLOSED NO LATER THAN MAY 1, 1994. 
FURTHERMORE, ALL OF THE DELAYS IN THE CLOSING 
ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE BUYER, KNIGHTON. 
Despite express contractual and case law authority to the 
contrary, the District Court found that the time is of the essence 
clause of the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement did not take 
effect until May 16, 1994. However, even under the District 
Court's interpretation, the Agreement was breached, since the Lotts 
did not receive the Trust Deed necessary for closing until June 9, 
1994, well beyond any conceivable extension even under the most 
liberal interpretation of the time is of the essence clause. Given 
the delays which took place after May 16, 1994, the Court's grant 
of summary judgment in Knighton's favor is perplexing at best. 
A. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement Contained a Time is of 
the Essence Clause, Requiring the Sale to Close No Later 
Than May 1, 1994 
The "time is of the essence" clause contained in paragraph Q 
of the Earnest Money Agreement, mandated closing on or before May 
1, 1994. In Century 21 All West Real Estate v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52 
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that, "[w]here the 
contract states that time is of the essence, cases hold that both 
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parties are discharged from their contract obligations if neither 
makes tender by the agreed closing date. . . . " Id. at 55 n.l. 
Paragraph Q of the Earnest Money Agreement reads as follows: 
TIME IS OP ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that 
this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein 
[May 1, 1994] due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, 
delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar 
occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then 
the closing date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond 
cessation of such condition, but in no event more than 
fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided 
herein. Thereafter, time is of the essence. This 
provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. 
"Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary 
instruments are signed and delivered by all parties to 
the transaction. 
Furthermore, pursuant to Paragraph R of the Agreement, in the 
event of default of the Agreement by a party, the non-defaulting 
party may retain possession of the Earnest Money as liquidated 
damages, or maintain an action for damages. 
There are two important points that must be clarified: 
(1) Absent an "interruption of transport, strike[], fire, 
flood, extreme weather, governmental regulation[], delay caused by 
lender, act[] of God, or similar occurrence[] beyond the control of 
Buyer or Seller," the closing date cannot be extended. Utah Courts 
have continually held that, when a contract for the sale of land 
has an express "time is of the essence" clause, and includes a 
provision for forfeiture or avoidance of the contract if 
performance is untimely or nonexistent, the clause will be 
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enforced. See, e.g., Barber v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct.App. 
1987). 
Here, there is no fact which fits any enumerated exception to 
the time is of the essence clause. Accordingly, under Utah law, 
the forfeiture provision of Paragraph R ensures that the time is of 
the essence provision of Paragraph Q is enforceable. 
Defendants attempt to argue that the time is of the essence 
clause is only triggered in the event of an occurrence outlined in 
Paragraph Q. This claim must be rejected. Such events are 
extraordinary. Since time is generally not of the essence in real 
estate contracts unless the contract contains an express provision, 
see, e.g., Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982), it is 
illogical to assume that the parties expressly contracted for this 
provision to be triggered only in the event of an extraordinary 
occurrence. Defendants' reading of the Agreement is both self-
serving and overly convoluted. Even if there is an ambiguity in 
the construction of the contract, the ambiguity must be construed 
against defendants as the parties responsible for the language used 
in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Matter of Orris' Estate, 622 
P.2d 337 (Utah 1980). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that, in the case relied upon 
by defendants in support of their argument regarding the 
interpretation of the time is of the essence clause, Krantz v. 
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Holt, 819 P. 2d 352 (Utah 1991) the issue of the validity and 
enforceability of the time is of the essence clause was not even 
presented to the Supreme Court. Therefore, the language relied by 
defendants is merely dictum, and not binding upon this Court. 
Therefore, absent the type of uncontrollable exception or 
occurrence which did not occur in the present case, time was of the 
essence as of May 1, 1994. There is no contractual excuse for 
extending the closing date. 
(2) Furthermore, defendants7 misreading of Paragraph Q 
ignores the fact that, even if an event such as those enumerated in 
that paragraph occurred, the extension is only for seven days. In 
this case, even if it were available, which it is not, the 
extension would expire on May 8, 1994. It was not until May 9, 
1994, eight days after the scheduled closing, and beyond the seven 
day extension, that Mr. & Mrs. Lott first received a copy of the 
Note and Trust Deed. Therefore, the time is of the essence clause 
was breached, even assuming the application of the extension. 
B. All Delays in Closing Are Attributable to the Buyer, 
Knighton 
The fact that closing did not occur until well after the May 
1 deadline is completely attributable to the delays of Knighton. 
Knighton did not tender performance prior to the May 1, 1994, 
closing date. He failed to deliver the Trust Deed and Note to Mr. 
& Mrs. Lott prior to the closing date. He never tendered his 
24 
performance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-1 (1951). Delivering 
documents to his attorney's office, rather than to Mr. & Mrs. Lott, 
does not constitute a tender of performance.1 
In fact, Knighton never fully performed. The sale was 
contingent upon Knighton's successful completion of a percolation 
test and a survey on the property. On April 26, 1994, Knighton 
informed Mr. & Mrs. Lott that the survey was not yet complete and 
that he would waive the percolation test, although Mr. & Mrs. Lott 
never received any such waiver in writing. Although Knighton later 
informed the Lotts that the survey was complete, it in fact was 
never completed. The District Court's finding that the survey was 
only for the benefit of Knighton, the buyer, is baffling, given the 
Lotts' position that they were relying upon such survey to protect 
them from any future claims regarding the boundaries of the 
property. In light of such disputed issues, the Court's grant of 
summary judgment is completely lacking in reasonable basis. 
1
 Knighton claims he delivered the money, the Promissory 
Note and the Trust Deed to his attorney's office on April 29, 1994, 
and signed all of the documents at that time. (R. at 49, R. at 
39) . The Trust Deed attached as Exhibit "D" to the Defendants' 
Memorandum (R. at 105) admittedly appears to be signed by 
Knighton, and his signature is notarized by Ralph Marsh. The Trust 
Deed, however, is dated May 1, 1994, a Sunday, as is the 
notarization. The question, then, is whether the Affidavit is 
perjured or whether an incorrect date was intentionally inserted on 
the Trust Deed. 
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In Guillory Corp. v. Dussin Investment Co., 272 Or. 267, 536 
P.2d 501 (1975), the Oregon Supreme Court held that, where time is 
of the essence, and payment of the down payment and delivery of the 
land sale contract are concurrent conditions: 
[A] purchaser who fails to tender payment within 
the time provided by the terms of an earnest money 
agreement cannot ordinarily either demand damages 
for failure of the seller to convey good title or 
rescind the contract and recover earnest money 
previously paid. . . . 
Id. at 274, 536 P.2d at 504. In Guillory, the purchaser tendered 
the down payment eight days late and showed no excuse for its 
lateness, such as the seller's inability or refusal to perform. 
The Court held that the Earnest Money Agreement expired of its own 
terms. The same result was reached under similar circumstances in 
Usinger v. Campbell, 280 Or. 751, 572 P.2d 1018 (1977). 
The closing was set to occur no later than May 1, 1994. It 
did not occur on or before that date, although Marsh and Knighton 
had months to prepare for the closing. They improperly attempt to 
blame the delay on Mr. & Mrs. Lott for two reasons: 
1. The designation of the location of the closing; and 
2. The delivery of the title report. 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott reluctantly agreed to utilize Marsh as the 
closing agent, upon Knighton's insistence and agreement to pay the 
closing costs himself if Marsh was utilized. His office was the 
location designated for the closing. All he needed to do was 
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promptly and properly prepare the necessary documents, transmit 
them to Mr. & Mrs. Lott in a timely manner, and hold them for this 
very simple closing. All of this easily could have been 
accomplished prior to May 1, 1994. 
Marsh was the closing agent. He was responsible for and did 
obtain the title report. If there was any confusion, this matter 
was resolved by April 26, 1994, giving Marsh plenty of time to 
obtain the title report, which only requires twenty-four hours to 
obtain, prior to the scheduled May 1, 1994, closing. 
In determining who is responsible for the delay, paragraph C, 
entitled SELLER'S WARRANTY, of the Earnest Money Agreement becomes 
important. Paragraph C states that the "[s]eller warrants that 
. . . all obligations against the property including . . . 
assessments . . . shall be brought current on or before closing." 
Closing should have occurred on May 1, 19942. 
An examination of the chronology in this case demonstrates 
that Knighton and Marsh were responsible for the delays: 
1. Marsh did not send the documents Mr. & Mrs. Lott needed 
to sign until April 29, 1994. These documents were 
transmitted by regular mail. 
2
 Because the closing was scheduled on May 1, 1994, a Sunday, 
the manner in which the Trust Deed originally drafted required it 
to be recorded on Friday, April 29, 1994, to avoid exposing Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott for assessments levied after the date of the closing. 
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2. Mr. & Mrs. Lott did not receive the documents they were 
required to execute until May 3, 1994, two days after the 
scheduled closing. 
3. Marsh's letter dated April 29, 1994, did not enclose 
copies of the requisite Note and Trust Deed contemplated 
by the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Mr. & Mrs. Lott 
were financing the transaction and could not sign 
documents transferring title without seeing the Trust 
Deed and Promissory Note. 
4. Mr. Lott immediately requested copies of the Note and 
Trust Deed, but did not receive them until May 9, 1994, 
eight days after the scheduled closing. 
5. Based upon Marsh's cover letter dated May 6, 1994, and 
the enclosed Trust Deed, Mr. & Mrs. Lott understandably 
were concerned that they were subjected to liability for 
any assessments levied after the agreed upon closing date 
of May 1, 1994, but before the recording of the Trust 
Deed. The Trust Deed dated May 1, 1994, contains 
language which only required Knighton to pay the future 
assessments after the deed was recorded.3 
3 Marsh's suggestion in his letter that "once the Deed from 
you is recorded, all future assessments will be due from the new 
owner and you will have no liability therefor" appears to be 
correct. 
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6. It took Mr. & Mrs. Lott approximately one week to contact 
attorneys in Pennsylvania and Utah, a reasonable thing to 
do in these circumstances. 
7. Only a minor change in the Trust Deed and Note was 
necessary to correct the problem created by Knighton's 
delay, and this request was made to Knighton on May 16, 
1994. This was an extremely simple change, and could 
only have taken a few minutes to accomplish. 
8. Marsh did not make the necessary change to the Trust Deed 
until June 7, 1994, three weeks after it was requested. 
The revised Trust Deed which Mr. & Mrs. Lott received on June 
9, 1994, did not protect them against assessments levied after May 
1, 1994: 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on 
the above property from May 1, 1994, to the extent not 
already paid by Beneficiaries, to pay all charges and 
assessments on water or water stock used on or with said 
property from May 1, 1994, not to commit waste, to 
maintain adequate fire insurance on improvements on said 
property,to pay all costs and expenses of 
collection . . . and to pay reasonable trustee's fees . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) By this time, both Knighton and Marsh knew Mr. 
& Mrs. Lott had paid the $2,800.00 water assessment. The language 
used, "to the extent not already paid by Beneficiaries," 
potentially subjected Mr. & Mrs. Lott to liability for the water 
assessment which everyone knew was imminent as of May 1, 1994, and 
which Mr. & Mrs. Lott had paid prior to June 9, 1994. Marsh's June 
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7, 1994, letter did not enclose a revised Settlement Statement 
requiring Knighton to be responsible for the $2,800.00 assessment. 
Furthermore, by June 9, 1994, several material changes had 
occurred: 
> Mr. & Mrs. Lott paid the assessment, changing their basis 
in the property. 
> According to the terms of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, Mr. & Mrs. Lott were extending $31,500 in 
credit to Knighton. Due to the extensive delays, and the 
cavalier manner in which the transaction was handled, it 
became apparent to Mr. & Mrs. Lott that Knighton was not 
a good credit risk. 
> Mr. & Mrs. Lott did not receive the payment due under the 
Promissory Note due on June 1, 1994, although Knighton 
acknowledged that the first payment under the Promissory 
Note was due on June 1, 1994, and said by June 1, 1994, 
the deal would be closed and Mr. & Mrs. Lott would 
receive the first payment.4 
4
 The $2,800 assessment represents 80% of the down payment 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott were receiving on this transaction. If they were 
liable for the assessment, Mr. & Mrs. Lott would have lost eight 
percent of the purchase price and would be financing the property 
with the debtor, Knighton, having little to no equity in the 
property. In the event of a default on the Note secured by the 
Trust Deed, Mr. & Mrs. Lott would not be fully secured. 
30 
Given the facts of this case, the Court's award of attorneys7 
fees simply cannot stand. If time was of the essence on May 1, 
1994, the closing date, as the contract and case law would suggest, 
then Knighton was clearly in breach of the Agreement and cannot 
recover fees under such Agreement. Even if the Court's 
interpretation of the clause as taking effect on May 16, 1994, was 
correct, the fact remains that someone breached the Agreement, 
since the Trust Deed was not delivered to the Lotts until June 9, 
1994. It is incomprehensible how summary judgment could be 
granted, and fees awarded Knighton, on such facts, given the 
factual disputes between the parties regarding the reasons for the 
delay and breach. 
POINT II 
KNIGHTON CANNOT RECOVER HIS ATTORNEYS7 FEES ON APPEAL 
BECAUSE THE ATTORNEYS' PEES PROVISION IN THE EARNEST 
MONEY AGREEMENT WAS ABROGATED WHEN KNIGHTON RECORDED THE 
WARRANTY DEED/ AND KNIGHTON IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUCH FEES 
UNDER THE MERGER DOCTRINE. 
The merger doctrine directly prohibits the award of any 
additional attorneys' fees to Knighton on appeal. Utah law does 
not support an award of fees in a case such as this. The terms of 
an Earnest Money Sales Agreement are merged into the Warranty Deed 
and extinguished upon delivery of that Deed. Here, the Deed to the 
subject Property has been delivered and accepted by Knighton, 
pursuant to the District Court's Order. Because the terms of the 
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Earnest Money Sales Agreement were extinguished, there is 
absolutely no basis for the award of any additional fees in this 
case to Knighton. 
A. Delivery and Acceptance of the Warranty Deed Extinguished 
The Attorneys' Fees Provision of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement 
Utah Courts have routinely held, along with other state 
Courts, that delivery and acceptance of a Warranty Deed 
extinguishes the provisions of a previous contract for the sale of 
land. In Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court explained that, since the deed is the final 
repository of the agreement which led to its execution, delivery 
and acceptance of the deed extinguishes the provisions of the 
underlying contract for the conveyance. The Secor Court noted: 
The doctrine of merger, which this Court 
recognizes, is applicable when the acts to be 
performed by the seller in a contract relate 
only to the delivery of title to the buyer. 
Execution and delivery of the deed by the 
seller then usually constitute full 
performance on his part, and acceptance of the 
deed by the buyer manifests his acceptance of 
that performance even though the estate 
conveyed may differ from that promised in the 
antecedent agreement. Therefore, in such a 
case the deed is the final agreement and all 
prior terms, whether written or verbal, are 
extinguished and unenforceable. 
Id. at 793 (emphasis added). These principles were recently 
reaffirmed by this Court in Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
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Utah Courts have held that, as a matter of course, the merger 
doctrine applies to attorneys' fee provisions in an Earnest Money 
Sales Agreements. In Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 
346 (Utah 1979) , the Supreme Court of Utah held that the plaintiffs 
were not entitled to collect attorneys' fees from the defendants 
pursuant to the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement, where the 
defendants failed to convey clear title. The Court noted that, 
although the Earnest Money Sales Agreement did contain an 
attorneys' fees provision, it also contained a standard abrogation 
clause. The Court found that 
[a]ttorney's fees are not chargeable to an 
opposing party generally unless there is 
contractual or statutory liability therefor. 
There is neither here. The terms of the 
Earnest Money Agreement were merged into the 
deed and extinguished upon delivery 
thereof . . . the deed . . . does not provide 
for the payment of attorneys' fees in an 
action for damages upon breach of the 
warranties. 
Id. at 348. See Barnhart v. Gold Run, Inc., 843 P. 2d 545, 549 
(Wash.App.Div. 3 1993) (due to merger doctrine, contractual right 
to attorneys' fees ended when the deed was issued; lf[t]he deed 
merged the provisions of the real estate contract, including the 
provision for fees"). 
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B. The Terms of the Parties' Agreement, Including the 
Attorneys' Fees Provision, Were Extinguished by the 
Court-Ordered Delivery of the Warranty Deed to 
Knighton 
Because of the merger doctrine, there is no basis for an award 
of fees on appeal in this case. Paragraph 0 of the Agreement 
contains an express abrogation clause: 
ABROGATION. Except for express warranties 
made in this Agreement execution and delivery 
of final closing documents shall abrogate this 
Agreement. 
This clause reflects the intent of the parties that the 
conveyance of the deed to the property acts as an extinguishment of 
all previous elements of the Agreement. The Lotts have already 
delivered the Warranty Deed, which has been recorded by Knighton. 
The terms of the Agreement, then, were extinguished by the Lotts' 
delivery of the Deed and Knighton's acceptance of the same. There 
is no basis to support any award of fees on appeal, because the 
only basis is the Agreement, which no longer exists. 
Accordingly, because the attorneys' fee provision of the 
Agreement was abrogated by the Lotts' delivery and Knighton's 
acceptance of the Warranty Deed, there is no basis upon which to 
award fees to the defendants on appeal, and their request should be 
denied. Moreover, this Conclusion remains true even if this Court 
accepts Knighton's argument that the remainder of the Lott's appeal 
has been mooted. The defendants seek an award of attorneys' fees 
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along with dismissal of the Lotts' appeal without any argument or 
citation to pertinent authority. Their claim should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
If this Court finds, in accordance with express contractual 
language and prevailing authority, that the "time is of the 
essence" clause took effect on May 1, 1994, then Knighton was in 
breach, and this case should be remanded to determine the issue of 
an award of fees to the Lotts. 
In the alternative, should this Court find that the clause did 
take effect on May 16, 1994, then the attorneys' fee award must be 
reversed and this case should be remanded for trial on the fact 
sensitive issue of which party breached the time is of the essence 
clause. 
Finally, the defendants' claim for an award of attorneys' fees 
on appeal should be denied, since the only basis for such award is 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, which has been extinguished by 
the Lotts' delivery and Knighton's acceptance of the Deed. 
Consequently, there is no basis for such award, and the request 
must be denied. 
Dated: October 10, 1996. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
MARK A. LARSEN 
KRISTINE EDDE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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Tab A 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (O) 
This It a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
A. INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating, 
air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, tight fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, win-
dow and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings. Installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit-
ters), fencing, trees and shrubs. 
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason 
of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, Income herefrom or as 
to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection, 
said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) alt obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall 
be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air. conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in 
satisfactory working condition at closing. 
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller 
has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards. 
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, 
deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally 
approve the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case, 
all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth 
in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become hull and void. 
G. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
or a preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title. 
Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agree-
ment at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued 
by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and 
the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any 
cancellation charge. 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing 
a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior 
to closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objection(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
J. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases 
entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
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EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE: January 27, 1994 
The undersigned Buyer . 
as EARNEST MONEY, the amount of 
in the form of_ C h e c k 
Kerry L. Knighton 
Two Hundred and'no/100 
Ralph 
which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law. 
Ralph J . Marsh (801)531-8300 
Brokerage; Phone Number 
Received by 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY Is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at 
Hi — Country Es ta tes
 f Ph. IIin the city of zz county of Sa l t Lake 
Lot 113 
. Utah, 
subject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
accordance with Section G. Said property is owned by D e n n i s A . k F r a n c i n e G . L o t t as sellers, and is more particularly described 
as See Exhibit nA" attached hereto 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES: 
Q UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY E8 Vacant Lot 
• IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Commercial 
D Vacant Acreage D Other 
D Residential D Condo D Other 
(a) Included Items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property. 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: N o n e 
(b) Excluded Items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale: N o n e 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
• public sewer D connected 
D septic tank D connected 
D other sanitary system 
D well D connected D other 
D irrigation water / secondary system 
# of shares Company 
D public water D connected 
Q H M M B M r . D connected 
D TV antenna 
Bfthelurd a n 
y.T.Y. 
D master antenna D prewired 
D connected 
(d) Survey. A certified survey B2 shall be furnished at the expense nf B u y e r 
£3 electricity D connected 
S ingress & egress by private easement 
D dedicated road D paved 
D curb and gutter 
D other rights 
.prior to closing, D shall not be furnished. 
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the:property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical 
condition, except: 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is T h i r t y F i v e T h o u s a n d ftr. T i n 7 1 0 0 
. Dollars ($ 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) which shall be paid as follows: 
$ 200,00 
$ 3300.00 
$ NA 
NA 
JJA-
which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: 
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer, 
which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include: D principal; D interest; • taxes; D insurance; D condo fees; D other 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include: D principal; D interest; D taxes; D insurance; D condo fees; D other ^ 
representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows: 
$ 35.000.00 
Other promissory note payable $4bi.4b montniy commencing one month ±rom closing, interest at y# per annum, secured Dy Trust Deed, payable in lull upon receipt of 
financing for construction of a home, prepayment without penalty. TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts 
to assume1 and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees 
to make application within NA days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at 
an interest rate not to exceed NA %• If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within NA dayS after Seller's acceptance 
of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice. Seller agrees to pay up to NA mortgage loan discount 
points, not to exceed $ -N" in addition, seller agrees to pay $ _ NA to be used for Buyer's other loan costs. 
S. CONDITION AND CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. Seller represents that Seller K holds title to the property In fee simple D is purchasing the property under a real 
es'ate contract. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be made as set forth in Section S. Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title to the property, subject 
. to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by ££a current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price D an abstract ot title brought current, 
with an attorney's opinion (See Section H). 
4. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing. Buyer shall take title 
subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer U has U has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement. 
. 5. VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest In Buyer as M\™<- K e r r y L . K n i g h t o n 
6. SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted: 
N o e a s e m e n t s o v e r t h e p r o p e r t y n t h f y r t h a n u t i l i t y Pagprrentc; , 
Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following: _ 
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
prior to closing: Buyer obtaining percolation test, satisfactory to Buyer-, 
-upon rece ip t of survey but-no-ilater—tbaa-
8. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closeo\n=w4wtow M?y ** . 19 -94— a* a reasonable location to be designated by 
Seller, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of Q date of possession D date of closing D other 
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on ' j * unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
10. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer. 
and the selling agent represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
written disclosure of the agency relationship^) was provided to him/her. ( ) ( ) Buyer's initials ( ) ( ) Seller's initials. 
11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE. THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN 
ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. 
12. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer oHers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall 
have until (AM/PM) F f i h . 1 0 , 19 Q4 . to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST 
MONEY to the BiiyerV y 
d & r & L ) * " f r * k January 29, 1994 ^ ^ S o u t h Kingston W a y l a y , UT q j j ^ g ^ 
(Buyer's Signature) ' (Date) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
CHECK ONE 
D ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
D REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's initials) 
j l j COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions onmodjfications,as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until £'*.OQ (StlPM) /^2B&ZtAtf!y /7$ , 19 ' ^ to accept the terms 
specified below. <? a\ 7 
zzCS 
(Seller's^gnature) ^ - " ( f t (Qate) y (Time) ( A d d r e s s £ > ^ ^ / J r > ^ '(Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
^a/ruit^ ^ry&f" fl/rt vffc/ v ?hr>/> foujfU h y^&</'$'>c /s>5</tc/fez 
(Seller's Signature) / ^ (Date) (Time) / <A d d r e^yt iL£/ i5c^L /?- (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
CHECK ONE: 0 
GQ ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
D REJECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. (Buyer's Initials) 
• COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
(Buyer's Signature) 0 (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed). 
A. D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: 
SIGNATURE OF SELLER SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
B. 52 I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed nn FZR. / P , 19 9 V by 
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the & Seller DBuyer. Sent by KfSgftV L. WtUiiTGN 
K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on its behalf warrants> 
his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller. 
L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
.and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree-
ment. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. 
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be In writing and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement 
not expressly modified or excluded therein. 
N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or If this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition 
or contingency to which the. sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to 
Buyer. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or In pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap-
plicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in-
terpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the 
earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall 
be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action. 
0. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogatethis Agreement. 
P. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property between 
the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism; flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
(10%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property 
prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair 
or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed. 
Q. TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
. fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing 
date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein. Thereafter, 
time is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
delivered by all parties to the transaction. 
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (V£) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs of providing 
title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest 
on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
at closing. 
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex-
cepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest-under an existing real estate contract, Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, 
containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
estate contract therein. 
T. NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
of the event with respect to which notice is required. If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given 
is automatically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect. If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the 
Buyer or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice. 
U. BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office. 
V. DAYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays. 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
SEAN N. EGAN (7191) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARK A. LARSEN, ESQ. 
Case No. 950760-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Mark A. Larsen, Esq., being duly sworn, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1. I am counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants in the 
above-captioned matter. I have personal knowledge of the facts 
set forth in this affidavit. 
2. On July 27, 1994, the Lotts brought suit against 
defendants/appellees Kerry L. Knighton and Ralph J. Marsh, Esq., 
alleging breach of the Earnest Money and Sales Agreement between 
the Lotts and Knighton and wrongful lien pursuant to U.C.A. 
§ 38-9-3. 
3. On July 28, 1994, Knighton filed a claim against the 
Lotts seeking specific performance of the Earnest Money and 
Sales Agreement or, in the alternative, damages. The two cases 
were consolidated into one action on September 19, 1994. 
4. On August 18, 1995, the trial court denied the Lotts' 
motion for summary judgment and granted Knighton's motion for 
summary judgment. 
5. On September 14, 1995, the Lotts filed a Notice of 
Appeal and a Cost Bond on Appeal. 
6. On September 14, 1995, on behalf of the Lotts, I 
caused to be delivered to Knighton the Warranty Deed pursuant 
to escrow instructions containing an accounting for expenses and 
costs which, pursuant to the Order, were to be paid before the 
Warranty Deed was recorded. 
7. Some time between September 14, 1995 and September 19, 
1995, Knighton, through his counsel Ralph J. Marsh, recorded the 
Warranty Deed despite the fact that Knighton had not paid for 
any of the costs and assessments the trial court required him 
2 
to pay before he was authorized to record the deed; he then 
tendered to the Lotts a check for the amount of money he 
believed he owed to them. 
8. On September 20, 1995, I filed, on behalf of the 
Lotts, a Notice of Posting of Supersedeas Bond. In addition, 
I also had recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens in the Salt Lake 
County Recorders Office for the property in dispute. 
9. On or about October 18, 1995, Knighton, through Marsh, 
tendered a check to the Lotts in the amount of $461.48 which was 
purportedly a payment due and owing under the Promissory Note 
which Knighton had executed on May 1, 1994, as payment for the 
property. 
10. The Lotts did not accept this check until they 
received assurance from Knighton that depositing the check would 
not prejudice their rights. 
11. Prior to receiving this check, the Lotts had not 
received a single payment under the Promissory Note since 
payments were scheduled to begin on June 1, 1994. 
12. On or about October 24, 1995, the Lotts substituted 
Ralph Marsh as Trustee for the Trust Deed and replaced him with 
Dean C. Andreasen, Esq. 
13. On or about October 24, 1995, I had recorded, on 
behalf of the Lotts, a Notice of Default on the Promissory Note 
3 
signed by Knighton. This Notice of Default demanded repayment 
of monies due and owing since June 1, 1994, plus interest. 
14. On January 4, 1996, I received a check from Knighton 
tendering to the Lotts $38,734.59. Marsh contended that this 
amount reflected the balance due and owing under the Promissory 
Note. 
15. On or about January 18, 1996, I notified Marsh, on 
behalf of the Lotts, that $6,051.35 remained due and owing 
pursuant to the Promissory Note. Marsh tendered this amount to 
the Lotts on January 22, 1996. 
16. In addition, Marsh indicated to me that the Lotts 
could accept the check for $461.48 which was tendered to the 
Lotts in October, 1995 without prejudice to their rights. 
17. On or about January 24, 1996, the Lotts provided Marsh 
with a Deed of Reconveyance for the property. 
Dated: March 5, 1996. 
A. LARSEN, ESQ. 
j)~tf<^-
4 
On this ^  ~ day of March, 1996, before me, a Notary Public 
in and for said state, personally appeared Mark A. Larsen, Esq., 
known to me to be the person who executed the within Affidavit 
and acknowledged to me that he executed the same and the 
contents thereof are true and accurate to the best of his 
information, knowledge and belief. 
m0 
1 ~"-*»»r*r^^ 
NOTAKY P U B L I C | 
MARY ANN BcCK 
201 South Main #1300 1 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
My Commission Expires 1 
October 13.1998 I 
STATE OF UTAH 
{ZtM (Ufa*/ 
PUBLIC 
wp5l\mal\lott\larsen.aff 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of March, 1996, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARK A. LARS EN, ESQ., to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
wp5l\mal\lott\larsen.aff 
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RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940904735 PR 
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) 
Defendants hereby move the Court to enter judgment in their favor and against 
plaintiffs on the grounds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This motion is supported by the MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herewith. 
DATED this ^ day of November, 1994. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Mar^li 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the £P day of November, 1994,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, to the following: 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
2 
RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and | 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940904735 PR 
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Kerry L. Knighton (hereinafter referred to as "Knighton") is a 
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and defendant Ralph J. Marsh is his attorney. 
[Admitted in 111 of plaintiffs' Answer]. 
2. Plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as "Lotts") are residents of Pennsylvania 
but the real property involved in this action is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
and the agreement between the parties was entered into and was to be performed in the 
State of Utah. [Admitted in H2 of plaintiffs' Answer]. 
3. On January 29, 1994, Knighton presented to Lotts a written offer to 
purchase certain real property for $35,000.00, payable $200.00 as earnest money, $3300.00 
1 
down payment at closing and $31,500.00 on a promissory note secured by a trust deed 
against the property. The real property to be purchased is located in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, known as Lot 113, Hi-Country Estates, Phase II, and more particularly described 
as follows: 
Beginning South 870.83 feet and East 2499.13 feet from the West 
Quarter Corner of Section 21, Township 4 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North 
71°22'15" West 582.27 feet; thence North 18°37'45" East 353.01 
feet; thence Easterly along a curve to the right 704 feet; thence 
South 53 • 48*29" East 304.13 feet; thence South 36° 11*31" West 
649.01 feet to the point of beginning, containing 10.48 acres. 
[Admitted in K3 of plaintiffs* Answer]. 
4. On February 7, 1994, Lotts accepted the offer subject to changing the 
amount of earnest money to $1,000.00 and reducing the down payment to $2,500.00. 
[Admitted in H4 of plaintiffs' Answer]. 
5. This counteroffer was accepted by Knighton on February 17, 1994. 
[Admitted in 115 of plaintiffs' Answer]. 
6. The agreement between the parties is an Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", which provides, among other things, as 
follows: 
a) The closing shall take place upon receipt of survey but no later than May 
1, 1994, at a reasonable location to be designated by Seller; [§8, Exh. "A"]. 
b) Seller shall provide to Buyer, not less than five business days prior to 
closing, a preliminary title report on the subject property; [§§G and V, Exh. 
"A"]. 
c) Seller shall convey title to Buyer by warranty deed free of defects; [§S, Exh. 
"A"]. 
c) Seller shall furnish good and marketable title to the property evidenced by 
a current policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price 
containing no exceptions other than those provided for in the standard form 
policy; [§§3 and H, Exh. "A"]. 
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d) The agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of 
the parties; [§L, Exh. "A"]. 
e) Should either party default, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from 
enforcing the agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided by the agreement 
or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or 
otherwise. [§N, Exh. "A"]. 
7. Lotts failed to designate a location for the closing of the sale. [Knighton 
Affidavit, 116]. 
8. Lotts failed to provide to Knighton a preliminary title report within five days 
prior to May 1, 1994, or at any time since. [Knighton Affidavit, 116]. 
9. Knighton, therefore, contacted Lotts by telephone and obtained their 
permission, on the evening of April 25, 1994, to have his attorney obtain a preliminary title 
report and prepare the necessary closing papers. [Knighton Affidavit, If7]. 
10. A preliminary title report was ordered but not received until Monday, May 
2, 1994. [Knighton Affidavit, 118]. 
11. Knighton deposited the down payment with his attorney and signed a 
promissory note, trust deed and closing statement and left those with his attorney on Friday, 
April 29,1994. Copies of those documents are attached hereto as Exhibits "BM, "C" and "D". 
[Knighton Affidavit, 119]. 
12. On Friday, April 29, 1994, a closing statement and warranty deed were 
prepared and sent to Lotts by Knighton's attorney with a cover letter requesting Lotts to sign 
and return those documents and to call if they had any questions. Copies of those 
documents are attached hereto as Exhibits "EM, "F" and "F-l". [Admitted in If 12 of plaintiffs' 
Answer]. These documents were received by Lotts on May 3, 1994. [Admitted in If 11 of 
plaintiffs' complaint]. 
13. On May 3, 1994, Dennis Lott called Knighton to request that a copy of the 
note and trust deed be sent to them and that charges for owner's assessments and a closing 
fee be deleted from the closing statement. [Admitted in 1113 of plaintiffs' Answer]. 
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14. On May 6, 1994, Knighton's attorney sent a revised closing statement and 
copies of the note and trust deed to Lotts with a cover letter requesting Lotts again to sign 
and return the closing statement and deed and to call if they had any questions. Copies of 
the letter and revised closing statement are attached as Exhibits "G" and "H". [Admitted in 
K14 of plaintiffs' Answer and H12 of plaintiffs' complaint]. 
15. On May 16,1994, Dennis Lott called Knighton and informed him that Lotts 
knew that a water assessment was about to be made against the property and they did not 
want to pay that assessment and requested a change in the trust deed to provide for that. 
Knighton informed Lott that he, Knighton, would pay that assessment when it was made. 
This information was conveyed to Knighton's attorney on May 20, 1994, with a request that 
he call Lotts to discuss the matter. [Knighton Affidavit, 1113]. 
16. Knighton's attorney was able to reach Lotts on May 24, 1994, when they 
requested him to prepare a new trust deed providing that Knighton pay all assessments, and 
specifically water assessments, after May 1, 1994, to have it signed by Knighton and then to 
call them by telephone so that they could turn on their fax machine and have a copy of the 
new trust deed faxed to them. [Admitted in 1116 of plaintiffs' Answer and II16 in plaintiffs' 
complaint, except as to the method of faxing the trust deed to Lotts]. 
17. Because Knighton was not able to come into his attorney's office 
immediately to sign the new trust deed, the new trust deed was mailed to him on May 27, 
1994. It was returned to Knighton's attorney on May 31, 1994. [Knighton Affidavit, 1115]. 
18. Knighton's attorney was not able to reach Lotts until June 7, 1994, when 
he was able to speak with Francine Lott. She informed him that she did not know how to 
turn the fax machine on and would have to wait until her husband was available. She was 
requested to have her husband, Dennis Lott, call when he was available. [The telephone call 
is admitted in H18 of plaintiffs' Answer but the substance of the conversation is denied]. 
19. In the evening of June 7, Dennis Lott called Knighton and told him they 
wanted to terminate the agreement. [Knighton Affidavit, If 16]. 
20. On June 9, 1994, Knighton's attorney sent to Lotts a copy of the new trust 
deed revised as requested by Lotts with a cover letter requesting that they sign and return 
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the closing statement and deed. Copies of that letter and trust deed are attached hereto as 
Exhibits T and "J". [Admitted in H20 of plaintiffs' Answer]. 
21. On June 16,1994, Lotts caused their attorney to send a letter to Knighton's 
attorney informing him that the agreement had been terminated. [Admitted in 1121 of 
plaintiffs' Answer]. 
22. By further letters of June 21, 1994, and July 8, 1994, and telephone 
discussions, the parties have not been able to resolve the matter. [Admitted in 1122 of 
plaintiffs' Answer]. 
ARGUMENT 
KNIGHTON IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES SPECIFICALLY PERFORMED AND 
TO BE AWARDED HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The agreement between the parties required that Lotts designate in advance 
the location of the closing and provide to Knighton, not less than five business days prior to 
the closing, a preliminary title report on the property. According to the agreement, the 
closing was to take place by May 1, 1994, which turned out to be a Sunday. Since Sunday 
is a legal holiday, §63-13-2(l)(a)(i), U.C.A., the closing could still take place on Monday, 
May 2, 1994.1 However, if time is not the essence of the agreement, the closing could take 
place within a reasonable time after May 2, 1994.2 The agreement between the parties in 
this case did not make time the essence of the agreement until fifteen days after the May 
1 
Section 68-3-8, U.C.A., provides that "whenever any act of a secular nature . . . is appointed 
by law or contract to be performed upon a particular day, which day falls upon a holiday, 
such act may be performed upon the next succeeding business day with the same effect as 
if it had been performed upon the day appointed." 
2 
Century 21 All Western Real Estate and Investment Inc. v. Webb. 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982), 
states that "where the executory contract contains no declaration that time is of the essence, 
the contract obligations can continue for some time beyond the agreed closing date." 
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1 closing date.3 The undisputed facts show that Lotts failed to provide a preliminary title 
report or to designate a place for closing. Upon their failure to do so, Knighton called Lotts 
on April 25, 1994, and obtained their permission to have his attorney obtain a title report 
and to prepare the necessary closing papers. The title report was ordered but was not 
delivered until May 2, 1994. Nevertheless, Knighton's attorney prepared the closing papers, 
Knighton signed a promissory note, trust deed and closing statement and left those with his 
attorney on Friday April 29, 1994, and a closing statement and warranty deed [Exhibits "E" 
and "P1] were sent to Lotts that same day with a cover letter [Exhibit "F-l"] requesting Lotts 
to sign and return those documents and to call if they had any questions. The Lotts received 
those documents by May 3 and, instead of calling Knighton's attorney, he called Knighton 
to request a copy of the note and trust deed and a new closing statement deleting charges 
for owner's assessments and closing fees. On May 6, a revised closing statement [Exhibit 
"H"] and copies of the note and trust deed [Exhibits "C" and flDM] were sent to Lotts with 
a cover letter [Exhibit "G"] again requesting Lotts to sign and return the closing statement 
and deed and to call if they had any questions. 
Thus, even though the obligation was on the Lotts to initiate the closing and to 
obtain and deliver a title report to Knighton and they defaulted in this obligation, at the 
request of the Lotts, Knighton proceeded to obtain a title report and to close the sale. He 
deposited the money he was to pay at the closing and signed all the documents on his side 
and left them with his attorney on April 29, 1994, in advance of the closing date set in the 
agreement. The documents which the Lotts were to sign were sent to them also on April 
29, 1994. The Lotts' requests for changes were accommodated and all documents sent to 
3 
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement, attached as Exhibit "A", provides in paragraph Q: 
"In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein . . . , then the 
closing date shall be extended . . . in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing 
date provided herein. Thereafter, time is of the essence." [Emphasis supplied]. This same 
clause in an earnest money sales agreement, which stipulated thirty days instead of fifteen, 
was held to have "no effect. . . where 30 days had not passed and the delay was the result 
of a mutual agreement." Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1991). 
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them by May 6, 1994, well within the fifteen days before time became the essence of the 
agreement. Keep in mind, that it was the Lotts who delayed the closing by failing to 
schedule the closing and provide the title report. Despite that, they could have signed and 
returned the documents well before fifteen days after the closing date. Instead, they waited 
until May 16, 1994, to call Knighton to request a further change in the documents-this time 
a change in the trust deed to provide that Knighton would pay all assessments against the 
property because they knew that a water assessment was about to be made against the 
property. Had they signed and returned the documents immediately, this water assessment 
would have been Knighton's obligation, since the deed would have been recorded making 
Knighton the owner responsible to pay all assessments and since the trust deed expressly 
obligated Knighton to pay all assessments. The expected water assessment, therefore, would 
not have been a problem. 
Nevertheless, Lotts requested a change in the trust deed providing that 
Knighton would pay all assessments, and specifically water assessments, after May 1, 1994, 
and requested that the revised trust deed be signed by Knighton and faxed to them for their 
review. Their instructions were followed but before a copy of the revised trust deed could 
be faxed to them, they decided they wanted to terminate the agreement. Their excuse for 
doing so was that the expected water assessment had been made against the property, which 
they paid. This obviously occurred sometime after May 24, 1994. [HU16 and 17, plaintiffs' 
complaint]. This excuse makes no sense for several reasons. First, had they returned the 
papers when they received them, the assessment would have been Knighton's obligation as 
the new owner of the property. Secondly, the revised trust deed made Knighton responsible 
for all assessments, and specifically water assessments, made after May 1,1994. [See Exhibit 
"J"]. Lotts should have signed and returned the papers, along with a copy of the water 
assessment with instructions for Knighton to pay that assessment. Thirdly, why didn't Lotts 
call to say that they had received the water assessment and to ask that Knighton be required 
to pay that as a part of the closing? Fourthly, why didn't Lotts call or otherwise give notice 
to Knighton of their intent to terminate the agreement if the closing were not completed by 
a certain date? Instead they waited until they heard from Knighton's attorney, with a 
request to turn on their fax machine so he could fax the revised trust deed, before they told 
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Knighton that they wanted to terminate the agreement. The Lotts' excuse for wanting to 
get out of this agreement simply does not hold any water. They obviously had other reasons 
of their own for wanting to terminate the agreement. 
The Lotts are now attempting to place blame for delays in closing onto 
Knighton and his attorney. That attempt is completely disingenuous in view of the 
undisputed facts in this case. The Lotts failed to schedule a closing or obtain a title report. 
When it was too late to obtain a title report and schedule a closing before May 1, 1994, the 
Lotts requested Knighton to have his attorney obtain a title report, which could not be done 
until May 2, and prepare the closing papers, which was done before the May First date. 
When Lotts first received the papers, they could have resolved all questions they had and 
obtained any revisions they wanted by calling Knighton's attorney on the telephone. Any 
changes could have been communicated instantaneously by fax if it were known that Lotts 
had a fax machine and the fax number were known. There was no reason why all questions 
could not have been cleared up within a few days. Instead, they chose to call Knighton, who 
called his attorney to have changes made and sent to Lotts by mail who then chose to wait 
before making further contact. There is an obligation of good faith and fair dealing implicit 
in every contract in the State of Utah. St. Benedict's Development v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital 811 P.2d 194,199 (Utah 1991); Zion's Properties. Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319,1321 
(Utah 1975). In this case, that requires Lotts to cooperate in closing the sale expeditiously. 
In Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980), it was held that a party who failed to 
make a payment due on May 1,1977, and informed the other party of his attempts to obtain 
the money, which other party made no complaints about the delay, and finally obtained and 
tendered the payment on February 21, 1978, was entitled to specific performance of the 
contract upon payment of the funds due. The court, in holding that the other party had 
waived strict compliance with the terms of the contract, stated, at 347: 
When parties have entered into a formal contract, such as for the 
purchase of real property, it is to be assumed that they will 
cooperate with each other in good faith for its performance, and 
one refusing to so perform, or claiming a forfeiture thereof, has 
the burden of showing justification for doing so. 
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Similarly, in Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553 (Utah 1987), when one party realized that 
a title report could not be obtained by the May 1, 1980 closing date and attempted to obtain 
an extension of the closing date, the other party did not respond and then refused to 
perform. The court, in holding that the first party was entitled to specific performance of 
the agreement, stated that "a party to a contract may not obtain an advantage from the fact 
that he is unable [or unwilling] to perform." And, in Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 846 
P.2d 1238 (Utah 1992), where a closing date in a time of the essence contract was extended 
by mutual agreement and the buyer tendered his own performance by the last agreed upon 
date, the court held that the buyer could obtain specific performance against the defaulting 
seller and stated, at 1243: 
Neither party to an agreement "can be said to be in default (and 
thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for 
specific performance) until the other party has tendered his own 
performance." Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56. In other words, "a 
party must make a tender of his own agreed performance in order 
to put the other party in default." Id.; see also Fischer v. Johnson, 
525 P.2d 45, 46-7 (Utah 1974). 
The tender cannot impose on the other party a new condition 
or requirement not already imposed by the contract. . . . If the 
law were otherwise, one could use a tender to compel the other 
party to comply with new contractual terms. 
Consistent with these principles, Knighton tendered his performance on April 
29, 1994, prior to the scheduled closing date. He paid the funds due and signed all of the 
documents to be signed by him. Everything else that had to be done to complete the closing 
was to be done by the Lotts. Every delay after that date was due to their requests for 
information or for changes in the documents. Some of those changes were not justified, such 
as requiring Knighton to pay all owner's assessments and closing fees, yet Knighton agreed 
to do so to facilitate the closing. Still the Lotts delayed the closing by failing to return the 
documents and then by requesting revision and resigning of the trust deed. Although such 
revisions were not required to make Knighton liable for the future water assessment, he 
agreed to make the change and resign the trust deed. When Knighton's attorney attempted 
to fax a copy of the revised trust deed to Lotts, they refused to cooperate and then refused 
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to perform. They now claim the right to terminate the agreement by asserting that the 
delays were the fault of Knighton and his attorney. Besides their failure to act in good faith 
and to cooperate in closing the transaction, the Lotts did not ever tender performance on 
their side. Under the principles of the foregoing cases, they cannot declare a default by 
Knighton until they have themselves tendered full and unconditional performance. Assuming 
that they had a right to terminate the agreement, they did not ever give Knighton notice that 
the transaction must be closed by a date certain or they would terminate the deal. Rather, 
without any advance notice or warning, they simply stated their intent not to perform at the 
very time Knighton was complying with their most recent demand. 
The Lotts not only caused the delays by failing to schedule a closing and to 
obtain a title report, but have failed to show good faith and cooperation when they shifted 
the burden of the closing to Knighton. Furthermore, they have demonstrated bad faith in 
demanding unjustified revisions of the documents and then refusing to perform once all the 
requested revisions had been made. They did not ever tender their own performance and 
gave no notice of their intent to terminate if the closing did not take place by a date certain. 
The only default in this matter was by Lotts. Knighton has been ready, willing and able to 
perform since April 29, 1994, and has fully and unconditionally tendered his performance. 
He is, therefore, entitled to a decree of this Court ordering the Lotts to specifically perform 
the agreement. He is further entitled to be awarded his costs and attorney's fees incurred 
in this action, which he proposes to submit to the Court by affidavit following the Court's 
ruling on this motion. 
DATED this 3 ^ day of November, 1994. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsjh 
Attorneys for Knighton 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the ^P day of November, 1994, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, to the following: 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (O) 
This Is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
IDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating, 
snlng and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, win-
oor screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, Installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit-
ting, trees and shrubs. 
ECTION. Unless otherwise Indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason 
resentatlon made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as 
jctlon. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection, 
dion shall be allowed bv Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
ER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property Including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall 
current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in 
working condition at closing. 
DITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
use of the well or wells Is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
DITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller 
owledge of any needed repairs and It meets all applicable government health and construction standards. 
ELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, 
rust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
st rate and/or deciare the entire balance due In the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally 
he sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case, 
t money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It Is understood and agreed that If provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth 
\ f herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become hull and void. 
.E INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
•nlnary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title. 
r, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agree-
loslng, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
.E INSURANCE. If title Insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued 
itle Insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be Issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and 
nbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
ess Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any 
ion charge. 
TING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer Is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing 
all existing teases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior 
\ Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objectlon(s) Is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
tNGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor now leases 
into, nor shall any substantial alterations or Improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
123 GEM Printing Co. S.L..C. Utah 
gend Yes(X) No(O) 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE: . January 27, 1994 
Jersigned Buyer 
EST MONEY, the amount of 
fl of check 
Kerry L. Knighton 
Two Hundred and*no/100-
Ralph J. Mar si' 
hereby deposits with Br&tmrmge 
"nn,J« 200.00 i 
ill be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law. 
h J . Marsh (801)531-8300 
Phone Number 
Received by 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
IPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY Is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at 
unt rv E s t a t e s , Ph . I I t n the city of zz County oi S a l t Lake 
Lot 113 
. Utah, 
3 any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
ice with Section G. Said property is owned by. Dennis A. & Franc ine G. L o t t as sellers, and is more particularly described 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
K APPLICABLE BOXES: 
IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY 
IPROVED REAL PROPERTY 
H Vacant Lot 
D Commercial 
• Vacant Acreage • Other 
• Residential • Condo D Other 
ncluded Hems. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property. 
following personal property shall also be Included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: N o n e 
Excluded items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale: N o n e 
CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price* 
ublic sewer D connected 
*o tank • connected 
sanitary system 
D well • connected D other 
D irrigation water / secondary system 
# of shares Company 
D TV antenna 
shall be furnished at the expense of B u y e r 
D master antenna • prewired 
• connected 
S electricity • connected 
ED ingress & egress by private easement 
• dedicated road • paved 
D curb and gutter 
D other rights 
iublic water • connected 
riMM* 0 connected 
Survey. A certified survey I? 
Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual Inspection of the;property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical 
ndition, except: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
.prior to closing, • shall not be furnished. 
JRCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is T h i r t y F i v e T h o u s a n d h n o / 1 0 0 
r ; Dollars ($ 3 5 , 0 0 0 _ 0 0 ) which shall be paid as follows* 
3 0 . 0 0 which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: 
D O . 0 0 representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
_NA representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer, 
which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ • 
which include: • principal; • interest; • taxes; D insurance; • condo fees; D other . 
J_L 
JJA. 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears Interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which Include: Q principal;, • interest; D taxes; D insurance; • condo fees; D other 
representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows: 
1^500-JXL- Other 
5,000.00 
Promissory note payable $4bi.4« montniy commencing one montn irom closing, 
interest at vi per annum, secured by Trust Deed, payable in lull upon receipt of 
financing'for construction of a home, prepayment without penalty. TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
t»-ydr is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts 
jsume'and/or procure same and this'offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees 
lake application within NA days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at 
rtterest rate not to exceed NA %. If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within N A <jayS after Seller's acceptance 
nis Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice. Seller agrees to pay up to N A mortgage loan discount 
N A i„ *AA\*\nn collar onrooc tn nnv/ <fc N A to be used for Buver's other loan costs. 
)1TI0N AND CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. Seller represents that Seller ££ holds title to the property in fee simple D is purchasing the property under a real 
act. Transfer of Seller's ownership Interest shall be made as set forth In Section S. Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title to the property, subject 
es and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by G£a current policy of title Insurance in the amount of purchase price • an abstract of title brought current, 
s opinion (See Section H). 
.CTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to Inspect the title to the subject properly prior to closing. Buyer shall take title 
/ existing restrictive covenants, Including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer U has U has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement. 
•|NG OF TITLE. Title shall vest In Buyer as follows: K e r r y L . K n i g h t o n 
.ERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted: . 
isements over thft p rope r t y nt.hp-r than u t i l i t y ^n.currents. 
to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following:, 
:IAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer Is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
sing: _ J 3 u X f i £ - £ k t a l ^ ^ 
upon-^eceipt-^f~survey~but^no^latGr~than 
SING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closedSgn=gr=bBtere M a y — 1 . 19 - 9 4 — a t a reasonable location to be designated by 
|ect to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
nent. Prorations set forth In Section R shall be made as of Q date of possession • date of closing D other 
closing SESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on 
NCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent 
lling agent 
TIA 
unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer, 
. represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
closure of the agency relationship(s) was provided to him/her. ( ) ( ) Buyer's initials ( ) ( ) Seller's initials. 
ERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN 
D BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. 
IEEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall 
JAM/PM) F f i h . 1 0 , 19 _ 9 d - . to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST 
'-2-* /Vruv^W 
mature) 0 
i the 
^Sg*3*^*** -fg^outW^gs-te^a^^p^OT—^J 
•ignature) (Date) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
NE 
PTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
•CTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer. (Seller's Initials) 
JTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions ortTTodjfications^as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
s said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until £100 ( i f i /PM) /^fe&ZM't^ty / f f , 19 ^ v 1 
d below. 
y^ftt)</£ ^r /K/U/r^r /fid/^d/ <rD 
e until ^ 
T/m. 
.to accept the terms 
r&. cs&ri _Av>^ Pty/ri&Jr s\*r~ 
QS/AIS jX6ce*>md-< ?ZOJ\.'*a .. "7" r 
~2/fi%&r-/%t>7-rt7'/ X^/bty ~3tt6t?£>timL./2, z,rs/j^j-^<i<- /jt/wxr 
Cl/AsO.LMJL- Vs fl/ll /ffl 
(Time) 
¥- A. 
( A d d r e s a C ^ / j L / ^ P r ' / M '(Phone) " (SSNH"AX ID) 
3{** /> fifaA nl M /VC3 / ? ¥'$> s" /^3 </C r/ 93X 
(Date) (Time) ( A d d r e s g J ^ ^ e / ^ ^ ^ Signature) 
3NE: 
EPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
ECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. (Buyer's Initials) 
NTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
(Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
"7 Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
w requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing ail signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed). 
. acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: 
*E OF SELLER SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
Date 
Date 
I Dersonallv caused a final CODV of the foranoinn Anraamfint hafirinn all slnnatnrac; tn ho mailAH on J-FK IW 
Dale 
HITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on its behalf warrants) 
r authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller. 
APLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
lor negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree-
ils Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. 
UNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement 
Bssly modified or excluded therein. 
FAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
titute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or If this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition 
lgency to which the.sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to 
Joth parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements heroin contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
g a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap-
law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in-
ler action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer -and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the 
money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall 
pleaded into court In accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's 
:urred by the principal broker in bringing such action. 
3ROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogatethis Agreement. 
SK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property between 
e hereof and the.date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism; flood; earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
3f the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property 
i closing or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property Is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees In writing to repair 
ace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed. 
IME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
iod, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing 
•jail be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more'than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein. Thereafter, 
of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
ed by all parties to the transaction. 
!• nSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (V2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs of providing 
ice or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest 
^d obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
sing. 
IEAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement Is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex-
d herein. If this Agreement Is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest.under an existing real estate contract, Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, 
ining Seller's assignment of said contract In form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
J contract therein. 
NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
J event with respect to which notice is required. If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given 
[omatlcally terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect. If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the 
r or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be.considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice. 
BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office. 
DAYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays. 
E FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
The property subject to the attached Earnest Money Receipt and Sales Agreement 
is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and is known and described as follows: 
Lot 113, Area D, Hi-Country Estates Phase II, more particularly described as 
follows: 
Beginning South 870.83 feet and East 2499.13 feet from the West Quarter 
Corner of Section 21, Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; and running thence North IV 22*15" West 582.27 feet; 
thence North 18• 3745" East 353.01 feet; 
thence Easterly along a curve to the right 704 feet; 
thence South 53 °A^29U East 304.13 feet; 
thence South 36° ir31M West 649.01 feet to the point of 
beginning, containing 10.48 acres. 
BUYER'S CLOSING STATEMENT 
SELLERS: Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. Lott 
BUYER: Kerry L. Knighton 
PROPERTY: Lot 113, Hi Country Estates Phase II 
Sales Price 
Earnest Money Paid 
Balance payable on promissory note 
Taxes have not been prorated 
Recording warranty deed 
Closing fee 
Balance due from Buyer 
$ 1,000.00 
31,500.00 
32,500.00 
2,665.00 
35,165.00 
$35,000.00 
15.00 
150.00 
35,165.00 
35,165.00 
The above statement is approved and disbursement of funds as outlined herein 
authorized this day of May, 1994. 
BUYER: 
•^ • ryu^AiJv^. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON 
ET^itit "&' 
PROMISSORY NDTE 
$31,500.00 May 1, 1994 
FOR VMUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to pay to DENNIS A. 
I0TT and FRANCINE G. L0TT, or order, Thirty-One-Thousand-Five Hundred and 
No/100 Dollars ($31,500.00), together with interest from date at the rate of 
nine (9.0%) percent per annum on the unpaid balance, payable as follows, 
viz: 
$461.48 or more per month commencing on June 1, 1994, 
until the entire principal balance, together with 
interest thereon, has been paid in full; 
in lawful money of the United States of America, negotiable and payable at 
the home of payee without defalcation or discount. All payments hereinabove 
provided for shall be applied first on accrued interest and balance to 
reduction of principal. The entire unpaid principal balance, together with 
interest thereon, shall be payable in full upon receipt by maker of 
financing for construction of a home on the property described on the trust 
deed which secures this note. Prepayment of this note may be made at any 
time without penalty. 
In the event of default in the payment of any installment of prin-
cipal or interest within fifteen (15) days of the due date thereof as herein 
stipulated, it shall be optional with the legal holder of this note to 
declare the entire principal sum hereof due and payable and proceedings may 
at once be instituted for the recovery of the same by law, with accrued 
interest and costs, including reasonable attorneyfs fees. 
The maker and endorsers severally waive presentment, protest and 
demand and waive notice of protest, demand and of dishonor and nonpayment of 
this note, and expressly agree that this note, or any payment thereunder, 
may be extended from time to time without in any way affecting the liability 
of the maker and endorsers thereof. 
/ \M\/vw s2L /Y^4{/(p\ 
KERRY $ KNIGHTON ° 
^ y k i t it ^ 
TRUST DEED 
THIS TRUST DEED is made this _ / day of May, 1994, between KERRY L 
KNIGHTON, as Trustor, whose address is 5890 South Kingston Way, Murray, Utah, 84107, 
RALPH J. MARSH, Attorney at Law, as Trustee, and DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE 
G. LOTT, his wife, as Beneficiaries. 
TRUSTOR HEREBY CONVEY AND WARRANT TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property situated in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah: 
Lot 113, Area D, Hi-Country Estates Phase II, more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning South 870.83 feet and East 2499.13 feet from the West Quarter Corner of 
Section 21, Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
runningthence North 71° 22*15" West 582.27 feet; 
thence North 18° 37*45" East 353.01 feet to a point on a 375.00 foot radius curve to the 
right (radius point bears South 71°22*15" East); 
thence Easterly along said curve an arc distance of 704 feet (delta angle 107° 33*46"); 
thence South 53°48'29" East 304.13 feet; 
thence South 36° 11*31" West 649.01 feet to the point of beginning, containing 10.48 
acres. 
SUBJECT TO a 25 foot right-of-way along the Northeasterly and Northwesterly sides. 
ALSO SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH all easements and rights-of-way and the 
rights to use the roadways of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision. 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a 
promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $31,500.00, payable to the 
order of Beneficiaries at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and 
payment of any sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above property, to pay all 
charges and assessments on water or water stock used on or with said property, not to 
commit waste, to maintain adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay 
all costs and expenses of collection (including trustee's and attorney's fees in the event of 
default in payment of the indebtedness secured hereby) and to pay reasonable trustee's fees 
for any of the services performed by Trustee hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof. 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any Notice of Default and of any 
Notice of Sale hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
KERRY L. KNlGflTON 
F*LJli + "A" 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
On the / day of May, 1994, personally appeared before me KERRY L. 
KNIGHTON signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed 
the same. i^ ^^ w. 
NOTARY PUBLKt 
Nctery Public J 
HALPH J. MARSH 5 
C3 So. Main Street # 800 I 
Salt Lako City. Utah 04101 . 
My Commission Expires 8 
Soptomhar24»l094 I 
State of Utah J 
mm m» ** mm tm+m«mm» mm m$ 
SELLERS' CLOSING STATEMENT 
SELLERS: Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. Lott 
BUYER: Kerry L. Knighton 
PROPERTY: Lot 113, Hi Country Estates Phase II 
Sales Price 
Balance payable on promissory note 
Taxes have not been prorated 
Sellers' share of 1994 Owners' Assessment 
Premium for title insurance policy 
Recording trust deed 
Closing fee 
Balance due Sellers 
$31,500.00 
100.00 
290.00 
15.00 
150.00 
32,055.00 
2,945.00 
$35,000.00 
35,000.00 
35,000.00 35,000.00 
The above statement is approved and disbursement of funds as outlined herein 
authorized this day of May, 1994. 
SELLERS: 
DENNIS A. LOTT 
FRANCINE G. LOTT 
I L4- " i : >' 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
Kerry L. Knighton 
5890 South Kingston Way 
Murray, Utah 84107 
WARRANTY DEEP 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. LOTT, his wife, of Chalfont, State of 
Pennsylvania, as grantors, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to KERRY L. 
KNIGHTON, as grantee, of Murray, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, for the sum 
of Ten and No/100 Dollars, and for other good and valuable consideration, the 
following described tract of land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
Lot 1.1.3, Area D, Hi-Country Estates Phase IT, more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning South 870-83 feet and East 2499.13 feet from the West Quarter Corner 
of Section 21, Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
and running ' thence North 71°22'15" West 582.27 feet; 
thence North 18° 3745" East 353.01 feet to a point on a 375.00 
foot radius curve to the right (radius 
point bears South 71°22'15" East); 
thence Easterly along said curve an arc distance of 704 feet (delta 
angle 107*33'46n); 
thence South 53* 48'29" East 304.13 feet; 
thence South 36° H'31" West 649.01 feet to the point of beginning, 
containing 10.48 acres. 
Subject to a 25 foot right-of-way along the Northeasterly and Northwesterly sides. 
Also subject to and together with all easements and rights-of-way and the rights 
to use the roadways of Hi County Estates Subdivision. 
WITNESS the hands of said grantor, this day of May A.D. 1994. 
DENNIS h. LOTT 
FRANCINE G. LOTT 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
County of 
On the clay of May, 1994, personally appeared before me DENNIS 
A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. LOTT, his wife, signers of the above instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
L v u . U J 
B A C K M A N , CLARK & M A R S H 
ATTHRNKYS AT LAW 
BOO MC'.lNTYRK BlMl.lMNC; 
f>8 SOUTH MAIN 
SALT LAKH CITY, UTAH 8 4 m i 
April 29, 1994 
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS A. LOTT 
3606 Bristol Road 
Chalfont, Pennsylvania 18914 3447 
Re: Lott/Knighton Closing 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Lott: 
Enclosed please find a warranty deed and closing statement to be signed by you 
and returned to me in order that the closing of your sale to Kerry L. Knighton may be 
completed. Please have the warranty deed notarized before returning it to me. 
Mr. Knighton has signed the prommissory note for the balance due you and the 
trust deed to secure payment of that balance. As soon as the warranty deed is 
returned, I will have it recorded along with the trust deed back to you and the original 
promissory note and the balance due you as shown on the closing statement will be sent 
to you. 
If you have any questions, please call me at the above number. 
Yours truly, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
RJM/rm 
b*Lk'+ 'T-l ' 
KAI.IMI |. MAKSII 
CAUY A. SAUCKNT 
OAVIH H. HOYCL 
T K L I : P I I O N I : ( H O I ) S : H . O H J 
I-AX NUMIIliK (1101) :m:i*24'20 
B A C K M A N , CLARK & M A R S H 
ATTOUNKYS AT LAW 
BOO MC:INTYRI-: Bim.niNc 
6R S O U T H M A I N 
S A L T L A K H C I T Y . U T A H H 4 i m 
May 6, 1994 
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS A. LOTT 
3606 Bristol Road 
Chalfont, Pennsylvania 18914 3447 
Re: Lott/ICnighton Closing 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Lott: 
Mr. Knighton has requested that I send to you a copy of the promissory note 
which he has signed to close the above transaction. A copy of that is enclosed for your 
information. Also at his request, I have enclosed a new closing statement eliminating 
the owner's assessment and the closing fee. Please sign and return*-that along with the 
notarized warranty deed. 
For your information, the owner's assessment is a lien against the property itself 
and is due from the current owner of the property. Therefore, once the deed from you 
is recorded, all future assessments will be due from the new owner and you will have 
no liability therefor. 
Again, if you have any questions, please call. 
Yours truly, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
RJM/rm 
I.1M! J. MAUSU 
AKY A. SAKCliNT 
D A v m n. noYr.is 
Ti i i . i iPHONii (noi l r>:n-»:ui(i 
KAX N U M I U L R (M01) :wi:i-242H 
Etfliibit <S 
SELLERS' CLOSING STATEMENT 
SELLERS: Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. Lott 
BUYER: Kerry L. Knighton 
PROPERTY: Lot 113, Hi Country Estates Phase IT 
Sales Price 
Balance payable on promissory note 
Taxes have not been prorated 
Premium for title insurance policy 
Recording trust deed 
Balance due Sellers 
$31,500.00 
290.00 
15.00 
31,805.00 
3,195.00 
$35,000.00 
35,000.00 
35,000.00 35,000.00 
The above statement is approved and disbursement of funds as outlined herein 
authorized this day of May, 1994. 
SELLERS: 
DENNIS A. LOTT 
FRANCINE G. LOTT 
tich»bw H 
•<AI.P1I |. M A K S I I 
.AKY A. SAUC.IiNT 
D A V I D H. HDYf.K 
•fiii .\:v\ I O N K (HOI) 5:n -H:»OO 
FAX Nt lMHKK (H01) :if»:i-24 2l l 
B A C K M A N , CLARK & M A R S H 
A ' l T O K N K Y S AM* LAW 
BOO MC. INTYRK Bun.mNc: 
6ft S O U T H M A I N 
S A L T L A K H C I T Y , U T A H 841 m 
June 9, 1994 
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS A. LOTT 
3606 Bristol Road 
Chalfont, Pennsylvania 18914 3447 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Lott: 
Re: Lott/Knighton Closing 
After attempting to reach you to send you a copy of the new Trust Deed by fax 
as you requested, Mr. Knighton has informed me that you now desire to terminate the 
agreement to sell the property to him. This is most disappointing in view of the efforts 
I and Mr. Knighton have expended to satisfy your requests in this closing. 
You have complained about the delays in getting this matter closed yet you have 
not considered that those delays were caused on your end. Mr. Knighton was prepared 
to close on May 1 as agreed but you had not delivered a title commitment. Closing 
papers were sent to you on two different occasions with a cover letter asking that you 
call if you had any questions. You did not call on either occasion but waited for Mr. 
Knighton to call you to find out why you had not returned the papers. The funds have 
been on deposit for delivery to you as soon as the papers are returned. 
I have enclosed a copy of the new Trust Deed with the changes you requested. 
I request that you immediately return the signed closing statement and warranty deed 
so that this matter may be concluded. Otherwise, Mr. TCnighton has indicated his intent 
to pursue legal action to enforce the agreement. A Notice of Interest has been 
recorded against the property to prevent you from selling the property to other parties 
in the meantime. I look forward to your return of the papers. 
Yours truly, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. M&rsh 
/X_A_A^' 
RJM/rm 
cc: Kerry L. Knichton / - y 1A i li iT ' \ 
T*-)* 
TRUST DEED 
THIS TRUST DEED is made this _[ day of May, 1994, between KERRY L 
KNIGHTON, as Trustor, whose address is 5890 South Kingston Way, Murray, Utah, 84107, 
RALPH J. MARSH, Attorney at Law, as Trustee, and DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE 
G. LOTT, his wife, as Beneficiaries. 
TRUSTOR HEREBY CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property situated in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah: 
Lot 113, Area D, Hi-Country Estates Phase II, more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning South 870.83 feet and East 2499.13 feet from the West Quarter Corner of 
Section 21, Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
runningthence North 71* 22*15" West 582.27 feet; 
thence North 18•3745" East 353.01 feet to a point on a 375.00 foot radius curve to the 
right (radius point bears South 71 ° 22'15" East); 
thence Easterly along said curve an arc distance of 704 feet (delta angle 107°33'46M); 
thence South 53 • 48*29" East 304.13 feet; 
thence South 3 6 ° l l ' 3 r West 649.01 feet to the point of beginning, containing 10.48 
acres. 
SUBJECT TO a 25 foot right-of-way along the Northeasterly and Northwesterly sides. 
ALSO SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH all easements and rights-of-way and the 
rights to use the roadways of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision. 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a 
promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $31,500.00, payable to the 
order of Beneficiaries at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and 
payment of any sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above property from May 1, 
1994, to the extent not already paid by Beneficiaries, to pay all charges and assessments on 
water or water stock used on or with said property from May 1, 1994, not to commit waste, 
to maintain adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay all costs and 
expenses of collection (including trustee's and attorney's fees in the event of default in 
payment of the indebtedness secured hereby) and to pay reasonable trustee's fees for any 
of the services performed by Trustee hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof. 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any Notice of Default and of any 
Notice of Sale hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
KERR^f L. KNIGHTON** 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
Notary Public ; 
RALPH J. MARSH I 
«fr6o. wain Street # GOO l 
Salt tako City, Utah 84101 ! 
My Commission Expires 1 
September 24,1994 I 
State of Utah I 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and | 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, | 
Plaintiffs, | 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940904735 PR 
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON, being first duly sworn, on oath, states as follows: 
1. I am one of the defendants in this action and the plaintiff in the consolidated 
action Civil No. 940904746 and I have personal knowledge of the facts hereinafter stated. 
2. On January 29, 1994, I sent to Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. Lott 
(hereinafter "Lotts") a written offer to purchase certain real property for $35,000.00, payable 
$200.00 as earnest money, $3300.00 down payment at closing and $31,500.00 on a promissory 
note secured by a trust deed against the property. The real property to be purchased is 
1 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, known as Lot 113, Hi-Country Estates, Phase 
II. 
3. On February 7, 1994, Lotts sent back the agreement accepting the offer 
subject to changing the amount of earnest money to $1,000.00 and reducing the down 
payment to $2,500.00. 
4. This counteroffer was accepted by me on February 17, 1994, by my signing 
the counteroffer and returning a copy to the Lotts. 
5. The agreement between the parties is an Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to the MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herewith (hereinafter 
"MEMORANDUM"). 
6. The Lotts did not ever contact me to tell me where or when the closing of 
this transaction would take place and they did not ever provide to me a preliminary title 
report within five days prior to May 1, 1994, or at any time since. 
7. I, therefore, contacted Lotts by telephone and obtained their permission, on 
the evening of April 25, 1994, to have my attorney obtain a preliminary title report and 
prepare the necessary closing papers. 
8. I contacted my attorney the next day and requested that he order a title 
report and prepare the closing papers. He ordered a preliminary title report but did not 
received until Monday, May 2, 1994. 
9. I deposited the down payment with my attorney and signed a promissory 
note, trust deed and closing statement and left those with my attorney on Friday, April 29, 
1994. Copies of those documents are attached as Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" to the 
MEMORANDUM. 
10. According to my instructions, my attorney also prepared a closing statement 
and warranty deed, which I examined, and sent those to Lotts on Friday, April 29,1994, with 
a cover letter requesting Lotts to sign and return those documents and to call if they had any 
questions. Copies of those documents are attached as Exhibits "E", "F" and "F-1M to the 
MEMORANDUM. 
2 
11. On May 3, 1994, Dennis Lott called me to request that a copy of the note 
and trust deed be sent to them and that charges for owner's assessments and a closing fee 
be deleted from the closing statement. I called my attorney the next day and passed this 
request on to him. 
12. On May 6, 1994, my attorney sent a revised closing statement and copies 
of the note and trust deed to Lotts with a cover letter requesting Lotts again to sign and 
return the closing statement and deed and to call if they had any questions. Copies of the 
letter and revised closing statement are attached as Exhibits "G" and "Htf to the 
MEMORANDUM. 
13. On May 16,1994, Dennis Lott called me and informed me that Lotts knew 
that a water assessment was about to be made against the property and they did not want 
to pay that assessment and requested a change in the trust deed to provide for that. I 
informed Lott that I would pay that assessment when it was made. This information was 
conveyed to my attorney on May 20, 1994, with a request that he call Lotts to discuss the 
matter. 
14. My attorney called me on May 27, 1994, and informed me that he was 
unable to reach Lotts until May 24, 1994, when they requested him to prepare a new trust 
deed providing that I pay all assessments, and specifically water assessments, after May 1, 
1994, to have it signed by me and then to call them by telephone so that they could turn on 
their fax machine and have a copy of the new trust deed faxed to them. 
15. Because I was not able to go into my attorney's office immediately to sign 
the new trust deed, the new trust deed was mailed to me on May 27, 1994. It was returned 
to my attorney on May 31, 1994. 
16. In the evening of June 7, Dennis Lott called me and told me they wanted 
to terminate the agreement. 
17. One June 9, 1994, at my request, my attorney sent to Lotts a copy of the 
new trust deed revised as requested by Lotts with a cover letter requesting that they sign and 
return the closing statement and deed. Copies of that letter and trust deed are attached as 
Exhibits "I" and "J" to the MEMORANDUM. 
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18. On June 16, 1994, Lotts caused their attorney to send a letter to my 
attorney, which I have examined, informing him that the agreement had been terminated. 
19. At no time prior to this letter did Lotts inform me that they would 
terminate the agreement or that I must close the transaction by a certain date or they would 
terminate the agreement. At all times prior to that letter, I was cooperating in making 
changes in the documents as requested by Lotts. 
20. I deposited the down payment with my attorney, who was asked to close 
the transaction, on April 29, 1994, and I have been ready, willing and able to complete the 
transaction and to pay all amounts due according to the agreement at all times since. 
DATED this 20 day of November, 1994. 
A W W C* tt KERRY L. KNIGHTON 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ day of November, 1994. 
d>^^\_ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the ^ day of November, 1994, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants. 
LOTTS9 REVISED MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS1 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940904735PR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiffs Dennis A. Lott and Franclne G. Lott (MMr. and Mrs. 
Lott" ) submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment: 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS1 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Mr. & Mrs. Lott respond to the Defendants' 
Statement of Facts as follows: 
1. Undisputed. 
2. Undisputed. 
3. Undisputed. 
4. Undisputed. 
5. Undisputed. 
6. Undisputed. These isolated quotes from the Earnest Money 
Agreement, however, are not all of the provisions relevant to the 
resolution of the pending Motion. 
7. Disputed. At Mr. Knighton's request, Mr. & Mrs. Lott 
agreed that the closing could occur through Mr. Knighton's 
attorney, Ralph Marsh. Previously, Mr. & Mrs. Lott had chosen Utah 
Title Company (whom we used when we purchased the land in the first 
place) to be the closing agent. As a result, Mr. Knighton agreed 
to pay all closing fees, as reflected by the removal of all closing 
fees from the Closing Statement attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of Dennis Lott.1 
8. Disputed. When Mr. Knighton stated that he wanted to use 
Mr. Marsh as a closing agent, he also stated that Mr. Marsh would 
handle all ordinary work associated with the preparation for 
closing, as would any title company, which Mr. & Mrs. Lott were 
lead to believe included obtaining a title report, as Utah Title 
would have done if it handled the closing.2 
9. Disputed. On the April 26, 1994, Mr. & Mrs. Lott called 
Mr. Knighton. They told him they were amazed that the title report 
had not been obtained. They told him to have Mr. Marsh obtain the 
title report because they were living 2,000 miles away from where 
Dennis Lott Affidavit f 3; Francine Lott Affidavit 1f 4. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit IT 4; Francine Lott Affidavit f 5. 
ii 
the closing was going to occur, and they understood that the 
closing agent was supposed to handle this sort of matter.3 
Although under the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement Mr. & Mrs. 
Lott were responsible for obtaining the title insurance, Mr. 
Knighton and Mr. Marsh agreed to assume this responsibility because 
they resided in Pennsylvania and title insurance for the property 
could be obtained shortly after requesting it. Mr. Knighton and 
Mr. Marsh failed to obtain the title insurance in a timely manner.4 
10. Undisputed, hut when the title report was ordered is not 
disclosed. Mr. & Mrs. Lott understand that it only takes 24 hours 
to obtain a title report, yet the title report was not obtained 
until May 2, 1994.5 
11. Until discovery in this matter is complete, Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott are not in a position to either admit or dispute these 
facts. 
12. Undisputed. 
13. Undisputed• 
14. Undisputed• 
15. Disputed. Only a minor change in the Trust Deed and Note 
was necessary to correct the problem created by Mr. Knighton's 
Dennis Lott Affidavit V 6. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit V 7. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit V 8. 
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delay, and this request was made to Mr, Knighton on May 16, 1994.6 
It apparently took Mr. Knighton until Friday, May 20, 1994, to 
contact Mr. Marsh concerning Mr. & Mrs. Lott's request, because, 
according to Mr. Knighton, Mr. Marsh was out of town.7 When Mr. 
Lott spoke with Mr. Knighton on the telephone on May 23, 1994, Mr. 
Lott told him that he was becoming increasingly frustrated by the 
delays and that, if the matter was not brought to closure 
immediately, Mr. Lott would call the whole thing off. Mr. 
Knighton acknowledged that the first payment under the Promissory 
Note was due in one week, on June 1, 1994. Mr. Knighton said by 
June 1, 1994, the deal would be closed and we would receive the 
first payment.8 On May 23, 1994, Mr. Knighton called Mr. Lott and 
asked him to call Mr. Marsh "so that we could get it right this 
time."9 
16. Disputed. On May 24, 1994, Mr. & Mrs. Lott called 
Mr. Marsh on three separate occasions. Mrs. Lott called 
Mr. Marsh's office on two separate occasions, asked for Mr. Marsh 
and was disconnected.10 Mr. Lott was finally able to "reach" Mr. 
Marsh on his third attempt after he arrived home from work that 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 18. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1T 19; Francine Lott Affidavit V 14. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 20. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit V 21. 
Francine Lott Affidavit 1f 15. 
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afternoon.11 When Mr. Lott spoke with Mr. Marsh on May 24, 1994, 
however, contrary to Mr. Knighton's representation, Mr. Marsh told 
him that, although he had been in and out of his office during the 
previous week, for the most part, he had been in his office. 
During this conversation, Mr. Lott requested that Mr. Marsh alter 
the documents so that Mr. Knighton was liable for all assessments 
levied after May 1, 1994.12 
17. Until discovery in this matter is complete, Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott are not in a position to either admit or dispute these 
facts. It is interesting to note, however, that a postal exchange 
of document is a very slow procedure given the "time is of the 
essence" clause and the frustration Mr. & Mrs. Lott expressed to 
both Mr. Knighton and Mr. Marsh. No explanation is offered as to 
why Mr. "Knighton was not able to come into his attorney's office 
immediately to sign the new trust deed." 
18. Disputed. Mrs. Lott can operate the facsimile machine, 
which has a simple on/off switch; the substance of the conversation 
follows: On June 7, 1994, Mr. Marsh called Mrs. Lott and informed 
her that he finally had made the changes to the Trust Deed, had the 
Trust Deed ready and wanted to send it to Mr. & Mrs. Lott by 
facsimile. Mrs. Lott told Mr. Marsh that they were no longer 
willing to close because it had now been three weeks since 
Dennis Lott Affidavit V 22. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1T 23. 
v 
requesting the change to the Trust Deed from Mr. Knighton and two 
weeks since Mr. Lott spoke with Mr. Marsh. Mrs. Lott Informed Mr. 
Marsh that, since requesting the changes from Mr. Marsh, a $2,800 
assessment was levied against the subject property, which Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott received and paid. Also, Mrs. Lott informed Mr. Marsh 
that, because the first payment on the Promissory Note was due on 
June 1, 1994, and they neither received the payment or the 
corrected Trust Deed by that time we assumed the deal was off. 
Mrs. Lott asked Mr. Marsh why it had taken so long to make the 
changes in the Trust Deed and Mr. Marsh told Mrs. Lott that it had 
taken Mr. Marsh several days to make the change, several more days 
to have Mr. Knighton sign the corrected document and still more 
days to obtain Mr. & Mrs. Lott's telephone number to arrange for 
the facsimile transmission of the Trust Deed to us. Mrs. Lott told 
Mr. Marsh she did not believe the delays were reasonable.13 
19• Undisputed• 
20• Undisputed. 
21. Undisputed. 
22. Undisputed• 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Mr. & Mrs. Lott submit the following Statement of 
Additional Material Facts: 
Francine Lott Affidavit % 17. 
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1. Mrs. Lott spoke with Mr. Knighton several times during 
the negotiation of the sale of the real property which forms the 
subject matter of this lawsuit. These conversations began in late 
December of 1993 or early January of 1994. Mrs. Lott told 
Defendant Kerry L. Knighton ("Mr. Knighton") the following, among 
other things: 
(a) A new water tank was being constructed to provide 
water to our property, as well as others, and that we 
expected a water assessment in late Spring, but did not 
want to be responsible for paying it. 
(b) The vote for the water assessment was to take place 
in Spring of 1994. 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott wanted to close any sale within the next month, 
which they felt was reasonable because no outside financing was 
necessary. Mr. Knighton said that any closing could not occur 
until Spring because he needed a survey of the property and a 
percolation test. He said he would order the test and survey 
immediately, but would like to extend the closing until May 1, 
1994, to allow for inclement weather. Mr. & Mrs. Lott agreed, but 
reiterated our concerns about waiting that long.14 
2. Mr. & Mrs. Lott, as Sellers, and Kerry L. Knighton, as 
Buyer, entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement dated 
Francine Lott Affidavit V 2. 
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January 27, 1994, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "AH to the 
Complaint in the above-referenced case.15 
3. At Mr. Knighton's request, Mr. & Mrs. Lott agreed that 
the closing could occur through Mr. Knighton's attorney, Ralph 
Marsh. Previously, Mr. £ Mrs. Lott had chosen Utah Title Company 
(whom we used when we purchased the land in the first place) to be 
the closing agent. As a result, Mr. Knighton agreed to pay all 
closing fees, as reflected by the removal of all closing fees from 
the Closing Statement attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of 
Dennis Lott.16 
4. When Mr. Knighton stated that he wanted to use Mr. Marsh 
as a closing agent, he also stated that Mr. Marsh would handle all 
ordinary work associated with the preparation for closing, as would 
any title company, which Mr. & Mrs. Lott were lead to believe 
included obtaining a title report, as Utah Title would have done if 
it handled the closing.17 
5. The sale was contingent upon Mr. Knighton's successful 
completion of a percolation test and a survey on the property. On 
April 26, 1994, Mr. Knighton informed Mr. & Mrs. Lott that the 
survey was not yet complete and that he would waive the percolation 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1T 2; Francine Lott Affidavit f 3. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit IT 3; Francine Lott Affidavit V 4. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1T 4; Francine Lott Affidavit ir 5. 
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test, although Mr. & Mrs. Lott never received any such waiver in 
writing.18 
6. Mr. Knighton called Mr. £ Mrs. Lott twice on April 25, 
1994: the first time he called, Mr. Lott was not home, and the 
second time around 11:00 p.m., during which conversation Mr. Lott 
told Mr. Knighton that Mr. Lott would call him the next night. On 
the April 26, 1994, Mr. & Mrs. Lott called Mr. Knighton. They told 
him they were amazed that the title report had not been obtained. 
They told him to have Mr. Marsh obtain the title report because 
they were living 2,000 miles away from where the closing was going 
to occur, and they understood that the closing agent was supposed 
to handle this sort of matter.19 
7. Although under the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott were responsible for obtaining the title insurance, 
Mr. Knighton and Mr. Marsh agreed to assume this responsibility 
because they resided in Pennsylvania and title insurance for the 
property could be obtained shortly after requesting it. Mr. 
Knighton and Mr. Marsh failed to obtain the title insurance in a 
timely manner.20 
Dennis Lott Affidavit V 5. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit % 6. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit f 7. 
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B. Mr. £ Mrs. Lott understand that it only takes 24 hours to 
obtain a title report, yet the title report was not obtained until 
May 2, 1994.21 
9. Paragraph 8 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
establishes the closing for the sale of the subject property to 
occur no later than May 1, 1994. Further, Paragraph Q of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement establishes that time is of the 
essence for the closing of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement.22 
10. On April 29, 1994, Mr. Knighton telephoned and told Mr. 
& Mrs. Lott that all was in order and the survey was complete. 
Mr. Knighton and Mr. Lott discussed the possibility of extending 
the closing date, which Mr. Knighton told Mr. Lott was not 
necessary based upon advise he received from Mr. Marsh.23 
11. Mr. Knighton did not tender performance by the agreed 
closing date of May 1, 1994.24 
12. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement did not close on May 1, 
1994, the agreed upon closing date, due solely to delays caused by 
Mr. Knighton or his attorney, Mr. Marsh.25 
Dennis Lott Affidavit V 8. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit H 9; Francine Lott Affidavit f 6. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 10. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit f 11; Francine Lott Affidavit 1T 7. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit f 12; Francine Lott Affidavit V 8. 
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13. Mr. & Mrs. Lott did not receive a copy of the documents 
they were required to execute pursuant to the terms of the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement until May 3, 1994, two days after the 
scheduled closing. These documents were transmitted utilizing 
regular mail under cover of Mr. Marsh's letter dated April 29, 
1994, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B" to Dennis Lott's 
Affidavit, but that letter did not enclose copies of the requisite 
Note and Trust Deed contemplated by the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement.26 
14. Mr. Lott Immediately requested copies of the Note and 
Trust Deed, but did not receive them until May 9, 1994, eight days 
after the scheduled closing.27 
15. Paragraph C in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement makes 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott liable for all assessments up through the date of 
the closing. Mr. Marsh, acting as Mr. Knighton's agent, stated in 
a letter to Mr. & Mrs. Lott dated May 6, 1994, which they received 
on May 9, 1994, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "C" to 
Dennis Lott's Affidavit, that "once the deed from [Mr. & Mrs. Lott] 
is recorded, all future assessments will be due from the new owner 
and [Mr. & Mrs. Lott] will have no liability therefor." Mr. 
Marsh's May 6, 1994, letter enclosed a copy of the Promissory Note 
and Trust Deed. Mr. & Mrs. Lott, however, were concerned that this 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 13; Francine Lott Affidavit V 9. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit V 14; Francine Lott Affidavit V 10. 
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subjected us to liability for any assessments levied after the 
agreed upon closing date of May 1, 1994, but before the recording 
of the Trust Deed.28 
16. After Mr. & Mrs. Lott received the Promissory Note and 
Trust Deed required by the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott were required to seek the advice of counsel to determine 
the Impact of assessments levied after the closing date of May 1, 
1994, but before the recording of the Trust Deed.29 
17. It took Mr. & Mrs. Lott approximately one week to contact 
attorneys in Pennsylvania and Utah. Based upon their advise, Mr. 
& Mrs. Lott sought a change in the wording of the Trust Deed for 
their own protection based upon the possibility of additional 
assessments occurring after the agreed-upon closing date.30 
18. Only a minor change in the Trust Deed and Note was 
necessary to correct the problem created by Mr. Knighton's delay, 
and this request was made to Mr. Knighton on May 16, 1994.31 
19. It apparently took Mr. Knighton until Friday, May 20, 
1994, to contact Mr. Marsh concerning Mr. & Mrs. Lottfs request, 
because, according to Mr. Knighton, Mr. Marsh was out of town.32 
Dennis Lott Affidavit % 15; Francine Lott Affidavit IT 11. 
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20. When Mr. Lott spoke with Mr. Knighton on the telephone on 
May 23, 1994, Mr. Lott told him that he was becoming increasingly 
frustrated by the delays and that, if the matter was not brought to 
closure immediately, Mr. Lott would call the whole thing off. Mr. 
Knighton acknowledged that the first payment under the Promissory 
Note was due in one week, on June 1, 1994. Mr. Knighton said, by 
June 1, 1994, the deal would be closed and Mr. & Mrs. Lott would 
receive the first payment.33 
21. On May 23, 1994, Mr. Knighton called Mr. Lott and asked 
him to call Mr. Marsh "so that we could get it right this time.M34 
22. On May 24, 1994, Mr. & Mrs. Lott called Mr. Marsh on 
three separate occasions. Mrs. Lott called Mr. Marsh's office on 
two separate occasions, asked for Mr. Marsh and was 
disconnected.35 Mr. Lott was finally able to "reach" Mr. Marsh on 
his third attempt after he arrived home from work that 
afternoon.36 
23. When Mr. Lott spoke with Mr. Marsh on May 24, 1994, 
however, contrary to Mr. Knighton's representation, Mr. Marsh told 
him that, although he had been in and out of his office during the 
previous week, for the most part, he had been in his office. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit V 20. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1T 21. 
Francine Lott Affidavit V 15. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1T 22. 
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During this conversation Mr. Lott requested that Mr. Marsh alter 
the documents so that Mr. Knighton was liable for all assessments 
levied after May 1, 1994.37 
24. Mr. & Mrs. Lott did not receive the payment due under the 
Promissory Note due on June 1, 1994.38 
25. Mr. Marsh did not make the necessary change to the Trust 
Deed until June 7, 1994. On that date, Mr. Marsh called Mrs. Lott 
and informed her that he finally had made the changes to the Trust 
Deed, had the Trust Deed ready and wanted to send it to Mr. & Mrs. 
Lott by facsimile. Mrs. Lott told Mr. Marsh that they were no 
longer willing to close because it had now been three weeks since 
requesting the change to the Trust Deed from Mr. Knighton and two 
weeks since Mr. Lott spoke with Mr. Marsh. Mrs. Lott informed Mr. 
Marsh that, since requesting the changes from Mr. Marsh, a $2,800 
assessment was levied against the subject property, which Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott received and paid. Also, Mrs. Lott informed Mr. Marsh 
that, because the first payment on the Promissory Note was due on 
June 1, 1994, and they neither received the payment or the 
corrected Trust Deed by that time we assumed the deal was off. 
Mrs. Lott asked Mr. Marsh why it had taken so long to make the 
changes in the Trust Deed and Mr. Marsh told Mrs. Lott that it had 
taken Mr. Marsh several days to make the change, several more days 
Dennis Lott Affidavit V 23. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit % 24; Francine Lott Affidavit IT 16. 
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to have Mr. Knighton sign the corrected document and still more 
days to obtain Mr. & Mrs. Lottfs telephone number to arrange for 
the facsimile transmission of the Trust Deed to us. Mrs. Lott told 
Mr. Marsh she did not believe the delays were reasonable.39 
26. After Mrs. Lott spoke with Mr. Marsh on June 7, 1994, at 
11:45 p.m. (EDT), Mr. Lott called Mr. Knighton. Mr. Lott informed 
him of the following: 
(a) Since requesting the changes in the Trust Deed three 
weeks ago, a $2,800 assessment was levied against the 
subject property, which Mr. & Mrs. Lott received and paid 
prior to the time they received the suggested changes in 
the Note and Trust Deed from Mr. Marsh. 
(b) Mr. & Mrs. Lott paid the assessment because, they 
were legally obligated to do so, and due to the extensive 
delays, they assumed Mr. Knighton no longer was 
interested in purchasing the property. 
(c) Mr. & Mrs. Lott's basis in the property had now 
changed, changing the value of the property, and that the 
deal was off. 
(d) Mr. & Mrs. Lott would release the Earnest Money to 
Mr. Knighton. 
Francine Lott Affidavit V 17. 
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Mr. Knighton asked If Mr. & Mrs. Lott were Interested In purchasing 
the survey of the property and told Mr. Lott that he would speak 
with Mr. Marsh and ask him "what had gone wrong."40 
27. Mr. Marsh did not make any changes to the Trust Deed 
until June 7, 1994, two weeks after Mr. Lottfs request. Mr. & Mrs. 
Lott received the proposed changes under cover of Mr. Marsh's 
letter dated June 9, 1994, once again sent by regular mail, a copy 
of which is attached as Exhibit "D" to Dennis Lottfs Affidavit. By 
that time, both Messrs. Marsh and Knighton knew Mr. & Mrs. Lott had 
paid the water assessment. Nevertheless, the Trust Deed enclosed 
with Mr. Marsh's June 9, 1994, letter was inadequate to address Mr. 
& Mrs. Lott's concerns, stating in pertinent part: 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and 
assessments on the above property from May 1, 
1994, to the extent not already paid by 
Beneficiaries, to pay all charges and 
assessments on water or water stock used on or 
with said property from May 1, 1994, not to 
commit waste, to maintain adequate fire 
insurance on improvements on said property,to 
pay all costs and expenses of collection • • . 
and to pay reasonable trustee's fees . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) Reading the altered, inadequate Trust Deed 
merely galvanized Mr. & Mrs. Lott's decision to go no further with 
the sale.41 
28. According to the terms of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, Mr. & Mrs. Lott were extending $31,500 in credit to 
40
 Dennis Lott Affidavit % 25. 
41
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 1T 26. 
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Mr. Knighton. Due to the extensive delays, and the cavalier manner 
in which the transaction was handled, it became apparent to Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott that Mr. Knighton was not a good credit risk.42 
29. Mr. & Mrs. Lott have never indicated to anyone that they 
were waiving the provisions in the Earnest Money Agreement that 
time was of the essence and that, if the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement did not close on or before May 1, 1994, that they were 
waiving their claim that Mr. Knighton breached the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement.43 
42
 Dennis Lott Affidavit V 27; Francine Lott Affidavit 1f 19. 
43
 Dennis Lott Affidavit V 28; Francine Lott Affidavit 1f 20. 
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POINT I 
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE, REQUIRING THE SALE TO 
BE CLOSED NO LATER THAN MAY 1, 1994. ALL OF 
THE DELAYS IN THE CLOSING ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
THE BUYER, MR. KNIGHTON. 
The "time Is of the essence91 clause contained In paragraph Q 
of the Earnest Money Agreement, mandating closing on or before 
May 1, 1994. In Century 21 All West Real Estate v. Webb, 645 P.2d 
52 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that, "Where the 
contract states that time Is of the essence, cases hold that both 
parties are discharged from their contract obligations If neither 
makes tender by the agreed closing date. • . ." Id. at 55 n.l. 
Mr. Knighton never tendered performance prior to the May 1, 
1994, closing date. He never delivered the Trust Deed and Note to 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott prior to the closing date. He never tendered his 
performance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-1 (1951). Delivering 
documents to his attorneys1 office, rather than to Mr. & Mrs. Lott, 
does not constitute a tender of performance.44 
Further, Mr. Knighton never fully performed. The sale was 
contingent upon Mr. Knighton's successful completion of a 
Mr. Knighton claims he delivered the money, the 
Promissory Note and the Trust Deed to his attorneys office on 
April 29, 1994, and signed all of the documents at that time. 
Defendants' Memorandum at 6; Affidavit in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment If 9. The Trust Deed attached as Exhibit "D" to 
the Defendants' Memorandum admittedly appears to be signed by 
Mr. Knighton, and his signature is notarized by Ralph Marsh. The 
Trust Deed, however, is dated May 1, 1994, a Sunday, as is the 
notarization. The issue this raises is whether the Affidavit is 
perjured or whether incorrect date intentionally was inserted on 
the Trust Deed. 
1 
percolation test and a survey on the property. On April 26, 1994, 
Mr. Knighton informed Mr. & Mrs. Lott that the survey was not yet 
complete and that he would waive the percolation test, although Mr. 
& Mrs. Lott never received any such waiver in writing. 
In Gulllory Corp. v. Dussln Investment Co., 272 Or. 267, 536 
P.2d 501 (1975), the Oregon Supreme Court held that, where time is 
of the essence, and payment of the down payment and delivery of the 
land sale contract are concurrent conditions, 
. • • a purchaser who fails to tender payment 
within the time provided by the terms of an earnest 
money agreement cannot ordinarily either demand 
damages for failure of the seller to convey good 
title or rescind the contract and recover earnest 
money previously paid. . . . 
Id. at 274, 536 P.2d at 504. In Gulllory, the purchaser tendered 
the down payment eight days late and showed no excuse for its 
lateness, such as the seller's Inability or refusal to perform. 
The Court held that the earnest money agreement expired of its own 
terms. The same result was reached under similar circumstances in 
Uslnger v. Campbell, 280 Or. 751, 572 P.2d 1018 (1977). 
Defendants1 attempt to mislead this Court as to the content of 
paragraph Q of the Earnest Money Agreement may stand alone as the 
most deceptive deletion of critical language and the substitute of 
ellipse for this deleted, controlling language. Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' 
Memorandum") in footnote 3 misquotes paragraph Q of the Earnest 
Money Agreement as follows: 
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"In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the 
date provided herein . . . , then the closing date shall 
be extended . . . in no event more than fifteen (15) days 
beyond the closing date provided herein. Thereafter, 
time is of the essence/ [Emphasis supplied]. . . . 
In reality, paragraph Q of the Earnest Money Agreement reads 
as follows: 
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that 
this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein 
[May 1, 1994] due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, 
delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar 
occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then 
the closing date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond 
cessation of such condition, but in no event more than 
fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided 
herein. Thereafter, time is of the essence. This 
provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. 
"Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary 
instruments are signed and delivered by all parties to 
the transaction. 
The language the Defendants* deleted in their quote of Paragraph Q 
contained in footnote 3 of Defendants' Memorandum is underlined. 
There are two important points that must be clarified due to 
the misleading deletion of the underlined critical language: 
First, absent an "interruption of transport, strike[], fire, flood, 
extreme weather, governmental regulation[], delay caused by lender, 
act[] of God, or similar occurrence[] beyond the control of Buyer 
or Seller," the closing date cannot be extended. No fact in this 
case fits any such exception to the time is of the essence clause. 
Second, if such an event occurred, the extension is only for 
seven days. In this case, even if it were available, which it is 
not, the extension would expire on May 8, 1994. It was not until 
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May 9, 1994, eight days after the scheduled closing, that Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott first received a copy of the Note and Trust Deed. 
There is no contractual excuse for extending the closing date, 
and time was of the essence as of May 1, 1994. Absent such an 
exception or occurrence, contrary to Defendants* contention, the 
agreement between the parties did not make time of the essence 
fifteen days after the scheduled May 1, 1994, closing. 
The closing was set to occur no later than May 1, 1994. It 
did not occur on or before that date, although Mr. Marsh and Mr. 
Knighton had months to prepare for the closing. They improperly 
attempt to blame the delay on Mr. & Mrs. Lott for two reasons: 
1. The designation of the location of the closing; and 
2. The delivery of the title report. 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott reluctantly agreed to utilize Mr. Marsh as the 
closing agent. His office was the location designated for the 
closing. All he needed to do was promptly and properly prepare the 
necessary documents, transmit them to Mr. & Mrs. Lott in a timely 
manner, and hold them for this very simple closing. All of this 
easily could have been accomplished prior to May 1, 1994. 
Mr. Marsh was the closing agent. He was responsible for and 
did obtain the title report. If there was any confusion, this 
matter was resolved by April 26, 1994, giving Mr. Marsh plenty of 
time to obtain the title report, which only requires twenty-four 
hours to obtain, prior to the schedule May 1, 1994, closing. 
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In determining who is responsible for the delay, paragraph C, 
entitled SELLER'S WARRANTY, of the Earnest Money Agreement becomes 
important. Paragraph C states that the "[s]eller warrants that 
. . . all obligations against the property including . . . 
assessments . . . shall be brought current on or before closing." 
Closing should have occurred on May 1, 1994.45 
An examination of the chronology in this case demonstrates 
that Mr. Knighton and Mr. Marsh were responsible for the delays: 
1. Mr. Marsh did not send the documents Mr. & Mrs. Lott 
needed to sign until April 29, 1994. These documents were 
transmitted by regular mail. 
2. Mr. & Mrs. Lott did not receive the documents they were 
required to execute until May 3, 1994, two days after the scheduled 
closing. 
3. Mr. Marsh's letter dated April 29, 1994, did not enclose 
copies of the requisite Note and Trust Deed contemplated by the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Mr. & Mrs. Lott were financing the 
transaction and could not sign documents transferring title without 
seeing the Trust Deed and Promissory Note. 
Because the closing was scheduled on May 1, 1994, a 
Sunday, the manner in which the Trust Deed originally drafted 
required it to be recorded on Friday, April 29, 1994, to avoid 
exposing Mr. & Mrs. Lott for assessments levied after the date of 
the closing. 
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4. Mr. Lott immediately requested copies of the Note and 
Trust Deed, but did not receive them until May 9, 1994, eight days 
after the scheduled closing. 
5. Based upon Mr. Marshfs cover letter dated May 6, 1994, and 
the enclosed Trust Deed, Mr. & Mrs. Lott understandably were 
concerned that they were subjected us to liability for any 
assessments levied after the agreed upon closing date of May 1, 
1994, but before the recording of the Trust Deed. The enclosed 
Trust Deed dated May 1, 1994, contains language only requiring 
Mr, Knighton to pay the assessments in the future after it is 
recorded.46 
6. It took Mr. & Mrs. Lott approximately one week to contact 
attorneys in Pennsylvania and Utah, a reasonable thing to do in 
these circumstances. 
7. Only a minor change in the Trust Deed and Note was 
necessary to correct the problem created by Mr. Knighton's delay, 
and this request was made to Mr. Knighton on May 16, 1994. This 
was an extremely simple change could only have taken a few minutes 
to accomplish. 
8. Mr. Marsh did not make the necessary change to the Trust 
Deed until June 7, 1994, three weeks after it was requested. 
Mr. Marsh's suggestion in his letter that Honce the Deed 
from you is recorded, all future assessments will be due from the 
new owner and you will have no liability therefor" appears to be 
correct. 
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The revised Trust Deed Mr. & Mrs. Lott received on June 9, 
1994, did not protect Mr. & Mrs. Lott against assessments levied 
after May 1, 1994: 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on 
the above property from May 1, 1994, to the extent not 
already paid by Beneficiaries, to pay all charges and 
assessments on water or water stock used on or with said 
property from May 1, 1994, not to commit waste, to 
maintain adequate fire Insurance on Improvements on said 
property,to pay all costs and expenses of collection . • 
• and to pay reasonable trustee's fees . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) By this time, both Mr. Knighton and Mr. Marsh 
knew Mr. & Mrs. Lott paid the $2,800.00 water assessment. The 
language used, "to the extent not already paid by Beneficiaries," 
potentially continued to subject Mr. & Mrs. Lott to liability for 
the water assessment everyone knew was imminent 
as of May 1, 1994, and Mr. & Mrs. Lott had paid prior to June 9, 
1994. Mr. Marsh's June 7, 1994, letter did not enclose a revised 
Settlement Statement requiring Mr. Knighton as being responsible 
for the $2,800.00 assessment. 
Furthermore, by June 9, 1994, several material changes had 
occurred: 
• Mr. & Mrs. Lott paid the assessment, changing their basis 
in the property. 
• According to the terms of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, Mr. & Mrs. Lott were extending $31,500 in credit to 
Mr. Knighton. Due to the extensive delays, and the cavalier manner 
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in which the transaction was handled, it became apparent to Mr. & 
Mrs. Lott that Mr. Knighton was not a good credit risk. 
• Mr. & Mrs. Lott did not receive the payment due under the 
Promissory Note due on June 1, 1994, although Mr. Knighton 
acknowledged that the first payment under the Promissory Note was 
due on June 1, 1994, and said by June 1, 1994, the deal would be 
closed and Mr. & Mrs. Lott would receive the first payment.47 
POINT II 
MR. & MRS. LOTT DID NOT BREACH THE COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Under Utah Law, the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing cannot conflict with express contractual rights. The 
Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing inheres in most contractual 
relationships.48 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, 
should be "used sparingly and with caution."49 Under Utah law, 
a court will not enforce an implied right or duty not supported by 
47
 The $2,800 assessment represents 80% of the down payment 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott were receiving on this transaction. If they were 
liable for the assessment, Mr. & Mrs. Lott would have lost eight 
percent of the purchase price and would be financing the property 
with the debtor, Mr. Knighton, having little to no equity in the 
property. In the event of a default on the Note secured by the 
Trust Deed, Mr. & Mrs. Lott would not be fully secured. 
48
 See, e.g., BreJiany v. Nordstrom Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 
1991); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 
194, 199 (Utah 1991). 
49
 Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
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or inconsistent with the contract itself. In Brehang v. Nordstrom, 
Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court explained the 
limitations on this duty: 
Under the implied covenant of good faith applied in 
Resource Management, the parties to a contract are deemed 
to intend that the terms of a contract should be 
construed in a manner which assumes the parties intended 
that the duties and rights created by the contract should 
be performed and exercised in good faith. Such a 
covenant cannot be construed, however, to establish new, 
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the 
parties. Nor can a covenant of good faith be used to 
nullify a right granted by a contract to one of the 
parties or to require a party vested with a contract 
right to exercise that right in a manner contrary to that 
party's legitimate self-interest. 
Id. at 55 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court went on 
to state that "[n]o obligation can be implied • . • which would be 
inconsistent with the other terms of the contractual relationship." 
Id. In Rio Rlgom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 
1980), the Utah Supreme Court stated, HA court will not enforce 
asserted rights that are not supported by the contract itself." 
Id. at 505 (citation omitted; emphasis added).50 
The implied covenant of good and fair dealing is not an 
equitable doctrine that operates to ensure that contracts are 
50
 See Woodland Theatres v. ABC Intermovntain Theatres, 560 
P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1977) ("An express covenant on a given subject 
excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a different to 
contradictory nature"). See generally Burton, More on Good Faith 
Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, Iowa L. 
Rev. 497, 499 (1984)("Courts generally do not use the good faith 
performance doctrine to override the agreement of the parties. 
Rather, the good faith performance doctrine is used to effectuate 
the intentions of the parties, or to protect their reasonable 
expectations, through interpretation and implication"). 
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"fair" or to avoid hardship flowing from the exercise of expressly 
negotiated contractual rights: 
It is fundamental that every contract imposes a duty on 
parties to exercise their contractual rights and perform their 
contractual obligations reasonably and in good faith. 
Nonetheless, a court may not make a better contract for the 
parties than they have made for themselves; furthermore, a 
court may not enforce asserted rights not supported by the 
contract itself, w[I]t cannot be adopted as a general precept 
of contract law that, whenever one party to a contract can 
show injury flowing from the exercise of a contract right by 
the other, a basis for relief will be somehow devised by the 
courts." 
Ted R. Brown £ Assocs. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970-71 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 
461, 464 (Utah 1978)) (citations omitted).51 
Mr. & Mrs. Lott have done nothing more than enforce specific 
contractual provisions contained in the Earnest Money Agreement. 
Mr. Knighton cannot attempt to assert a breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing contrary to those specific contractual 
provisions. If Mr. Knighton did not close by May 1, 1994, the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot rescue him. 
DATED: December 15, 1994. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Mask A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
51
 See Woodland Theatres, 560 P.2d at 703. ("It is not 
enough to say that an implied covenant is necessary in order to 
make the contract fair, or that without such a covenant it would be 
improvident or unwise, or that the contract would operate 
unjustly"). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of December, 1994, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing J.OTTS' REVISED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to the following: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
wp51\mal\lott\opsunjd2.nen 
11 
/^/^IDAV/ ILOi FILED , _ 
ni-.T^!'-T r.njF. I 
9U DEC IU PM ^ : U 1 
r.iiTRICT 
t ! l ' l ' < SA'j 'uKt: CGuiTY 
MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Ut tPUTY CLCfiK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants. 
RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 940904735PR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiffs Dennis A. and Francine G. Lott submit the 
following Affidavit of Mark A. Larsen pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. 56(f): 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MARK A. LARSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says 
as follows: 
1. I am counsel of record for the Plaintiffs in the 
above-captloned matter and have personal knowledge of the facts 
stated in this Affidavit, 
2* Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the above-captloned 
matter on July 27, 1994. The Defendants filed a similar matter 
in Civil No. 940904746PR on the following day. 
3. Activity has occurred in this file every month since 
it was filed, with the possible exception of October. This 
activity consists primarily of filing pleadings and 
consolidating the two matters. 
4. Due to the congestion in my calendar, I previously 
have not been able to notice the depositions of the Defendants. 
Those depositions, however, have now been noticed. 
5. Further, Mr. and Mrs. Lott have served Requests for 
Production of Documents on the Defendants. 
6. Until this discovery is complete, Mr. and Mrs. Lott 
are not in a position to fully respond to the Defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment for the following reasons: 
a. Only discovery will reveal the actual dates of 
Mr. Knighton's deposit of funds in Mr. Marsh's trust 
account. 
b. Only discovery will resolve conflicts which 
already have occurred in the record filed in support of 
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the Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. These 
conflicts include, but are not limited to, the Affidavit 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment stating that 
Mr. Knighton signed the original Trust Deed on April 29, 
1994, but the Trust Deed and its notarization bearing the 
date of May 1, 1994, a Sunday. Either the Affidavit is 
perjured or the Trust Deed was intentionally post-dated. 
c. Discovery also will resolve or focus conflicts 
in the factual background of this case. 
7. As a result, the decision on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be postponed until the completion of 
discovery in this case. 
DATED: December 14, 1994. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 14th day of 
December, 1994. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of December, 
1994, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT, to the following: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
vp51\mal\lott\affldavl.Ml 
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TabE 
RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION 
TO RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 940904735 PR 
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The information in this paragraph refers to alleged conversations during the 
negotiations for the contract later signed by the parties and is barred by the integration 
clause in Section L of the contract and by the parol evidence rule. 
2. Undisputed. 
3. Disputed in part. The conversation in which the Lotts agreed that the 
closing could occur through Mr. Marsh occurred on April 26, 1994, after Lotts had failed to 
provide a title report and designate a location for the closing. Notice that the Lotts place 
no date on this conversation. Mr. Knighton did not agree to pay all closing fees at this time 
but did so agree on May 3 when Lotts told him they did not want to pay any closing fees. 
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It is also disputed that Lotts had chosen Utah Title Company to be the closing agent or that 
they used Utah Title Company when they purchased the land since Utah Title Company has 
been out of business for many years and since it is known that their purchase was closed 
through another title company. 
4. Undisputed except that any implication that this conversation took place 
prior to April 26, 1994, is disputed. 
5. Undisputed. 
6. Undisputed except that sentence 3 is disputed. 
7. Undisputed except that it is disputed that title insurance could be obtained 
shortly after requesting it since that depends on the nature of the title search required and 
the availability of title company personnel to do the search, examine it and prepare and 
deliver the title report. It is also disputed that Mr. Knighton and Mr. Marsh failed to obtain 
the title insurance in a timely manner. It was ordered immediately after Mr. Knighton's 
conversation with Mr. Lott on April 26, 1994, and was delivered on May 2, 1994. 
8. Disputed that it takes only 24 hours to obtain a title report. 
9. Disputed because these are legal conclusions. 
10. Disputed because Mr. Knighton made no telephone call to Lotts on this 
date. This statement, however, establishes that the Lotts were not opposed to an extension 
of the closing date and, therefore, time was not of the essence to them. 
11. Disputed because Mr. Knighton signed the closing documents to be signed 
by him and deposited the down payment with Mr. Marsh on April 29, 1994. 
12. Disputed. May 1, 1994, was a Sunday. The closing did not take place 
because of delays by the Lotts. 
13. Undisputed. 
14. Undisputed. 
15. Undisputed except that Lotts would not be liable for assessments prior to 
closing if Mr. Knighton agreed to pay them, which he did in the Trust Deed. 
16. Disputed but irrelevant. 
17. Undisputed. 
18. Undisputed. 
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19. Undisputed. 
20. Disputed but irrelevant. 
21. Disputed. 
22. Disputed except that it is admitted that the conversation took place on that 
date. 
23. Undisputed. 
24. Undisputed except that no payment was due on the promissory note until 
the Lotts completed the closing by signing and returning the deed. 
25. Disputed. The changes in the Trust Deed were made and the Trust Deed 
was sent to Mr. Knighton on May 27, 1994, and returned to Mr. Marsh on May 31, 1994. 
Mr. Marsh tried to reach the Lotts by telephone earlier but was not successful until June 7, 
1994, when Mrs. Lott said that she would have to wait until her husband was home to turn 
on the facsimile machine. None of the information alleged in this conversation by Mrs. Lott 
was conveyed to Mr. Marsh but it is, nevertheless, irrelevant. 
26. Disputed except that it is undisputed that Mr. Lott told Mr. Knighton he 
wanted to terminate the contract. 
27. Disputed that the changes were not made until June 7. [See paragraph 25 
above]. It is also disputed that Mr. Marsh and Mr. Knighton knew that the Lotts had paid 
the water assessment. It is also disputed that the revised Trust Deed has the meaning 
claimed by the Lotts. The words "to the extent not already paid by Beneficiaries" clearly 
refer to the taxes and homeowners' assessments on the property and not to the water 
assessments, which are handled separately in the phrase following those words. 
28. It is not disputed that the Lotts were extending credit to Mr. Knighton, 
secured by the property, but they had already agreed to that when they signed the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement, whether or not Mr. Knighton was a good credit risk. 
29. Disputed that time was of the essence and that, if it was, that there was no 
waiver thereof. The Lotts were clearly willing to close the transaction up until June 7, 1994, 
because they were requesting and demanding changes in the documents to satisfy themselves 
up to that time and did not ever tender their own performance prior to asserting that the 
contract was terminated. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MATERIAL FACTS IN THIS MATTER ARE NOT IN 
DISPUTE. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE. 
While the Lotts have disputed some of the facts stated in Knighton's initial 
memorandum, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The Lotts have admitted 
the signing of the written agreement. That agreement contains an integration clause 
excluding any consideration of oral representations made prior to the agreement or of any 
oral statements made to alter the agreement. [§ L]. Therefore, any claims that the 
obligations placed upon the Lotts by the written agreement were orally shifted to Knighton 
and his attorney may not be considered by the Court. However, the attempt by the Lotts 
to shift the burden to designate a location for the closing and to provide a title report to 
Knighton at least five business days prior to the closing is an admission that the Lotts did 
not perform these obligations. It is undisputed that they failed to perform these two duties. 
It is also undisputed that the Lotts either requested or gave their permission for Knighton 
and his attorney to obtain a title report, prepare the closing documents and for Mr. Marsh 
to act as closing agent. [Lotts' Memorandum, p. ii, H7-9]. While the Lotts place no date on 
this request or permission, Knighton states that it was April 25 or 26, which Lotts have not 
disputed. It is also undisputed that a title report was then ordered [after April 26, since 
Lotts state they were amazed it had not been obtained on that date, Lotts' Memorandum, 
p. iii, 119] and received on May 2, 1994. The Lotts' alleged understanding that it only takes 
24 hours to obtain a title report is both unrealistic and irrelevant. It is certainly not 
unreasonable that it took five days, including a weekend, at the end of a month when title 
companies are busy closing month-end transactions. 
It is also undisputed that Knighton signed the promissory note, trust deed and 
closing statement on April 29, 1994, and left those with the closing agent along with the 
$2,665.00 balance due on the down payment. This amount, together with the $1,000.00 he 
had previously deposited, totaled $3,665.00 that Knighton had deposited with the closing 
agent. [Sergio Bernardo affidavit, MI 4 & 5]. He had thus tendered full performance of his 
duties under the agreement and had done everything he was obligated to do prior to the 
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May 1, 1994, closing date. It is undisputed that the deed and Sellers' Closing Statement 
were prepared and sent to the Lotts on April 29, 1994, and that they received them on May 
3, 1994. Completion of the closing was then entirely up to the Lotts, which they could do 
by signing and returning the deed and their closing statement. The cover letter sent to them 
requested that they telephone Mr. Marsh if they had any questions about the document. 
Because they had a facsimile machine, they could have called him to request that copies of 
the note and trust deed be faxed to them. Instead, they called Mr. Knighton that evening 
and requested that he ask Mr. Marsh to forward those copies by mail along with a revised 
closing statement deleting the closing fees and assessments. They made no complaint then 
about any failure to close by May 1, 1994, and did not pursue the most rapid method of 
obtaining the information they desired. When they received the copies of the note and trust 
deed and revised closing statement on May 9, 1994, they again made no complaint about any 
delay in the closing and did not respond for a whole week. They had again received a cover 
letter requesting that they call if they had any questions. They did not do so. After a week, 
they again called Knighton to request that a change be made in the trust deed. The Lotts 
confirmed this request with Mr. Marsh on May 24, 1994, and specifically instructed him to 
prepare a new trust deed making Knighton responsible for all water assessments after May 
1, 1994, and to have Knighton sign the new trust deed. Again, they made no complaint 
about any delay. They just wanted the documents to specifically express the obligation of 
Knighton to pay the water assessments, which was done. It is also undisputed that the next 
communication took place on June 7, 1994. While the entire exact conversation is in 
dispute, there is no dispute that Mr. Marsh wanted to fax the revised trust deed to the Lotts 
for their approval and that the Lotts, for the first time, were suddenly unwilling to complete 
the transaction. No prior notice of this intent had been given. Everything that had been 
done from April 29, 1994, to June 7, 1994, was to make changes in the documents to satisfy 
the Lotts. At no time did they ever sign the deed and tender their performance to Knighton 
or to the closing agent. None of the foregoing facts are in dispute. The only facts in dispute 
have to do with the content of various conversations which are all irrelevant to the terms of 
the contract between the parties and to the performance thereof. Despite the grandiose 
attempts by the Lotts to create a dispute as to the facts, there is no genuine dispute as to 
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any material fact. This case is appropriate for summary judgment and there is no need to 
cause the substantial additional expense to the parties and take the time of the Court for 
further proceedings in this matter. The material facts are clear and the Court may enter 
judgment on those facts as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court in Heglar Ranch, Inc. 
v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980), held that the rule that summary judgment is 
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact "does not preclude summary 
judgment simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is 
genuinely controverted." Summary judgment was upheld because no "material issue of fact 
has been raised, the resolution of which could constitute the defense of duress." Likewise, 
in this case, the Lotts have failed to raise any material issue as to whether Knighton 
completely performed the agreement on his side. It is totally undisputed that Knighton did 
everything required of him to close this transaction on April 29, 1994. Everything that 
happened thereafter was done to satisfy requests made by the Lotts and all of the delays 
were caused because they did not immediately call the closing agent and make their requests 
for changes in the documents directly to him. Had they informed him that they had a 
facsimile machine, any changes could have been faxed to them instantaneously and the 
closing could have been completed within a few days of May 1, 1994. Their attempts to 
place the blame for their delays on others is simply a disingenuous attempt to delay the 
inevitable decision in this case at great expense in money, time and effort to the parties and 
to the Court. The summary judgment procedure is intended to avoid that and this is an 
appropriate case for summary judgment. 
POINT II 
KNIGHTON PERFORMED PRIOR TO THE MAY 1, 1994, 
CLOSING DATE. 
The Lotts argue that Knighton did not tender his performance prior to the May 
1,1994, closing date and state that "delivering documents to his attorneys' office, rather than 
to Mr. & Mrs. Lott, does not constitute a tender of performance." However, they have 
admitted that Knighton's attorney was to be the closing agent [Lotts' Revised Memorandum, 
p. viii, MI 3 & 4] and they have not disputed that Knighton signed the documents and left 
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them and the down payment with the closing agent on April 29, 1994.1 It is, therefore, 
without dispute that Knighton performed his side of the closing by this date. Delivery of the 
documents to the Lotts is not required without a simultaneous delivery of the deed by the 
Lotts in return. That, of course, is the reason a closing agent is used in such transactions-so 
that both sides can perform through an intermediary without waiting for the other side to 
perform first. Knighton not only performed by the May 1, 1994, closing date but the Lotts 
were informed of his performance by the letter sent to them on April 29, 1994. Completion 
of the closing was entirely up to the Lotts. The Lotts' claim that Knighton "never fully 
performed" because the sale was contingent upon the successful completion of a percolation 
test and a survey is another spurious claim. Their memorandum admits that Knighton 
waived the percolation test and Mr. Lott admits in his affidavit that Knighton told him on 
April 29, 1994, "that all was in order and the survey was complete." [Dennis Lott Affidavit, 
p. 4, II 10]. The claim that Knighton did not perform by the closing date is contrary to the 
Lotts' own affidavits. 
POINT III 
TIME WAS NOT THE ESSENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT 
UNTIL MAY 16, 1994, AND WAS NOT THEREAFTER 
BECAUSE ALL DELAYS WERE CAUSED BY LOTTS. 
The Lotts have argued from citation to cases from Oregon and from a 
misreading of the Time of the Essence clause of the contract that the contract had to be 
closed before May 1,1994, even though they made no effort themselves to close by that date 
and did everything they could to prevent the closing from being completed after that date. 
Section Q of the contract clearly provides that "thereafter [that is, after fifteen days from the 
1 
They have claimed they have not done discovery to determine these facts [Lotts' Revised 
Memorandum, p. iii, H 11] but they admit that their own closing documents were prepared 
and sent on April 29, 1994, along with a cover letter explaining that Knighton had signed the 
note and trust deed, and that they received these documents on May 3, 1994 [Lotts' Revised 
Memorandum, p. iii, HU 12 & 13]. Given the intervening weekend, it is not reasonable to 
dispute these facts and discovery is not required to establish them. Knighton has asserted 
them and the Lotts have not denied them. For purposes of this motion, they are deemed 
admitted. Rule 4-501(2)(b), C.J.A. 
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scheduled closing date], time is of the essence." Obviously, this language does not make 
time of the essence prior to that date. The preceding language referring to extensions due 
to interruption of transport, strikes, etc. does not make time of the essence as of May 1, 
1994. Rather, it provides for extensions of up to fifteen days. Then, and then only, does the 
contract make time of the essence. The recent Utah case of Krantz v. Holt 819 P.2d 352, 
354 (Utah 1991), interpreted this same time of the essence clause in the Utah standard form 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement to mean that the clause had no effect until after the 
expiration of the stated fifteen days. [In that case the agreement stated that time would be 
of the essence after thirty days]. That case disposes of all of the Lotts' arguments as to the 
meaning of the time of the essence clause. That case further held that the clause did not 
apply when "the delay in closing was the result of mutual agreement." The failure of the 
Lotts to tender their own performance by May 1, 1994, and their continual requests for 
further information and for changes in the documents, even if such requests were 
reasonable, constituted requests on their part for delays in the completion of the closing. 
Their requests for delays were granted by Knighton as each change was accommodated. As 
stated in Krantz v. Holt, [at 354] "under those circumstances, [Lotts] would have waived 
[their] right to strictly enforce the closing date stated in the agreement." 
This case is also similar to Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 846 P.2d 1238 
(Utah 1992), in which time was the essence of the agreement but the closing date had been 
extended several times by mutual agreement. The buyer tendered his performance by the 
last agreed upon date and the court held that he was entitled to specific performance. The 
court stated that neither party can be said to be in default until the other party has tendered 
his own performance. Thus, since only Knighton has tendered performance, he is the only 
one who can claim that the other party is in default. The Lotts have never tendered 
performance on their side. The Utah cases are consistent with those elsewhere. For 
example, in Turner v. Gunderson, 807 P.2d 370 (Wash. App. 1991), both parties mutually 
agreed to extend a time of the essence contract to a date uncertain. The court stated: 
Turner and Ingram were entitled to participate in the 
establishment of a new date certain or, at a minimum, Gundersons 
were required to communicate a new date before unilaterally 
repudiating the contract. 
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. . . . When an agreement provides time is of the essence, and 
performance has not been tendered by either party, such provision 
is for the benefit of both parties (unless the agreement expressly 
or impliedly makes the provision solely for the benefit of one of 
the parties), and requires the agreement of both parties to change 
the termination date. 
A reasonable time for performance can be implied. . . . 
A new date certain for closing had not been established by 
mutual agreement nor had Gundersons communicated a closing 
date before demanding immediate payment on January 21, 1987. 
This demand, coupled with a change in terms, constituted a 
repudiation. 
In this case, the Lotts and Knighton, by requesting and allowing changes in the documents, 
mutually agreed to an extension of time to close to a date uncertain. Neither party had 
communicated a new closing date. Neither could claim the other was in default without first 
establishing a new closing date. The Lotts had no right to suddenly refuse to perform on 
June 8, 1994, without first setting a new closing date. This is especially true since Knighton 
had fully performed and all delays were at the request and for the benefit of the Lotts. 
Knighton is, therefore, entitled to specific performance of the agreement. 
POINT IV 
THE LOTTS5 ARGUMENT BASED ON THE LANGUAGE OF 
THE REVISED TRUST DEED IS A BOGUS ISSUE BECAUSE 
THEY HAD REFUSED TO PERFORM BEFORE THEY HAD 
EVER SEEN THE REVISED TRUST DEED. 
The Lotts attempt to make much of the language in the revised trust deed to 
the effect that the taxes and assessments would be paid by Knighton "to the extent not 
already paid by Beneficiaries." This attempt is also disingenuous for several reasons. First, 
this language refers only to the general property taxes and the regular home owners' 
assessments, on which the Lotts had already made a payment and, therefore, did not want 
to be charged with those assessments on the original closing statement. It has no reference 
to the water assessment which is handled in the language which follows that is now objected 
to. Therefore, it did not make the Lotts liable for the water assessment. Secondly, the 
revised trust deed was prepared on May 27, 1994, which was before Knighton was informed 
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that Lotts had received and paid the water assessment on June 7, 1994. Therefore, neither 
Knighton nor Mr. Marsh knew that Lotts had paid the water assessment when the revised 
trust deed was prepared and signed. Thirdly, the Lotts should not have paid the water 
assessment when it was received but should have forwarded that to Knighton or the closing 
agent to be paid by Knighton. They knew that the closing was in process, that Knighton had 
signed the papers on his side and had deposited the earnest money and that the only thing 
to be done was for them to sign and return the deed and closing statement. For them to 
pay the water assessment and claim that suddenly the deal had changed was an act of bad 
faith on their part. Fourthly, they had not seen the revised trust deed containing this 
language when they refused to perform on June 7, 1994. Because they had refused to allow 
Mr. Marsh to fax the revised trust deed to them and because they wanted to terminate the 
deal, Mr. Marsh forwarded a copy of the revised trust deed to them with his letter of June 
9, 1994. They were, therefore, not aware of this language in the revised trust deed until 
some days after June 9. Interestingly, the lengthy letters from the Lotts' attorney of June 
16 and July 8, 1994, make no reference to this language in the revised trust deed. This 
argument is totally an after-thought and had nothing to do with the Lotts' refusal to perform. 
The same is true of the arguments that the Lotts changed their basis in the 
property by paying the water assessment, that they suddenly considered that Knighton was 
not a good credit risk and that Knighton did not pay the note payment due June 1, 1994. 
Knighton agreed to pay the water assessment and was legally obligated to do so. They 
should have forwarded the assessment to him for payment. They did not have to pay it. 
They agreed to extend credit to Knighton when the agreement was signed in January. There 
is nothing in the agreement allowing them to rescind if they learned that «he was not a good 
credit risk nor is there any evidence to show that he is not a good credit risk. Knighton 
would have paid the June 1, 1994, note payment if the Lotts had completed the closing and 
he will pay that payment and all others that are due as soon as the Lotts convey title to the 
property as they are obligated to do. The Lotts cannot complain about a failure to perform 
by Knighton until they themselves have performed. M[A] party must make a tender of his 
own agreed performance in order to put the other party in default." Century 21 All Western 
Real Estate Investment Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982). All of these arguments 
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are "bogus" issues raised only to confuse the court. They are in fact an attempt to deceive 
the court and should not even be considered. 
POINT V 
THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING APPLIES IN THIS CASE BUT NOT IN THE 
EMPLOYMENT CASES CITED BY THE LOTTS. 
The Lotts have cited several cases in an attempt to convince the Court that the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not change the contract between the 
parties. This is another bogus argument for three reasons. First, Knighton is not attempting 
to change the written agreement. He only wants it enforced as written. He performed. 
They did not. Secondly, the Lotts have failed to perform and they are the ones attempting 
to change the terms of the written agreement. Thirdly, the cases which establish the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing make one exception and that is for employment 
contracts. The cases relied upon by the Lotts are employment contract cases. In its 
quotation from Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991), on page 9 of the 
Revised Memorandum, the Lotts have conveniently deleted the sentence which precedes 
their quotation. That sentence states: 
The purpose and function of the implied covenant of good faith 
generally recognized in all contracts is different from the purpose 
and function of the so-called covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in employment contracts. 
The court went on to explain that "it would be inconsistent to hold that an employer, on the 
basis of the implied covenant of good faith, is bound to a substantive limitation on the 
employer's right to discharge." That exception for employment contracts does not apply to 
other contracts. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to all other 
contracts and has been specifically applied to contracts for the purchase of real property. 
Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1980). Despite Knighton's total 
performance by April 29, 1994, and his attempts to accommodate all requests made by the 
Lotts, they have failed to cooperate to close this sale expeditiously or at all. Had they 
communicated their requests expeditiously, this sale could have been closed on both sides 
by May 3, 1994, or soon thereafter, well within the fifteen days after May 1 allowed by the 
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agreement. Knighton is entitled to specific performance of the agreement as a matter of law 
since none of the essential facts are in dispute. 
POINT VI 
A CONTINUANCE UNDER RULE 56(F) IS NOT JUSTIFIED 
AND IS JUST A FURTHER ATTEMPT BY THE LOTTS TO 
DELAY THIS MATTER AND CAUSE FURTHER EXPENSE. 
Rule 56(f) is intended to prevent summary judgment before a party has had 
time to conduct discovery if discovery would create a genuine issue of fact. It is not 
intended, however, to allow a party to go on a "fishing expedition" for purely speculative 
facts when the facts are already clearly established. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 
740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987). While the Lotts claim that there has been activity in this 
case every month since the pleadings were filed, that activity has been taken by Knighton 
and the Lotts have done nothing. More importantly, the facts which the Lotts want further 
time to discover have to do with Knighton's deposit of the down payment and the signing 
of the original trust deed. These facts have been clearly established by the affidavits of 
Knighton and Sergio Bernardo and have not been disputed by the Lotts. They are deemed 
admitted. They are also irrelevant since, by the agreement, time was not the essence of this 
matter until fifteen days after May 1, 1994, and, by mutual extension, time was not the 
essence thereafter. Furthermore, to allow a delay of this essentially factually undisputed 
matter for discovery would simply add to the injustice already perpetrated by the Lotts in 
refusing to close. The discovery requests made by the Lotts were not served until after the 
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed and response was due from the Lotts. Those 
requests are simply a further attempt to delay this matter the facts of which are not 
disputed. Summary judgment is appropriate and should be granted now without further 
delays. 
DATED this 3 day of January, 1995. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh / 
Attorneys for Knighton 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants. 
LOTTS1 MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940904735PR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Pursuant toU.R.C.P. 56, Plaintiffs Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. 
Lott (the "Lotts") respectfully move for summary judgment. As grounds 
for this Motion, the Lotts state: 
1. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement (the "Agreement") between 
the Lotts and Defendant Kerry Knighton ("Knighton") contained a valid 
enforceable "time is of the essence" clause. 
2. The Agreement stated that closing would occur upon receipt of 
survey but no later than May 1, 1994. After that date, time was of the 
essence. 
3. Knighton failed to perform under the Agreement in several 
ways, including but not limited to, failing to provide the Trust Deed 
and Note to the Lotts in a timely fashion, failing to tender the down 
payment at the agreed-upon time, failing to complete the property survey 
as required, failing to obtain and deliver a title report, and failing 
to obtain title insurance. 
4* The delays in closing were unreasonable and unnecessary. 
Moreover, the delays were solely the fault of Knighton and his agents. 
5. Because the time of essence provision in the Agreement is 
valid and enforceable and because Knighton failed to perform due to his 
own fault, the Lotts' obligation under the Agreement should be 
discharged as a matter of law. 
6. As additional grounds for their Motion, the Lotts expressly 
incorporate their Memorandum in support of summary judgment. 
DATED: June 8, 1995. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Mark A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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I hereby certify that on the _x day of June, 1995, I caused 
to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing LOTTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to the following: 
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68 South Main Street 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants. 
LOTTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940904735PR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiffs Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. Lott submit the following 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment: 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a case about how a former real estate agent and his 
attorney carelessly and irresponsibly breached their obligations to 
complete a purchase of property from Plaintiffs Dennis and Francine Lott 
(the "Lotts"). 
The Lotts, as Sellers, and Kerry L. Knighton ("Knighton"), as 
Buyer, entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement (the "Agreement"). 
The Agreement required the sale to close upon receipt of a property 
survey but no later than May 1, 1994, and made time of the essence. 
Solely as a result of delays of Knighton or his agents, the sale did not 
close on time. Indeed, over forty days after the scheduled closing, the 
sale was still not in a position to close. 
As a result, the Lotts initiated this lawsuit and through their 
pending Motion for Summary Judgment seek the following relief: 
• A declaration that Knighton breached the Agreement, relieving 
the Lotts from any further obligation to perform their 
obligations under the Agreement. 
+> The forfeiture of the earnest money deposit currently held 
with the closing agent. 
• The attorneys' fees and costs they have incurred in this 
lawsuit. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, the Lotts submit the following Statement of Additional 
Material Facts: 
1. Beginning in late December, 1993, or early January 1994, the 
Lotts, through Francine Lott, began negotiations with Knighton 
concerning the sale of the real property at issue in this lawsuit. 
Francine Lott stated the following, among other things: 
(a) A new water tank was being constructed to provide water 
to the Lotts' property, as well as others, and that the Lotts 
expected a water assessment in late Spring, but did not want 
to be responsible for paying it. 
ii 
(b) The vote for the water assessment was to take place in 
Spring of 1994. 
The Lotts wanted to close any sale within the next month, which they 
felt was reasonable because no outside financing was necessary. 
Knighton, who was a licensed real estate agent, said that any closing 
could not occur until Spring because he needed a survey of the property 
and a percolation test. He said he would order the test and survey 
immediately, but would like to extend the closing until May 1, 1994, to 
allow for inclement weather. The Lotts agreed, but emphasized to 
Knighton their concerns about waiting that long.1 
2. The Lotts, as Sellers, and Knighton, as Buyer, entered into 
the Agreement dated January 27, 1994, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit "A" to the Complaint in the instant action. The parties 
contemplated that this transaction would be seller-financed, that is, by 
the Lotts. Under the Agreement, closing was to occur upon receipt of a 
survey but no later than May 1, 1994.2 
3. The Agreement was a standard form earnest money sales 
agreement which Knighton and his attorney, Ralph Marsh ("Marsh"), 
selected and drafted themselves.3 
4. At Knighton's request, the Lotts agreed that the closing could 
occur through Marsh. Previously, the Lotts had chosen Utah Title 
1
 Francine Lott Affidavit If 2; Deposition of Kerry Knighton at 11. 
2
 Dennis Lott Affidavit f 2; Francine Lott Affidavit V 3; Exhibit 
"A" to Complaint* 
3
 Deposition of Ralph Marsh at 14. 
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Company to be the closing agent. As a result, Knighton agreed to pay 
all closing fees. Indeed, all references to closing fees were removed 
from the Closing Statement.4 
5. Knighton represented to the Lotts that Marsh would handle all 
ordinary work associated with the preparation for closing, as would any 
title company. Based on this representation, the Lotts believed that 
Marsh would obtain a title report, as Utah Title would have done if it 
handled the closing.5 
6. The sale of the real property was contingent upon Knighton's 
successful completion of a percolation test and a survey on the 
property. On April 26, 1994, less than one week before closing, 
Knighton informed the Lotts that the survey was not yet complete and 
that he would waive the percolation test, although the Lotts never 
received any such waiver in writing. The survey was never completed 
even though it was a precondition to Knighton's obligations to perform 
under the Agreement.6 
7. By April 26, 1994, less than one week before the scheduled 
closing, Knighton had not obtained a title report. On April 26, 1994, 
the Lotts called Knighton. They told him they were amazed that the 
title report had not been obtained. They told him to have Marsh obtain 
the title report because they were living in Pennsylvania, 2,000 miles 
4
 Deposition of Kerry Knighton at 55; Dennis Lott Affidavit If 3, 
Exhibit MAM; Francine Lott Affidavit ir 4. 
5
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 11 4; Francine Lott Affidavit H 5. 
6
 Dennis Lott Affidavit M 5; Deposition of Kerry Knighton at 33-34; 
Deposition of Ralph Marsh at 46-47. 
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away from where the closing was going to occur, and they understood that 
the closing agent was supposed to handle this sort of matter.7 
8. Knighton and Marsh agreed to assume responsibility for 
obtaining title insurance notwithstanding the terms of the Agreement 
because the Lotts resided in Pennsylvania and title insurance for the 
property could be obtained shortly after requesting it. Knighton and 
Marsh failed to obtain the title insurance in a timely manner.8 
9. It only should take 24 hours to obtain a title report, yet the 
title report was not obtained until May 2, 1994.9 
10. A closing agent for a residential or commercial real estate 
transaction has the following duties and responsibilities: 
(a) In discharging his duties to close the sale of a 
residential property, the closing agent is responsible 
for the preparation of all necessary documents to 
transfer title and secure any indebtedness, including the 
preparation of all warranty deeds, trust deeds, trust 
deed notes, and other documents necessary to convey title 
or secure indebtedness. 
(b) On a seller-financed transaction, the closing agent is 
responsible for preparing these documents sufficiently 
far in advance of the closing date and transmitting those 
documents to the appropriate parties sufficiently far in 
7
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 6; Deposition of Kerry Knighton at 39-40. 
8
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 7; Deposition of Kerry Knighton at 42. 
9
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 1F 8. 
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advance of the closing date so that the sale can be 
easily and conveniently closed on the closing date upon 
which the parties have agreed in any earnest money 
agreement. 
(c) The closing agent also customarily is responsible for 
providing the location for closing of the real estate 
transaction.10 
11. If the seller resides outside of the State of Utah and the 
warranty deed, trust deed and promissory note are not prepared and 
submitted to the seller sufficiently in advance of the closing for the 
seller to have a meaningful opportunity to review them, the fault for 
the delay associated with the preparation of the documents lies solely 
with the closing agent.11 
12. In instances where title insurance is necessary, the closing 
agent normally and customarily provides the title insurance or, in the 
situation where the closing agent does not provide it, secures it for 
the parties from a title company.12 
13. It would be unreasonable to expect a seller of real property, 
who is financing the buyerfs purchase of that property, to close the 
transaction without first examining the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed, 
Affidavit of Charles A. Hammond 1f 6. 
11
 Affidavit of Charles A. Hammond 1f 7. 
12
 Affidavit of Charles A. Hammond ir 8. 
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which should be provided to this seller in advance of the closing 
date.13 
14. Paragraph 8 of the Agreement establishes the closing for the 
sale of the subject property to occur upon receipt of a survey or no 
later than May 1, 1994. Further, Paragraph Q of the Agreement 
establishes that time is of the essence for the closing of the 
Agreement.14 
15. On April 29, 1994, Knighton telephoned the Lotts to tell them 
that all was in order and the survey was complete. In fact, the survey 
was never completed, as Knighton has admitted. Knighton and Dennis Lott 
discussed the possibility of extending the closing date. Knighton told 
Lott an extension was not necessary based upon advice he received from 
Marsh.15 
16. Knighton did not tender performance by the agreed closing date 
of May 1, 1994.16 
17. The Agreement did not close on May 1, 1994, the agreed upon 
closing date, due solely to delays caused by Knighton or his attorney, 
Marsh.17 
13
 Affidavit of Charles A. Hammond V 9; Deposition of Ralph Marsh 
at 20. 
14
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 9; Francine Lott Affidavit \\ 6. 
15
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 10; Deposition of Kerry Knighton 
at 33-34. 
16
 Dennis Lott Affidavit V 11; Francine Lott Affidavit II 7. 
17
 Dennis Lott Affidavit If 12; Francine Lott Affidavit \\ 8. 
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18. The Lotts did not receive copies of the documents necessary to 
execute the closing pursuant to the terms of the Agreement until May 3, 
1994, two days after the scheduled closing. These documents were sent 
to the Lotts by Marsh by regular mail on April 29, 1994. Marsh concedes 
that he has no excuse for sending such important documents by regular 
mail. Significantly, Marsh did not enclose copies of the requisite Note 
and Trust Deed contemplated by the Agreement.18 
19. Dennis Lott immediately requested copies of the Note and Trust 
Deed, but did not receive them until May 9, 1994, eight days after the 
scheduled closing.19 
20. Paragraph C in the Agreement makes the Lotts liable for all 
assessments up through the date of the closing. Marsh, acting as 
Knighton's agent, stated in a letter to the Lotts dated May 6, 1994, 
which they received on May 9, 1994 (a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit "C" to Dennis Lott's Affidavit), that "once the deed from [the 
Lotts] is recorded, all future assessments will be due from the new 
owner and [the Lotts] will have no liability therefor." Marsh's May 6, 
1994, letter enclosed a copy of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed. The 
Lotts, however, were concerned that they were subject to liability for 
18
 Deposition of Ralph Marsh at 14; Dennis Lott Affidavit ir 13 (a 
copy of Marsh's letter is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit B); 
Francine Lott Affidavit If 9. 
19
 Dennis Lott Affidavit If 14; Francine Lott Affidavit If 10. 
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any assessments levied after the agreed upon closing date of May 1, 
1994, but before the recording of the Trust Deed.20 
21. After the Lotts received the Promissory Note and Trust Deed 
required by the Agreement, they were required to seek the advice of 
counsel to determine the impact of assessments levied against the 
property for which they were responsible after the closing date of 
May 1, 1994, but before the recording of the Trust Deed.21 
22. It took the Lotts approximately one week to contact attorneys 
in Pennsylvania and Utah. Based upon the advice of that counsel, the 
Lotts sought a change in the wording of the Trust Deed to protect them 
from liability for additional assessments occurring after the agreed-
upon closing date.22 
23. At that point, only a minor change in the Trust Deed and Note 
was necessary to correct the problem created by Knighton's delay. The 
Lotts requested Knighton to make this change on May 16, 1994.23 
24. Knighton did not contact Marsh to make this change until 
May 20, 1994, three weeks after the scheduled closing date and four days 
after the Lotts requested Knighton to contact Marsh.24 
Deposition of Kerry Knighton at 57; Dennis Lott Affidavit If 15; 
Francine Lott Affidavit 1f 11. 
21
 Dennis Lott Affidavit V 16; Francine Lott Affidavit V 12. 
22
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 1T 17; Francine Lott Affidavit V 13. 
23
 Deposition of Ralph Marsh at 32; Dennis Lott Affidavit IF 18. 
24
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 1T 19; Francine Lott Affidavit 11 14. 
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25. On May 23, 1994, Dennis Lott spoke with Knighton on the 
telephone and told him that he was becoming increasingly frustrated by 
the delays and that if the matter was not brought to closure 
immediately, the Lotts would call the whole transaction off. Knighton 
said that the deal would be closed by June 1, 1994, which Knighton 
acknowledged was the date the first payment under the Promissory Note 
was due, and the Lotts would receive the first payment.25 
26. On May 23, 1994, Knighton called Dennis Lott and asked him to 
call Marsh "so that we could get it right this time."26 
27. On May 24, 1994, the Lotts called Marsh on three separate 
occasions. When they finally reached him, Dennis Lott requested that 
Marsh alter the documents so that Knighton was liable for all 
assessments levied on the property after May 1, 1994.27 
28. The Lotts did not receive the payment due under the Promissory 
Note due on June 1, 1994.28 
29. Marsh did not make the necessary changes to the Trust Deed 
until June 7, 1994, even though the changes were minor. On that same 
day, Marsh spoke with Francine Lott by telephone and informed her of the 
following: 
a. He had finally made the necessary changes to the Trust 
Deed; 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 20. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 21. 
Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 23. 
Francine Lott Affidavit V 17, 
x 
25 
26 
27 
28 
b. The Trust Deed was ready to be sent.29 
30. Francine Lott responded that because of Knighton's and Marsh's 
unreasonable and unnecessary delays, she and her husband were no longer 
willing to go forward with the closing.30 
31. On June 7, 1994, at 11:45 p.m. (EDT), Dennis Lott called 
Knighton. Lott informed him of the following: 
a. Since requesting the changes in the Trust Deed three weeks 
ago, a $2,800 assessment was levied against the subject property, 
which the Lotts received and paid prior to the time they received 
the suggested changes in the Note and Trust Deed from Marsh. 
b. The Lotts paid the assessment, because they were legally 
obligated to do so, and due to the extensive delays, they assumed 
Knighton no longer was interested in purchasing the property. 
c. The Lotts' basis in the property had now changed, changing 
the value of the property, and that the deal was off. 
d. The Lotts would release the Earnest Money to Knighton. 
Knighton asked if the Lotts were interested in purchasing the survey of 
the property even though Knighton knew that no survey had been 
completed.31 
32. The Lotts received the proposed changes to the Trust Deed from 
Marsh on June 9, 1994. These changes were sent by regular mail. By 
29
 Francine Lott Affidavit 1f 17; Deposition of Kerry Knighton 
at 53-54; Deposition of Ralph Marsh at 18. 
30
 Francine Lott Affidavit V 17. 
31
 Dennis Lott Affidavit IT 25 and Exhibit D; Deposition of Kerry 
Knighton at 33-34. 
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that time, both Marsh and Knighton knew that the Lotts had paid the 
water assessment. Nevertheless, the Trust Deed enclosed with Marsh's 
June 9, 1994, letter was inadequate to address the Lotts' concerns. 
Specifically, the Trust Deed did not protect the Lotts from paying 
assessments for water usage after May 1, 1994. One of the very concerns 
of the Lotts entering into these negotiations with Knighton was to avoid 
responsibility and liability for these assessments.32 
33. According to the terms of the Agreement, the Lotts were 
extending $31,500 in credit to Knighton. Due to the extensive delays, 
and the cavalier manner in which the transaction was handled, it became 
apparent to the Lotts that Knighton was not a good credit risk.33 
34. The Lotts have never indicated to anyone that they were 
waiving the provisions in the Agreement that time was of the essence and 
that, if the Agreement did not close on or before May 1, 1994, that they 
were waiving their claim that Knighton breached the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement.34 
32
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 1[ 26; Francine Lott Affidavit ir 2; 
Deposition of Kerry Knighton at 57. 
33
 Dennis Lott Affidavit H 27; Francine Lott Affidavit « 19. 
34
 Dennis Lott Affidavit % 28; Francine Lott Affidavit 1T 20. 
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POINT I 
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT 
TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE AND THAT THE SALE BE CLOSED 
NO LATER THAN MAY 1, 1994. 
The Earnest Money Agreement between the Lotts and Knighton 
expressly states that closing was to occur upon receipt of the property 
survey and no later than May 1, 1994. This Agreement also explicitly 
states that time is of the essence. Specifically, Paragraph Q of that 
Agreement reads as follows: 
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that 
this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein 
[May 1, 1994] due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, 
delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar 
occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then 
the closing date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond 
cessation of such condition, but in no event more than 
fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided 
herein. Thereafter, time is of the essence. This 
provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. 
"Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary 
instruments are signed and delivered by all parties to 
the transaction. (Emphasis added.) 
In addition, pursuant to Paragraph R of the Agreement in the event 
of default of this Agreement by one party, the non-defaulting party may 
retain possession of the Earnest Money as liquidated damages or maintain 
an action for damages. 
It is well settled in Utah that when a contract for the sale of 
land has an express "time of essence" clause and some provision for 
forfeiture or some avoidance of the contract in the event performance is 
untimely or nonexistent, the time of essence clause will be enforced. 
See, e.g., BarJber v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987) and cases 
cited. Accordingly, under Utah law, the forfeiture provision in 
1 
Paragraph R ensures that the time of the essence provision in 
Paragraph Q is enforceable. Moreover, it is a well-established custom 
and practice in Utah that time becomes of the essence at the time of 
closing, in this case May 1, 1994. See Further Affidavit of Charles A. 
Hammond (attached hereto as Exhibit 1). 
Knighton's argument that the time of essence clause is only 
triggered in the event of an occurrence outlined in Paragraph Q of the 
Agreement must be rejected because those events are extraordinary and do 
not routinely occur. Since time of essence clauses are generally not 
standard features of land sales contracts, see, e.g., Cahoon v. Cahoon, 
641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982), it is illogical to assume that the parties 
expressly contracted for an unusual provision to be triggered in the 
event of an extraordinary occurrence. Knighton's reading of the 
Agreement is both self-serving and overly convoluted. Moreover, to the 
extent there is an ambiguity in the construction of the contract, that 
ambiguity must be construed against Knighton and Marsh as the parties 
responsible for the language used in the Agreement. Matter of Orris' 
Estate, 622 P.2d 337 (Utah 1980) (Language of an ambiguous instrument 
should be construed more strictly against drafter of an agreement, 
particularly if drafter is an attorney). 
Even if an extension of the closing date were applicable here, it 
would have expired on May 8, 1994. It was not until May 9, 1994, eight 
days after the scheduled closing, that the Lotts first received a copy 
of the Note and Trust Deed. 
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There is no contractual excuse for extending the closing date, and 
time was of the essence as of May 1, 1994. See Further Affidavit of 
Charles A. Hammond. Absent such an exception or occurrence, contrary to 
Defendants' contention, the agreement between the parties did not make 
time of the essence fifteen days after the scheduled May 1, 1994, 
closing. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE PROVISION IS 
ENFORCEABLE AND BECAUSE KNIGHTON DID NOT TENDER 
PERFORMANCE, THE PARTIES ARE DISCHARGED FROM 
FURTHER OBLIGATION UNDER THE AGREEMENT. 
Knighton never tendered performance prior to the May 1, 1994, 
closing date. Specifically, he never (1) delivered the Trust Deed and 
Note to the Lotts; (2) never tendered the cash down payment; and 
(3) performed the property survey. Finally, Knighton never tendered his 
performance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-1 (1951). 
In Century 21 All West Real Estate v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 
1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that, "Where the contract states 
that time is of the essence, cases hold that both parties are discharged 
from their contract obligations if neither makes tender by the agreed 
closing date." Id. at 55 n.l. 
It is clear already that the time of essence clause is enforceable. 
A review of the undisputed facts makes it clear that Knighton did not 
tender performance in several material respects. Accordingly, the Lotts 
should be discharged from their obligation under the Agreement. 
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1. Knighton's Failure to Deliver the Trust Deed and Note 
Delivering documents to his attorneys' office, rather than to the 
Lotts, does not constitute a tender of performance.35 Marsh is 
Knighton's attorney, and therefore, Knighton's agent.36 Marsh is not 
an agent of the Lotts. 
Knighton was under an obligation to tender performance by sending 
the properly executed Note and Trust Deed. Well before closing, Dennis 
Lott requested copies of the Note and Trust Deed; he did not receive 
them until May 9, 1994, eight days after the scheduled closing.37 
Moreover, the Note and Trust Deed were deficient in that they did not 
provide the protection against further assessments that the Lotts 
requested and further because they could not be recorded until Monday, 
May 2, 1994, a day after closing. 
2. Knighton's Failure to Provide the Promised Down Payment 
Knighton was under an obligation to tender performance by sending 
the cash deposited in Marsh's Trust Account to the Lotts or by tendering 
Knighton claims he delivered the money, the Promissory Note and 
the Trust Deed to his attorneys office on April 29, 1994, and signed all 
of the documents at that time. Defendants' Memorandum at 6; Affidavit 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 1f 9. The Trust Deed attached 
as Exhibit HD" to the Defendants' Memorandum admittedly appears to be 
signed by Knighton, and his signature is notarized by Ralph Marsh. The 
Trust Deed, however, is dated May 1, 1994, a Sunday, as is the 
notarization. The issue this raises is whether the Affidavit is 
perjured or whether incorrect date intentionally was inserted on the 
Trust Deed. 
36
 Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984)(any neglect 
by a party's attorney is attributable to that party through principles 
of agency). 
37
 Dennis Lott Affidavit 1f 14; Francine Lott Affidavit If 10. 
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performance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-1 (1943). * He did 
neither. 
3. Knighton's Failure to Conduct the Property Survey 
As Knighton's agent Marsh has conceded, the sale was contingent 
upon Knighton's successful completion of a percolation test and a 
certified survey on the property. On April 26, 1994, Knighton informed 
the Lotts that the survey was not yet complete and that he would waive 
the percolation test, although the Lotts never received any such waiver 
in writing. The survey was for the Lotts' benefit, as well as Knighton. 
Knighton never completed the survey and did not conduct the percolation 
test. 
POINT III 
KNIGHTON AND MARSH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DELAYS 
IN CLOSING AND THE RESULTANT CONSEQUENCES. 
The closing was set to occur no later than May 1, 1994. It did not 
occur on or before that date, although Marsh and Knighton had months to 
prepare for the closing.39 Paragraph C of the Agreement states that the 
"[s]eller warrants that . . . all obligations against the property 
including . . . assessments . • . shall be brought current on or before 
closing.M Closing should have occurred on May 1, 1994.40 
38
 See Sleverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954). 
39
 Indeed, Marsh has conceded that he knew in February, 1994, that 
he was going to be the closing agent. Deposition of Ralph Marsh at 
29-30. 
40
 Because the closing was scheduled on May 1, 1994, a Sunday, the 
manner in which the Trust Deed originally drafted required it to be 
recorded on Friday, April 29, 1994, to avoid exposing the Lotts for 
assessments levied after the date of the closing. Yet, as stated above. 
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An examination of the chronology in this case demonstrates that 
Knighton and Marsh were responsible for the delays in the closing. 
1. Marsh did not send the documents the Lotts needed to sign 
until April 29, 1994. These documents were sent by regular 
mail and were not received until May 3, 1994. 
2. Marsh did not enclose copies of the requisite Note and Trust 
Deed contemplated by the Agreement with the documents he 
mailed April 29, 1995, even though he knew that it was 
customary for a seller who is financing a transaction to 
review such documents before closing. 
3. Dennis Lott immediately requested copies of the Note and Trust 
Deed, but did not receive them until May 9, 1994, eight days 
after the scheduled closing. 
4. The Trust Deed drafted by Marsh which the Lotts received on 
May 9, 1994, subjected the Lotts to liability for any 
assessments levied after the agreed upon closing date of 
May 1, 1994, but before the recording of the Trust Deed. The 
Trust Deed only required Knighton to pay the assessments in 
the future after the Trust Deed was recorded. 
5* It took the Lotts approximately one week to contact attorneys 
in Pennsylvania and Utah. Based upon advice of that counsel, 
the Lotts sought a change in the wording of the Trust Deed to 
Knighton did not deliver the Trust Deed to Marsh until, at the earliest, 
April 29, 1994, and Marsh sent it to the Lotts on May 9, 1994. 
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avoid liability for assessments occurring after the agreed-
upon closing date but before the documents were recorded. 
6. Up to that point, only a minor change to the Trust Deed and 
Note was needed to correct the problem created by Knighton's 
delay. The Lotts requested to Knighton to make this change on 
May 16, 1994. 
7. Marsh did not make the necessary change to the Trust Deed 
until June 7, 1994, three weeks after it was requested. 
Even after Marsh's tardy revision, the language of the Trust Deed 
did not protect the Lotts against assessments levied after May 1, 1994. 
The revised Trust Deed the Lotts received on June 9, 1994, stated in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and 
assessments on the above property from May 1, 1994, 
to the extent not already paid by Beneficiaries, to 
pay all charges and assessments on water or water 
stock used on or with said property from May 1, 
1994, not to commit waste, to maintain adequate 
fire insurance on improvements on said property,to 
pay all costs and expenses of collection . . . and 
to pay reasonable trustee's fees . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) By this time, however, both Knighton and Marsh knew 
the Lotts paid the $2,800.00 water assessment. Thus, the language "to 
the extent not already paid by Beneficiaries" continued to subject the 
Lotts to liability for the water assessment which everyone knew was 
imminent as of May 1, 1994, and which the Lotts had paid prior to 
June 9, 1994. Marsh's June 7, 1994, letter did not enclose a revised 
Settlement Statement requiring Knighton as being responsible for the 
$2,800.00 assessment. 
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Furthermore, by June 9, 1994, several material changes had 
occurred: 
* The Lotts paid the assessment, changing their basis in the 
property. 
• According to the terms of the Agreement, the Lotts were 
extending $31,500 in credit to Knighton. Due to the extensive 
delays, and the cavalier manner in which the transaction was 
handled, it became apparent to the Lotts that Knighton was not 
a good credit risk. 
• The Lotts did not receive the payment due under the Promissory 
Note due on June 1, 19'94, although Knighton acknowledged that 
the first payment under the Promissory Note was due on that 
date. 
The $2,800 assessment represents 80% of the down payment the Lotts 
were receiving on this transaction. If they were liable for the 
assessment, the Lotts would have lost eight percent of the purchase 
price and would be financing the property with the debtor, Knighton, 
having little to no equity in the property. In the event of a default 
on the Note secured by the Trust Deed, the Lotts would not be fully 
secured. 
CONCLUSION 
Time was of the essence in closing the transaction. The closing 
date was no later than May 1, 1994. Marsh was the closing agent, 
responsible for procuring title insurance, closing the transaction in 
his office, and drafting the necessary documents. He did not do so in 
8 
a timely manner. Marsh was Knighton's attorney and agent only; he did 
not represent the Lotts. 
Knighton did not tender his performance prior to the closing date. 
Because time was of the essence, the Earnest Money Agreement expired of 
its own terms. 
DATED: June 8, 1995. 
CAMPBELL MAACK &,SESSIONS 
J^M*~-
A. Larsen 
eys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of June, 1995, I caused 
to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing LOTTS1 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to the 
following: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
wp51\mal\lott\»u»aary.»ein 
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. : 
LOTT, : 
: FURTHER AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiffs, : CHARLES A. HAMMOND 
vs. : 
: Civil No. 940904735PR 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. : 
MARSH, : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants. : 
In opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiffs Dennis A. and Francine G. Lott submit the following 
Further Affidavit of Charles A. Hammond, an expert witness on 
the duties and responsibilities of a real estate closing agent: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
CHARLES A. HAMMOND, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says as follows: 
EXHIBIT 1 
1. The "time is of the essenceM clause contained in the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement in this transaction comes from a 
standard form earnest money sales agreement utilized by realtors 
and others in this area. 
2. Based upon my experience in real estate title matters 
and real estate sales matters generally, it is my opinion that 
the "time is of the essence" clause contained in the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement in this case is not ambiguous at all. To 
the contrary, time becomes of the essence for a transaction 
pursuant to this Agreement at the time of closing. 
3. In any event, it is the custom and practice in Utah 
and elsewhere that time becomes of the essence in a sale of real 
property upon the closing date. 
DATED: June 7, 1995. 
CHARLES A. HAMMOND 
* 
Y 
1995. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this / - day of June, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MARY ANN BECK 
SM South Main #1300 
St tuf t»c* . i f r t4 i t t 
MyComntortonExptot 
Octtar 13.198f 
STATE OF UTAH 
l O ^ A R ^ / P U B L I C • 
My Commission Expires: 
/*- /3 - if 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the P* - day of June, 1995, 
I caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FURTHER AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. HAMMOND, to the 
following: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
&**&?),**& 
wp51\mal\lott\affidavit2.ham 
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TabG 
RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and 
FRANCINE G. LOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and 
RALPH J. MARSH 
Defendants. 
KNIGHTON'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO LOTTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940904735 PR 
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) 
In defendants' Memoranda in support of their motion for summary judgment 
it is stated and demonstrated, from the affidavits submitted by both sides, that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact. Nevertheless, plaintiffs continue to make statements 
in their memorandum which are either contrary to the admitted facts or are not admissible 
into evidence and should not be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, 
defendants object to the so-called "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" in plaintiffs' 
memorandum as follows, referring to the numbered paragraphs of such statement in 
plaintiffs' memorandum: 
1 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED OR OTHERWISE OBJECTIONAL FACTS 
1. The information in this refers to alleged conversations during the 
negotiations for the contract later signed by the parties and is barred by the integration 
clause in Section L of the contract and by the parol evidence rule. [Exhibit "A", Section L, 
attached to defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment]. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs here admit that the language in the contract referring to a survey and 
percolation test was inserted at the request of and for the benefit of the buyer which 
contradicts statements previously made by plaintiffs' attorney that these provisions were 
included at the request of the sellers. Plaintiffs' lack of credibility is shown by their own 
statements. 
2. Undisputed. 
3. Undisputed. 
4. Disputed in part. The conversation in which the Lotts agreed that the 
closing could occur through Mr. Marsh occurred on April 26, 1994, after Lotts had failed to 
provide a title report and designate a location for the closing. Notice that the Lotts place 
no date on this conversation and notice, too, that Mr. Knighton stated that the Lotts told 
him Mto go ahead and have my attorney try and get the title insurance" and to ask Mr. Marsh 
to prepare the closing documents. [Knighton Deposition, 39-40]. Mr. Knighton did not 
agree to pay all closing fees at this time but did so agree on May 3 when Lotts told him they 
did not want to pay any closing fees. [Knighton Affidavit, If 11]. If Lotts had chosen Utah 
Title Company to be the closing agent, they did not inform Mr. Knighton of that fact nor 
do they claim to have so informed him. The credibility of this statement is suspect because 
it is general knowledge that Utah Title Company has been out of business for many years. 
5. Disputed that Knighton told Lotts that Marsh would handle all ordinary 
work associated with the preparation for closing. He only stated that he would ask Marsh 
to obtain a title report and prepare the documents to close. [Knighton Deposition, 40; 
Knighton Affidavit, H 8]. Mr. Lott admits that he told Knighton to have Marsh obtain a title 
report on April 26, 1994. [Dennis Lott Affidavit, H 6]. 
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6. Undisputed. The survey and percolation test were preconditions to 
Knighton's obligations to perform but were waived by him. They were not, however, 
preconditions to Lotts' obligations to perform. 
7. The implications of this paragraph are disputed. After Knighton called Lotts 
twice on April 25, 1994, and they said they would call him back the next day. On April 26, 
1994, they did call him back and for the first time Knighton learned that Lotts had done 
nothing to obtain a title report even though it was their obligation to do so. [Section G of 
Exhibit "A" attached to defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment; Knighton Deposition, 39-40]. Because Lotts had done nothing, they told 
Knighton to have his attorney obtain the report and prepare the closing documents. Their 
alleged "amazement" is itself amazing because it was their obligation. If they had really 
chosen Utah Title as the closing agent, as they allege, they surely would have obtained a title 
report from Utah Title by then. It is quite obvious that they had neither chosen Utah Title 
nor had they obtained a title report. 
8. Disputed that Knighton and Marsh agreed to assume responsibility for 
obtaining title insurance. They did, however, undertake to accommodate the Lotts by 
ordering the title report and prepare the closing papers because the Lotts had failed to do 
so. It is also disputed that title insurance could be obtained shortly after requesting it since 
that depends on the nature of the title search required and the availability of title company 
personnel to do the search, examine it and prepare and deliver the title report. The title 
report was ordered immediately after Knighton's conversation with Mr. Lott on April 26, 
1994, and was delivered on May 2, 1994. [Knighton Deposition, 39-40; Marsh Deposition, 
17-19]. 
9. Disputed that it takes only 24 hours to obtain a title report. See paragraph 
8 above. 
10. Disputed because these are legal conclusions and claims to be the opinion 
of an expert witness who has no knowledge of the facts of this case. It ignores that the Lotts 
were obligated to obtain the title report and arrange for the closing but failed to do so. It 
further ignores the fact that Knighton and Marsh did not assume the responsibilities of the 
Lotts but were only attempting to accommodate them because of their failure to perform. 
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It also ignores the legal principles that the duties in this case are established by the contract 
between the parties, of which this so-called expert has no knowledge, and that a party to a 
contract cannot benefit from his own failure to perform. 
11. Disputed for the same reasons stated in paragraph 10 above. 
12. Undisputed. 
13. Undisputed except that this conclusion is not based on facts. Lotts had an 
opportunity to examine the note and trust deed and requested changes in the trust deed 
which were made even though they were not required. [Marsh Deposition, 31-33, 42-43], 
14. Disputed because these are legal conclusions. The agreement provides that 
time is of the essence only after fifteen days from the scheduled closing date. 
15. Disputed because Knighton made no telephone call to Lotts on that date. 
This statement, however, establishes that the Lotts were not opposed to an extension of the 
closing date and, therefore, time was not of the essence to them. Mr. Knighton told Mr. 
Lott on April 26 that the survey was to his satisfaction-not that it was not done. [Knighton 
Deposition, 34]. 
16. Disputed because Mr. Knighton signed the closing documents to be signed 
by him and deposited the down payment with Mr. Marsh on April 29„ 1994. [Knighton 
Affidavit, H 9] The Lotts had already agreed that Mr. Marsh should be the closing agent. 
[Dennis Lott Affidavit, 1f 6]. 
17. Disputed. May 1, 1994, was a Sunday. The closing did not take place 
solely because the Lotts requested changes in the documents and never did tender their 
performance by delivering the signed deed and closing statement. 
18. Undisputed except that the use of regular mail did not delay the closing. 
Lotts could have completed the closing on May 3, 1994, by simply calling Mr. Marsh on the 
telephone and asking him to fax the changes and the documents they requested. Instead, 
they called Mr. Knighton. 
19. Undisputed. 
20. Undisputed except that Lotts would not be liable for assessments prior to 
closing if Mr. Knighton agreed to pay them, which he did in the Trust Deed. 
21. Disputed but irrelevant. 
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22. Undisputed. 
23. Disputed that any change was required or that Knighton caused any delay. 
24. Undisputed except that plaintiffs have not mentioned the reason for the 
delay, that is, that Knighton was unable to contact Mr. Marsh until that date. 
25. Disputed but irrelevant. 
26. Disputed. 
27. Undisputed. 
28. Undisputed but no payment was due on the promissory note until the Lotts 
completed the closing by signing and returning the deed. 
29. Disputed. The changes in the Trust deed were made and the Trust Deed 
and the Trust Deed was sent to Mr. Knighton on May 27, 1994, and returned to Mr. Marsh 
on May 31, 1994. Mr. Marsh tried to reach the Lotts by telephone earlier but was not 
successful until June 7, 1994, when Mrs. Lott said she would have to wait until her husband 
was home to turn on the facsimile machine. [Marsh Deposition, 43]. 
30. Disputed. [Marsh Deposition, 43]. It is interesting that plaintiffs no longer 
claim that the information contained in paragraph 31 was conveyed to Marsh by Mr. Lott, 
as they did in responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
31. Disputed except that it is undisputed that Mr. Lott told Mr. Knighton he 
wanted to terminate the contract. [Knighton Deposition, 54]. 
32. Disputed that Marsh and Knighton knew that Lotts had paid the water 
assessment and that the Trust Deed was inadequate to address the Lotts' concerns. This is 
a legal conclusion. 
33. It is not disputed that the Lotts were extending credit to Mr. Knighton, 
secured by the property, but they had already agreed to that when they signed the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement, whether or not Mr. Knighton was a good credit risk. 
34. Disputed that time was the essence of the agreement. That is a legal 
conclusion. If time was the essence of this agreement, there was a waiver thereof. The 
Lotts were clearly willing to close the transaction up until June 7, 1994, because they were 
requesting and demanding changes in the documents to satisfy themselves up to that time 
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and did not ever tender their own performance prior to asserting that the contract was 
terminated. 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. For additional facts not in dispute, see the Statement of Facts in defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Lotts were not prepared to close this transaction on May 1, 1994, or any 
time thereafter because they did not hold title to the property. Title stood in the name of 
Zions First National Bank then and still does. [Marsh Deposition, 9-11; Title Commitment 
attached hereto]. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TIME WAS NOT THE ESSENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT 
UNTIL MAY 16, 1994, AND WAS NOT THEREAFTER 
BECAUSE ALL DELAYS WERE CAUSED BY LOTTS. 
Plaintiffs have argued that time was the essence of this agreement because it 
contains both a forfeiture clause and a time of the essence clause. They rely upon Barker 
v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 1987) as authority for that proposition. That case actually 
states, in dictum, that a contract which requires a forfeiture of a deposit if a deadline is not 
met may mean that time is of the essence. It also states, in dictum, at 52, that "a closing 
date alone in a contract for the sale or exchange of land does not make time of the essence." 
Our contract does not provide for forfeiture of a deposit if a deadline is not met. Rather, 
it provides that ,!in the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the 
earnest money as liquidated damages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller." 
[Section N, Exhibit "A" to defendants initial memorandum]. The Barker case actually held 
that when one party realized that a title report could not be obtained by the May 1, 1980 
closing date and attempted to obtain an extension of the closing date and the other party 
did not respond and then refused to perform, the first party was entitled to specific 
performance of the agreement, stating, at 53, "a party to a contract may not obtain an 
advantage from the fact that he is unable to perform." That case, therefore, totally supports 
6 
the position of Knighton that he is entitled to have Lotts specifically perform the contract 
because they did not provide a title report by May 1, 1994. 
Plaintiffs' attempt to argue that the law applicable to this case is determined 
by the opinion of a layman working for a title company is irrelevant. It is not the opinion 
of some unknown title company employee that establishes whether time is of the essence. 
Rather, it is the words of the contract between the parties as interpreted by the courts. The 
Utah Supreme Court, in Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1991), held that the same 
clause in this contract, except that it provided that time was the essence after thirty days 
instead of fifteen, had "no effect . . . where 30 days had not passed and the delay was the 
result of a mutual agreement." Therefore, in this case, time was not of the essence until 
fifteen days after the scheduled closing date, in any event, and not thereafter because of the 
Lotts' requests for changes in the documents. We do not argue that only a disaster triggers 
the time of the essence clause, as claimed by plaintiffs. We only argue that time could not 
have been the essence of this agreement until fifteen days after the scheduled closing date, 
which is the way the Supreme Court reads this agreement. This language is not ambiguous 
nor was it drafted by Knighton or his attorney. It is the language of a standard form 
contract in common use which has already been construed by the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs' 
attempt, after the fact, to twist this language to mean something else flies in the face of its 
clear, unambiguous meaning and the interpretation of the Utah Supreme Court. 
POINT II 
KNIGHTON PERFORMED PRIOR TO THE MAY 1, 1994, 
CLOSING DATE, LOTTS DID NOT EVER TENDER THEIR 
PERFORMANCE. 
The Lotts argue that Knighton did not tender his performance prior to the May 
1,1994, closing date and state that "delivering documents to his attorneys' office, rather than 
to Mr. & Mrs. Lott, does not constitute a tender of performance." However, they have 
admitted that Knighton's attorney was to be the closing agent [Lotts' Revised Memorandum, 
p. viii, 1111 3 & 4] and they have not disputed that Knighton signed the documents and left 
them and the down payment with the closing agent on April 29, 1994. It is, therefore, 
without dispute that Knighton performed his side of the closing by this date. Delivery of the 
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documents to the Lotts is not required without a simultaneous delivery of the deed by the 
Lotts in return. That, of course, is the reason a closing agent is used in such transactions-so 
that both sides can perform through an intermediary without waiting for the other side to 
perform first. Knighton not only performed by the May 1, 1994, closing date but the Lotts 
were informed of his performance by the letter sent to them on April 29, 1994. Completion 
of the closing was entirely up to the Lotts. The Lotts' claim that Knighton "never fully 
performed" because the sale was contingent upon the successful completion of a percolation 
test and a survey is another spurious claim. Their memorandum admits that Knighton 
waived the percolation test and Mr. Lott admits in his affidavit that Knighton told him on 
April 29, 1994, "that all was in order and the survey was complete." [Dennis Lott Affidavit, 
p. 4,11 10]. The claim that Knighton did not perform by the closing date is contrary to the 
Lotts' own affidavits. 
Lotts' attempt to claim that the failure to obtain a survey was a failure of 
performance on Knighton's part is totally disingenuous. This claim was never mentioned by 
the Lotts at the time and is now an after-the-fact fabrication. They have not pointed to any 
evidence that the survey was for their benefit and it is difficult to see how it could be. On 
the other hand, they have admitted, in paragraph 1 of the Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts in their Memorandum, that Knighton needed the survey for his benefit. It is easy to 
see why a survey could benefit him. Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1242 
(Utah 1992), held that "a seller is not entitled to take advantage of a provision intended to 
benefit the buyer alone." Knighton actually had a surveyor go onto the property and 
determine where the corners were and he told the Lotts that the survey "was to my 
satisfaction." If Lotts wanted the survey for their benefit, they should have said so. They 
cannot claim a default by Knighton on this or any other ground. 
Lotts rely upon Century 21 All West Real Estate v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 
1982), to argue that both parties are discharged if neither tenders performance by the 
agreed closing date. That case actually held that "neither party can be said to be in default 
. . . until the other party has tendered his own performance." Lotts have not ever tendered 
their performance and they, therefore, are not in a position to claim default. Knighton, on 
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the other hand, did tender his performance and he is entitled to have the Court order 
specific performance by the Lotts. 
Lotts also failed to perform in the closing of this transaction because they did 
not hold title to the property and could not deliver title. Title stood then, and stands now, 
in the name of Zions First National Bank. It was the obligation of the Lotts to provide clear 
title. They could not then and cannot now. Fortunately for them, Mr. Marsh was able to 
obtain from the bank a deed which would clear the title and allow them to close. It was not 
Mr. Marsh's nor Mr. Knighton's obligation to clear the title for them. The defect in the title 
was not discovered until Mr. Marsh received the title report on May 2, 1994. He voluntarily 
undertook to clear this defect in the title without even informing the Lotts of the problem. 
However, it is both ludicrous and ungracious of the Lotts to claim that they were ready to 
close when they had no title and Mr. Marsh, on his own, arranged to clear the title. This 
fact alone is sufficient to deny summary judgment for the Lotts. 
POINT III 
THE LOTTS' ARGUMENT BASED ON THE LANGUAGE OF 
THE REVISED TRUST DEED IS A BOGUS ISSUE BECAUSE 
THEY HAD REFUSED TO PERFORM BEFORE THEY HAD 
EVER SEEN THE REVISED TRUST DEED. 
The Lotts attempt to make much of the language in the revised trust deed to 
the effect that the taxes and assessments would be paid by Knighton "to the extent not 
already paid by Beneficiaries." This attempt is also disingenuous for several reasons. First, 
this language refers only to the general property taxes and the regular home owners' 
assessments, on which the Lotts had already made a payment and, therefore, did not want 
to be charged with those assessments on the original closing statement. It has no reference 
to the water assessment which is handled in the language which follows that is now objected 
to. Therefore, it did not make the Lotts liable for the water assessment. Secondly, the 
revised trust deed was prepared on May 27, 1994, which was before Knighton was informed 
that Lotts had received and paid the water assessment on June 7, 1994. Therefore, neither 
Knighton nor Mr. Marsh knew that Lotts had paid the water assessment when the revised 
trust deed was prepared and signed. Thirdly, the Lotts should not have paid the water 
assessment when it was received but should have forwarded that to Knighton or the closing 
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agent to be paid by Knighton. They knew that the closing was in process, that Knighton had 
signed the papers on his side and had deposited the earnest money and that the only thing 
to be done was for them to sign and return the deed and closing statement. For them to 
pay the water assessment and claim that suddenly the deal had changed was an act of bad 
faith on their part. Fourthly, they had not seen the revised trust deed containing this 
language when they refused to perform on June 7, 1994. Because they had refused to allow 
Mr. Marsh to fax the revised trust deed to them and because they wanted to terminate the 
deal, Mr. Marsh forwarded a copy of the revised trust deed to them with his letter of June 
9, 1994. They were, therefore, not aware of this language in the revised trust deed until 
some days after June 9. Interestingly, the lengthy letters from the Lotts' attorney of June 
16 and July 8, 1994, make no reference to this language in the revised trust deed. This 
argument is totally an after-thought and had nothing to do with the Lotts' refusal to perform. 
The same is true of the arguments that the Lotts changed their basis in the 
property by paying the water assessment, that they suddenly considered that Knighton was 
not a good credit risk and that Knighton did not pay the note payment due June 1, 1994. 
Knighton agreed to pay the water assessment and was legally obligated to do so. They 
should have forwarded the assessment to him for payment. They did not have to pay it. 
They agreed to extend credit to Knighton when the agreement was signed in January. There 
is nothing in the agreement allowing them to rescind if they learned that he was not a good 
credit risk nor is there any evidence to show that he is not a good credit risk. Knighton 
would have paid the June 1, 1994, note payment if the Lotts had completed the closing and 
he will pay that payment and all others that are due as soon as the Lotts convey title to the 
property as they are obligated to do. The Lotts cannot complain about a failure to perform 
by Knighton until they themselves have performed. "[A] party must make a tender of his 
own agreed performance in order to put the other party in default." Century 21 All Western 
Real Estate Investment Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982). All of these arguments 
are "bogus" issues raised only to confuse the court. They are in fact an attempt to deceive 
the court and should not even be considered. 
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CONCLUSION 
Time was not the essence of this agreement until after May 16, 1994, by the 
terms of the agreement itself, and was not thereafter because all delays were caused by the 
Lotts. Their requests for revisions in the documents amounted to a request for a 
postponement of the closing until those changes could be made. Knighton had fully 
performed his side of the closing on April 29, 1994. Everything else that had to be done to 
complete the closing was to be done by the Lotts. Despite the attempts to accommodate 
the Lotts, they did not ever tender performance on their side by sending the signed deed and 
closing statement or even by stating their willingness to do so upon some condition. All 
other issues raised by the Lotts have been manufactured after-the-fact. Their interpretation 
of the language of the revised trust deed is phony because they refused to perform long 
before they had ever seen that language. There is no basis in the agreement which would 
allow the Lotts to back out because Mr. Knighton might be a poor credit risk nor is there 
any evidence that he is a poor credit risk. 
The Lotts have simply failed to even attempt to close this transaction in good 
faith and have done everything in the power to prevent the closing. The Court should 
foreclose any further attempts by them to frustrate this transaction by entering summary 
judgment against the Lotts ordering them to specifically perform the agreement. 
DATED this JfL day of June, 1995. 
BACKMj\N, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh7 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the l°l day of June, 1995, I hand-delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO THE LOTTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to the following: 
MARK A. LARSEN 
SEAN N. EG AN 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
ISSUED BY 
Sanctity el Contract 
S T E W A R T TITLE 
GUARANTY COMPANY 
STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY, A Texas Corporation, herein called the Company, for a valuable 
consideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A, in 
favor of the proposed Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest covered 
hereby in the land described or referred to in Schedule A, upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor; 
all subject to the provisions of Schedules A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof. 
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the 
policy or policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the time 
of the issuance of this Commitment or by subsequent endorsement. 
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability 
and obligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six months after the effective date hereof or when the 
policy or policies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy 
or policies is not the fault of the Company. 
Signed under seal for the Company, but this Commitment shall not be valid or binding until it bears an 
authorized Countersignature. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Stewart Title Guaranty Company has caused its corporate name and seal to be 
hereunto affixed by its duly authorized officers on the date shown in Schedule A. 
S T E W A R T TITLE 
GUARANTY COMPANY 
Chairman of Me Board 
Countersigned by 
Authorized Signatory „ , _ , . , - - „ r r n 
BAGK?^M-?7i:W/VP.T TITLE BERV.GF.5, L fD. 
1 6 7 E T T o l «0 wOUTH. MUhi-m», U V ^ 1 0 7 
City, State 
SCHEDULE A 
ORDER NO.: 94050748 
1. Effective date: APRIL 27, 1994 at 7:45 a.m. 
2. Policy or policies to be issued: Amount of insurance Rate 
Type REGULAR 
A. ALTA Owners Policy (4-6-90) $ 35,000.00 $ 290.00 
Proposed insured: 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON 
Proposed insured: 
Other coverages and/or charges: 
3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in the 
Commitment and covered herein is: 
Fee Simple as to Parcel 1 
A non-exclusive easement and right of way as to Parcel 2. 
Subject to the terms, conditions and limitations of said estate 
4. Title is at the effective date vested in: 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Trustee 
5. The land referred to in this commitment is in the STATE OF UTAH , County 
of Salt Lake , and is described as follows: 
PARCEL 1: 
Lot 113, HI COUNTRY ESTATES PHASE II, an unrecorded subdivision 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and more particularly 
described as follows: 
Beginning at a point which is South 870.83 feet and East 2499.13 
feet from the West quarter corner of Section 21, Township 4 
South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence North 71 deg. 22'15" West 582.27 feet; thence North 18 
deg. 37'45" East 353.01 feet to a point on a 375.00 foot radius 
curve to the right (radius point bears South 71 deg. 22'15" 
East); thence Easterly along said curve on an arc distance of 
704.00 feet (delta angle = 107 deg. 33'46l!); thence South 53 
CONTINUATION SHEET 
SCHEDULE A 
ORDER NO.: 94050748 
deg. 48'29" East 304.13 feet; thence South 36 deg. 11'31" West 
64 9.01 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: 
Together with all non-exclusive easements and rights of way and 
the rights to use the roadways of Hi-Country Estates 
Subdivision. 
BACKMAN-STEWART TITLE SERVICES, LTD. 
SCHEDULE B - SECTION 1 
ORDER NO.: 94050748 
REQUIREMENTS 
THE FOLLOWING ARE THE REQUIREMENTS TO BE COMPLIED WITH: 
ITEM (a) PAYMENT TO OR FOR THE ACCOUNT QF THE GRANTORS OR 
MORTGAGORS OF THE FULL CONSIDERATION FOR THE ESTATE OR INTEREST 
TO BE INSURED. 
ITEM (b) PROPER INSTRUMENT (S) CREATING THE ESTATE OR INTEREST 
TO BE INSURED MUST BE EXECUTED AND DULY FILED FOR RECORD. 
TO-WIT: 
1. Deed from the vestee to Hi-Country Estates, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, Hi-Country Estates, a Utah limited partnership, and 
Hi-Country Estates, Second, a Utah limited partnership, 
pursuant to that certain Real Estate Contract dated March 25, 
1970 between Tony Mascaro and Carmen M. Mascaro, his wife, and 
Mary Mascaro, as sellers and Hi-Country Estates, a limited 
partnership as buyers as disclosed by various instruments of 
record, including that certain Assignment of Real Estate 
Contract for Security Purposes. 
Recorded January 31, 1974 
Entry No. 2597644 
Book/Page 3 50 9/274 
Note The Assignment of Real Estate Contract for Security 
Purposes referred to above has been released. 
Note Seller's interest in said contract now appears to be 
held of record by the vestee herein. 
2. Copy of Partnership Agreement for Hi-Country Estates Limited 
Partnership and Hi-Country Estates Second Limited Partnership. 
3. The following requirements should be complied with prior to the 
issuance of any title policies 
A. Certified copy of Resolution of the Governing board of the 
Hi-Country Estates, Inc. a Utah Non-Profit Corporation, 1). 
authorizing the borrowing of money and execution of necessary 
documents 2). authorizing the sale of the subject property and 
the execution of necessary documents) and reciting that the 
board has been duly authorized in the premises by the 
CONTINUATION SHEET 
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ORDER NO.: 94050748 
REQUIREMENTS: (Continued) 
congregation. Said Resolution must be properly certified by ari( 
officer of the corporation with the Corporate Seal affixed. Said 
Resolution must be submitted to and approved by The Company, 
but may not need to be recorded. 
B. Proper showing as to the present discipline, by-laws or 
other rules and regulations of Hi-Country Estates insofar as the 
same pertains to and authorizes the above contemplated 
transaction. The showing need only be made to The Company and no 
documents need be recorded. 
Note: In the event that said discipline, by-laws or rules and 
regulations do not authorize the contemplated real estate 
transaction, additional requirements may be necessary. 
Deed from Hi-Country Estates, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Hi-Country Estates, a Utah limited partnership, and Hi-Country 
Estates, Second, a Utah limited partnership, to Dennis A. Lott 
and Francine G. Lott pursuant to the following: 
Uniform Real Estate Contract 
Seller Hi-Country Estates, Second, a Utah limited 
partnership 
Buyer Gerald H. Bagley 
Dated November 8, 1973 
Recorded January 25, 1974 
Entry No. 2596675 
Book/Page 3506/178 
Assignment 
Assignor Gerald H. Bagley 
Assigned to Jordan Acres, a Utah limited partnership 
Dated January 16, 1975 
Recorded November 4, 1986 
Entry No. 4343633 
Book/Page 583 6/781 
Warranty Deed 
Grantor Jordan Acres, a limited partnership 
Grantee Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. Lott 
Recorded October 31, 1986 
Entry No. 4341247 
Book/Page 5834/143 0 
5. Deed from Dennis A. Lott and Francine G. Lott to Kerry L. 
Knighton. 
CONTINUATION SHEET 
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ORDER NO.: 94050748 
REQUIREMENTS: (continued) 
PLEASE DIRECT ANY INQUIRIES CONCERNING THIS COMMITMENT TO| 
TODD EVANS 
(801) 288-8818 
NOTE| The following names have been checked for Judgements, 
Federal Tax Liens and Bankruptcies and none were found of record| 
DENNIS A. LOTT 
FRANCINE G. LOTT 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON 
NOTICE TO APPLICANT: The land covered herein may be serviced by 
districts, service companies and/or municipalities, which 
assess charges for water, sewer, electricity and any other 
utilities, etc. which are not covered by this report or insured 
under a title insurance policy. 
NOTE: If the applicant desires copies of the documents 
underlying any exception to coverage shown herein, the Company 
will furnish the same on request, if available, either with or 
without charge as appears appropriate. 
NOTE: Any matter in dispute between you and the Company may be 
subject to arbitration as an alternative to court action 
pursuant to the Title Insurance Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association, a copy of which is available on request 
from the Company. Any decision reached by arbitration shall be 
binding upon both you and the Company. The arbitration award 
may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and may be 
entered as a judgment in any court of proper jurisdiction. 
SCHEDULE B - SECTION 2 
ORDER NO.: 94050748 
EXCEPTIONS: 
THE POLICY OR POLICIES TO BE ISSUED WILL CONTAIN EXCEPTIONS TO 
THE FOLLOWING UNLESS THE SAME ARE DISPOSED OF TO THE SATISFACTION 
OF THE COMPANY: 
[Printed Exceptions] 
1. Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing 
liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies 
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public 
records. Proceedings by a public agency which may result in 
taxes or assessments, or notices of such proceedings, 
whether or not shown by the records of such agency or by the 
public record. 
2. Any facts, rights, interests or claims which are not 
shown by the public records, but which could be ascertained 
by an inspection of the land or by making inquiry of persons 
in possession thereof. 
3. Easements, liens or encumbrances, or claims thereof, 
which are not shown by the public records. 
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in 
area, encroachments, or any other facts which a correct 
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by the 
public records. 
5. (a) Unpatented mining claims; (b) reservations or 
exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance 
thereof; (c) water rights, claims or title to water. 
6. Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or 
material heretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law 
and not shown by the public records. 
7. Any adverse claim based upon the assertion that 
(a) Some portion of the land forms the bed or bank of a 
navigable river or lake; or lies below the mean high water mark 
thereof; 
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EXCEPTIONS: (continued) 
(b) The boundary of the land has been affected by a change 
in the course or water level of a navigable river or lake; 
(c) The land is subject to water rights, claims or title 
to water and to any law or governmental regulation pertaining 
to wetlands. 
[Special Exceptions] 
8. Lien of Taxes, not yet due and payable: 
Year 1994 
Sidwell No. 32-21-300-006 
Prior year 1993 Paid 
Amount $1.80 
9. The land described herein is located within the boundaries of 
Salt Lake County and is subject to any assessments levied 
thereby. 
10. An Ordinance of the County of Salt Lake creating the Butterfield 
and Rose Canyons Planning District, adopting the uniform zoning 
ordinances of Salt Lake County, Utah for the Butterfield and 
Rose Canyons Planning District, adopting a zoning map for the 
Butterfield and Rose Canyons Planning District, and amending 
Section 22-8-4 of the revised ordinances of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, 1966. 
Recorded August 6, 1975 
Entry No. 2 731327 
Book/Page 3933/460 
11. The right of the Salt Lake County Assessor to reassess the Tax 
Assessment on said property in accordance with Sees. 59-5-86 105 
UCA 1953 as disclosed by that certain Annual Application for 
Assessment and Taxation of Agricultural Land 1969 Farmland 
Assessment Act: 
Recorded December 20, 1979 
Entry No. 3380454 
Book/Page 5010/784 
12. Covenants, conditions and restrictions and any violations 
thereof, and the obligations thereof which may contain a 
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SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS: (continued) 
forfeiture or reversionary clause but omitting any restrictions 
based on race, color, religion or national origin. 
Recorded October 10, 1973 
Entry No. 2574770 
Book/Page 3435/92 
Re-recorded February 4, 1974 
Entry No. 2598154 
Book/Page 3511/49 
Amended Covenants 
Recorded December 19, 1980 
Entry No. 3516064 
Book/Page 5193/248 
Amended Covenants 
Recorded March 20, 1990 
Entry No. 4894429 
Book/Page 6206/325 
13. Agreement, including the terms and conditions thereof: 
Between Hi-Country Estates Second, a Utah limited 
partnership 
And Herriman Pipeline and Development, Inc., 
a non-profit Utah corporation 
Dated October 8, 1973 
Recorded August 20, 1974 
Entry No. 2644823 
Book/Page 3659/388 
14. Reciprocal Easement, and the terms and conditions thereof: 
Executed by Hi-Country Estates Second, a limited partnership 
Purpose Easement for a restrictive private road for ingress 
and egress over and across the private 
right of way 
Recorded January 9, 1975 
Entry No. 2676747 
Book/Page 3760/236 
15. A 25 foot right of way along the Northeasterly, Northerly and 
Northwesterly boundaries, and the rights of others in and to 
said right of way and Parcel 2. 
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XIN £hh THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Oxf SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DENNIS A I IOTT ai l :l FRANCTNr 0 . ...,. 
LOTT, 
LOTTS1 REPLY MEMORANDUM 
Plaintiffs, IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF THEIR 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
J s, I ] 1 ! : 9 40904735PR 
KERRY IJ. KNIGHTON and RALPH J 
MARSH, Judge Homer F Wilkinson 
Defendants. : 
the following Reply Memorandum :! x it Further Support: of Thei i Motion for 
Summary, 1 udgment: 
IHTRODUCTION 
Amid the torrent of finger-pointing and blame-shifting which floods 
Defendants Kerry I Knighton*« '""Knighton") and Ralph .,1 • Marsh, Esq.'s 
("Marsh") Opposition to til: le Lotts1 Motion Summary Judgmer the 
following key facts remain undisputed: 
Floor 
'Lrui t CitP.iT 
1. Receipt of the property survey by the Lotts was a condition of 
Knighton's performance under the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
(the "Agreementw) but the survey was never completed; 
2. Marsh was aware that he was closing agent for the sale of the 
property at issue in this case since at least February of 
1994; 
3. As closing agent, Marsh was obliged to obtain title insurance 
for the Lotts but failed to do so until after the scheduled 
closing date; 
4. The changes to the Trust Deed which the Lotts requested on 
May 16, 1994, were not conveyed to the Lotts until June 7, 
1994, and were incorrect even then; and 
5. Marsh drafted and approved of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement terms. 
Defendants fail to rebut these facts, preferring instead to either 
ignore them or brand them legal conclusions. This tactic does not 
satisfy Defendants' burden for opposing summary judgment. Indeed, it is 
well settled that in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the 
nonmovant must provide material facts which raise a genuine issue of 
dispute. A mere dispute over a nonmaterial fact is not enough. Heglar 
Ranch, Inc. v. Stlllman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980).* 
1
 Nor have Defendants complied with the requirement of Rule 4-501 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration that where facts are 
disputed, the party raising the dispute must refer specifically to those 
portions of the record upon which that party relies. Defendants1 
Opposition is rife with disputed facts that have little or no support in 
the record. Rule 4-501 does not allow a party to simply state that a 
fact is disputed without more. 
2 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS 
1* Ml in M .I ill in1 I  "I in i'liiiii I in ii'iil 1.1 r i c e t h o s e d o c u m e n t s s p e a k f o r 
themselves. 
2V Disputed I I: le Lotts believed they were prepared to close on 
CI II II III t I 111 I " M i l 1 ' ' ' i w * r f f t n n n n 4 -, ^ f f p f" t 111 f h € " t i t l e O f t l l O 
property being sold was * .. .** whicn Derendant Marsh was i " I in ill ill h i IMP. 
been aware *. .?fore He because he was obliged to obtain 
ti t.le * Further "Ill \ i it until bin 
deposition was taken that Marsh disclosed, for the si I inn llie 
existenc defect in t'hp ntiali'i ot title. Marsh is holding, but has 
r i rill I 'iiliiiiciliii w i l l in I in nil' 1 his defect in the title.2 
POINT I 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT KNIGHTON DID NOT 
PERFORM, THAT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE NO LATER THAN 
MAY 16, 1994, THAT MARSH FAILED TO OBTAIN TITLE 
INSURANCE FOR THE PROPERTY AND THAT MARSH FAILED TO 
RESOLVE THE DEFECTS IN THE TRUST DEED IN A TIMELY 
MANNER. THESE UNDISPUTED FACTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE 
Deff ' i r i i i l i i i i i i i i i l l "i. mi i In ""<i.iM" il 11 ill in in i in mi nil I. il  HI ill l l l i e i r I n I J S In iiiiii II III i I in p a p e r s II in nil IILII II i in II / 
fai 1 to address the key points which make summary judgment appropriate 
in this action. 
*• •  Kiiiyiitom s Failure to Perform, 
• 1.. Lack of a property survey: Defendants do spure 
that a survey on the property was not completed ndisputed Fact -1 
I il, I in , "Il i s p u t e t h a t: • i: o m p 3 e t::::l :: i i ::: i: * - r ~ E 
Knighton's performance. Undisputed Fact astead, Defendants 
?
 Deposition of Ralph J. Marsh at xi-12. 
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argue that because the property survey was purportedly for Knighton's 
benefit only, he could waive that survey as a condition of the contract. 
This argument must be rejected. 
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement states very clearly that a 
special contingency of the sale of the property is that closing will not 
occur until "receipt of a survey." Knighton cannot unilaterally waive 
a condition of performance because it now serves his litigation 
interests to do so.3 See, e.g., Burness v. Bruce, 776 P.2d 32 (Or. App. 
1989) (plaintiff cannot waive material term of contract). Accordingly, 
the undisputed facts show that Defendants did not and have not to date 
tendered performance under the very Agreement they now wish to enforce. 
2. Marsh's Failure to Obtain Title Insurance: Marsh 
conceded in his deposition that he had been aware since February of 1994 
that he would be the closing agent for this transaction.4 It is 
further undisputed that the closing agent is responsible for procuring 
title insurance in a timely manner. Undisputed Fact No. 12. Finally, 
it is undisputed that Marsh agreed to procure title insurance but that 
he did not do so until May 2, 1994, after the scheduled closing date. 
Undisputed Fact No. 8. 
Moreover, Knighton gave no indication to the Lotts that this 
condition was being abrogated. To the contrary, Knighton told them that 
the survey had been completed and offered to sell it to them. 
Undisputed Facts Nos. 15 and 31. 
4
 Deposition of Ralph J. Marsh at 29. 
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I Time Was of the Essence After May 16, 1994. 
Defendant11'! .nni i]\ir Mint frliip dirt not become of the essence 
May , i iu j i B l ; , \ »' • " » " ' " 
support this position. Plaintiffs stand by their interpretation c 
time - of-essence clause as - tated -*- Motion and Memorandur 
addition, it i s worth n o n n g tnat -cue 
enforceability ;t,t t:ime-of-essence clause was not presented to the 
Sup- 'rantr Moreover1 the Courtfn Interpretation of the 
time c: -essence provision was not esseni 1 ri i in ins i m i i n<| ,5 . 
Ever : Defendants have correctly construed the time *" essence 
owevei:
 (f the fal ] owing facts remain undisputed and are 
ciisposii. „ Ui'iii;1 Lssues presenter! 11,11 1, in 11" 1 i m 1111 1: : 
Il Ili »tis asked Knighton to correct the Trust Deed on 
Mav 94; 
• Knignton . - convey til: ni s i: equesx 
May 1994; 
• Marsh t incite the requested changes until May 27, 
1994; 
••t^.- :•  Knighton c-iz • -^  return rV-i- revised Trust Deed to Marsh 
until Ma , x^^4 
••+> • • 'Marsh did not provide requestei.1 chaiiyt11," I I In 1 II I I i 
• -,
 :
 • until June "i , 11 994,; • 
5
 To the extent there remains a dispute about the meaning of the 
time-of-essence clause that creates an ambiguity, that ambiguity must be 
construed against the drafter—a point not disputed by Defendants. 
Undisputed Fact No. 3; Matter of Orrlss' Estate, 622 P.2d 337 (Utah 
1980). 
• These revised changes did not address the very concerns 
which the Lotts had expressed to Knighton concerning 
their liability for water assessments. 
Defendants offer no competent rebuttal to these facts. Of 
particular significance is the issue of the revisions to the Trust Deed. 
It is undisputed that from the outset of their negotiations with 
Knighton, the Lotts made it clear that they did not wish to be held 
liable for water assessments levied on the property after the closing on 
May 1, 1994, but before the Trust Deed was recorded. Undisputed Fact 
No. 1. On May 16, 1994, the Lotts requested Knighton to revise the 
Trust Deed, a copy of which they had received only days before, because 
the property had been assessed water fees. The Lotts wanted Knighton to 
be responsible for these assessments and they wanted the Trust Deed to 
reflect that fact. 
After a three-week delay, Marsh returned the Trust Deed to the 
Lotts; however, the language of the Deed on its face makes it clear that 
Lotts were still liable for all assessments prior to the recording of 
the Trust Deed. See Lotts1 Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 7. Defendants' only response to the Lotts' 
contention that the Trust Deed is inadequate is that it is "a legal 
conclusion." See Response to Undisputed Fact No. 32. 
These facts clearly show that even if time was not of the essence 
until May 16, 1994, Defendants did nothing to honor their contractual 
obligation to close on the sale of the property. Nor have Defendants 
disputed as a matter of law that the time-of-essence clause in the 
6 
Agreement enforceable and that a breach of the time-of-essence clause 
discharges the parties from their contractual obligations.6' 
p 0 I N T 1 I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW MARSH, AN EXPERIENCED 
REAL ESTATE ATTORNEY, AND KNIGHTON, A LICENSED REAL 
ESTATE BROKER, TO AVOID THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
FAILING TO PERFORM THEIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
Marsh is a skilled real estate attorney drafted the Agreement.7 
Knighton I s a licensed reaJ estate broke, ar e II a] ; per sen is 
who live 2,000 miles away from the propertv :»* s>ae )t simply shocks 
the conscience that Defendants could enaao * - *- following conduct but 
remain unwiiJ ing to accept any respons: ; 
• Express! y contracting to obtain a property survey and then not 
only not completing the survey the agreed upon date, but 
t e l l i n g the Lo t t s LliciL In , in II lb I H J . I I clone; 
*• Expressly contracting to obtai property survey and then 
unilatera ] ly deciding upon initiation of litigation that such 
a sur vey wooid be waived and was unnecessary; 
6
 Defendants' attempts to escape the force of Century 21 Ell West 
Real Estate v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 55 n.l (Utah 1982) is unavailing. The 
Supreme Court of Utah clearly stated in that case that "where the 
contract states that time is of the essence, cases hold that both 
parties are discharged from their contract obligations If neither makes 
tender by the agreed closing date." (Emphasis added). Defendants' 
further attempt to escape the force of this holding by arguing that 
Knighton performed is equally unavailing J n J i ght of the undisputed 
facts recited above. 
7
 Deposition of Ralph J Marsh at 5 • 6; Undisputed Fact No. 3 
8
 Deposition of Kerry L. Knighton a t 11. 
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• Expressly contracting with the Lotts to close a deal on May 1, 
1994, but sending crucial closing documents by regular mail on 
April 29, 1994, with no excuse for doing so;9 
• Expressly agreeing to assume responsibility for obtaining 
title insurance and then failing to do so until after the 
expressly contracted for closing date had passed; 
• Blaming the Lotts for not obtaining title insurance even 
though Marsh, as an experienced real estate attorney, and 
Knighton, as a licensed real estate broker, knew or should 
have known that they were responsible for obtaining such 
insurance; 
• Obtaining a preliminary title report which indicated a title 
defect but then failing to inform the Lotts of that title 
defect until after the Lotts had initiated litigation against 
Marsh and Knighton; 
• Failing to provide changes to the Trust Deed until June 7, 
1994, three weeks after such changes were requested and three 
weeks after, by Defendants' own admission, time became of the 
essence. 
* Blithely asserting that the changes to the Trust Deed 
requested by the Lotts were not necessary and when made were 
adequate to address the Lotts1 concerns even though the Trust 
Deed on its face continues to hold the Lotts liable for water 
assessments• 
Marsh Depo. Trans, at 14 (lines 1-7). 
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CONCLUSION 
Ee.- ' • I ("I'l'iiretation ml the "time- is-of -the-essence" 
clause -r..i parties agree m a t Lime Decame C.IJ IIIII m essn m, » 
latter than June 15, 1995. By that time, Knighton had performed 
sev lush/i Mcvreoi Defendants ilure oroide 
meaningful factual and legal oppositic, -.;.•„ 
j* abundantly clear that summar udgment Plaintiffs1 favor is 
apy - - ~-*\ of a real ecTt*Ftfe 
broker and his lawyer should not distract this Court trom recogni *' ILIIILJ 
the validity of the Lotts' Motion. 
; • DATED: J' : ,:i , i 
CAMPBELL MAACK &
 S E S S I 0 N S 
A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Zp- day of June, 1995, I caused 
to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing LOTTS' 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, to the following: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
s?/zL» u^,^ &n>** 
wp51\mal\lott\reply»em.opp 
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1 (WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
2 HAD IN OPEN COURT:) 
3 THE COURT: THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT IS A 
4 CASE OF LOTT VERSUS KNIGHTON. IS THE PLAINTIFF PRESENT AND 
5 READY TO PROCEED? 
6 MR. LARSEN: YES, YOUR HONOR. MARK LARSEN. I 
7 REPRESENT THE PLAINTIFFS DENNIS AND FRANCINE LOTT IN THIS CASE. 
8 THE COURT: AND THE DEFENDANT? 
9 MR. MARSH: RALPH MARSH REPRESENTING THE 
10 DEFENDANTS. 
11 THE COURT: I GUESS THIS IS CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
12 SUMMARY JUDGMENT. I GUESS WHAT YOU'D BETTER DO IS, MR. 
13 LARSEN, YOU GO FIRST AND THEN MR. MARSH MAY GO, THEN EACH OF 
14 YOU MAY RESPOND TO THE OTHER ONE. 
15 MR. LARSEN: MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH, YOUR 
16 HONOR? 
17 THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
18 MR. LARSEN: WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO IS FOCUS 
19 THE COURT'S ATTENTION ON WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE THE MATERIAL 
20 FACTS IN THIS CASE THAT ARE NECESSARY FOR A RESOLUTION OF 
21 LOTTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
22 THE BASIC DISPUTE BREAKS DOWN AS TO THE "TIME IS 
23 OF THE ESSENCE" CLAUSE, AND AS TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THAT 
24 "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE" CLAUSE. 
25 WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT TO THE COURT IN 
1 FOCUSING THAT PARTICULAR DISPUTE IS AS TO THE DOCUMENT I'VE 
2 GIVEN YOU. IT IS AN EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
3 THE PARTIES. THIS PARTICULAR DOCUMENT WAS DRAFTED BY RALPH 
4 MARSH. IT WAS A STANDARD EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
5 THAT CONTAINS STANDARD CLAUSES, BUT IT WAS MR. MARSH WHO, AS 
6 MR. KNIGHTON'S ATTORNEY, SELECTED THIS PARTICULAR CONTRACT, 
7 AND WHO MODIFIED THIS PARTICULAR CONTRACT, AND INSERTED THE 
8 WRITTEN PROVISIONS INTO THIS CONTRACT, BOTH TYPEWRITTEN AND 
9 HANDWRITTEN. 
10 OBVIOUSLY, IF THERE IS ANY AMBIGUITY IN THIS 
11 CONTRACT, IT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS IN 
12 THIS CASE WHO SELECTED THE CONTRACT, MODIFIED IT, AND WHO ARE 
13 RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS DRAFTING. 
14 NOW WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT TO THE 
15 COURT, BEFORE YOU GET TO THE "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE" CLAUSE, 
16 WHICH IS ON THE LAST PAGE, IF YOU TURN TO THE THIRD PAGE OF 
17 THIS--AND, JUDGE, IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM, THIS WAS A MULTI-SIDED 
18 COPY DOCUMENT. 
19 THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. 
20 MR. LARSEN: YOU'RE LOOKING AT ONE OF THE INSIDE 
21 PAGES HERE. IF I COULD DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO THE PARAGRAPH 
22 NO. 8, WHICH IS THE CLOSING OF THE SALE, WHICH IS ABOUT A 
23 QUARTER OF THE WAY DOWN THE PAGE, THE "CLOSING OF SALE," WHAT 
24 YOU'LL NOTICE IS THAT THE STANDARD PROVISIONS IN THIS CONTRACT 
25 HAVE BEEN MODIFIED. THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT, IF YOU WERE FILLING 
3 
1 IN THE BLANKS, WOULD HAVE READ, "THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE 
2 CLOSED ON OR BEFORE MAY 1, 1994," AND THE "ON OR BEFORE" HAS 
3 BEEN STRICKEN FROM THIS PARTICULAR CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE, 
4 AND IN ITS PLACE, IN TYPEWRITING BY MR. MARSH, THERE HAS BEEN 
5 INSERTED, "UPON RECEIPT OF SURVEY BUT NO LATER THAN MAY 1, 
6 1994." 
7 THIS PARTICULAR LANGUAGE IN THE CONTRACT 
8 INDICATES THAT THE CLOSING IS TO OCCUR UPON THE RECEIPT OF THE 
9 SURVEY, OR NO LATER THAN MAY 1, 1994. 
10 NOW THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND ON THE SURVEY IN 
11 THIS CASE, WHICH IS A SURVEY BEING OBTAINED FOR BOTH PARTIES' 
12 BENEFIT, IS THAT THIS PARTICULAR PROPERTY IS LOCATED IN AN AREA 
13 THAT HAS A LOT OF SNOW. IT'S DIFFICULT TO ACCESS IT DURING THE 
14 WINTER. 
15 THIS IS A SELLER-FINANCED DEAL. YOU'LL NOTICE 
16 THE PARTIES ARE--THE LAST DATE OF EXECUTION ON THIS PARTICULAR 
17 PAGE IS FEBRUARY THE 17TH, 1994, AND THAT'S THE ACCEPTANCE OF 
18 THE COUNTER OFFER BY MR. KNIGHTON. 
19 NOW THIS A SELLER-FINANCED DEAL. THERE IS 
20 REALLY NO REASON FOR THE DELAY IN THIS PARTICULAR CLOSING, 
21 EXCEPT THAT TWO EVENTS NEEDED TO OCCUR. 
22 PARAGRAPH NO. 7 REQUIRES THE BUYER TO OBTAIN A 
23 PERCOLATION TEST SATISFACTORY TO THE BUYER. AND IF YOU TAKE A 
24 LOOK ON THE SECOND PAGE-JUST ONE SECOND, YOUR HONOR-WHAT 
25 I'M LOOKING FOR IS THE PROVISION THAT REQUIRES THE SURVEY, AND 
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1 THERE IS A CHECKED BOX THAT STATES THAT, "THE SURVEY SHALL 
2 OBTAINED BY THE BUYER." OH, EXCUSE ME, IT IS ON THE SECOND 
3 PAGE, AND IF YOU TAKE A LOOK AT PARAGRAPH 1(D), IT SAYS "SURVEY. 
4 A CERTIFIED SURVEY SHALL BE FURNISHED AT THE EXPENSE OF BUYER 
5 PRIOR TO CLOSING..." 
6 MR. KNIGHTON CALLED THE LOTTS, AND THIS IS 
7 UNDISPUTED, ON APRIL THE 29TH, AND SAID TO THEM, "I HAVE 
8 OBTAINED THE SURVEY." 
9 NOW THAT IS ONE WHEN THE CLOSING IS SUPPOSED 
10 TO OCCUR, WHEN THAT SURVEY IS RECEIVED. IT TURNS OUT THAT, 
11 THROUGH DISCOVERY, WE HAVE UNCOVERED THAT MR. LOTT DID NOT 
12 TELL--EXCUSE ME, MR. KNIGHTON, WHEN HE CALLED THE LOTTS AND 
13 SAID THERE WAS A SURVEY, WAS NOT TELLING THEM THE TRUTH. 
14 MR. KNIGHTON HAS NEVER OBTAINED THE SURVEY ON 
15 THIS PROPERTY, AND THAT TOO IS AN ABSOLUTELY UNDISPUTED FACT. 
16 NOW WHEN YOU CONSTRUE THE LANGUAGE OF 
17 PARAGRAPH 8 THAT SAYS THAT THE CLOSING SHALL OCCUR UPON 
18 RECEIPT OF THE SURVEY, BUT NO LATER THAN MAY THE 1ST; AND YOU 
19 READ THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PARAGRAPH 2 ON THE VERY 
20 LAST PAGE, WHICH IS THE "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE" CLAUSE, THE 
21 VERY WORST INTERPRETATION FOR THE LOTTS IN TERMS OF THIS 
22 PARTICULAR MOTION WOULD BE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE, AND 
23 THAT TIME BECAME OF THE ESSENCE, AND THIS IS THE POSITION THAT 
24 THE DEFENDANTS' ARGUE, 15 DAYS AFTER MAY 1. 
25 SO FIRST OF ALL, WHEN YOU CONSTRUE THE 
1 LANGUAGE, THE VERY WORST THAT IT COULD BE WOULD BE 15 DAYS 
2 AFTER THE RECEIPT OF THE SURVEY, WHICH WAS NEVER RECEIVED. 
3 AND THAT BECOMES CONFUSING. BUT THERE IS AN ARGUMENT THAT 
4 THAT SHOULD AT LEAST BE TWO DAYS LATER, EVEN UNDER THEIR-
5 AND I THINK IT'S INAPPROPRIATE-INTERPRETATION OF THIS 
6 PARTICULAR LANGUAGE. 
7 NOW THE "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE" CLAUSE 
8 BASICALLY SAYS THAT IN THE EVENT THE SALE CANNOT BE CLOSED BY 
9 THE DATE PROVIDED HEREIN, DUE TO INTERRUPTIONS OF TRANSPORT 
10 STRIKES, FIRE, FLOOD, EXTREME WEATHER, GOVERNMENTAL 
11 REGULATIONS, DELAYS CAUSED BY THE LENDER--AND THERE IS NO 
12 LENDER-ACTS OF GOD OR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES BEYOND THE 
13 CONTROL OF THE BUYER AND THE SELLER, THEN THE CLOSING SHALL 
14 BE EXTENDED SEVEN DAYS BEYOND THE CESSATION OF THE 
15 CONDITION. 
16 SO I'D LIKE TO POINT OUT TO YOU THAT IN THIS CASE, 
17 JUDGE, NONE OF THOSE EVENTS OCCURRED. NONE OF THOSE EVENTS 
18 OCCURRED, AND THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO REASON FOR DELAYING 
19 THIS PARTICULAR CLOSING. 
20 AND THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT IS NOT WHETHER 
21 LOTTS PERFORMED. THE ISSUE IS WHETHER MR. KNIGHTON 
22 PERFORMED, BECAUSE THE CASE LAW'S ABSOLUTELY UNDISPUTABLE 
23 THAT IF YOU TAKE-AND THIS IS NOT A POSITION THAT ANYBODY HAS 
24 TRIED TO DISPUTE--IF YOU TAKE A LOOK AT THE CENTURY 21 ALL WEST 
25 REAL ESTATE VERSUS WEBB CASE. WHICH IS 645 P2.D52, THE SUPREME 
1 COURT OF THIS STATE MAKES IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT--AND I'LL 
2 QUOTE THE APPLICABLE LANGUAGE--
3 WHERE THE CONTRACT STATES THAT TIME IS OF 
4 THE ESSENCE, CASES HOLD THAT BOTH PARTIES 
5 ARE DISCHARGED FROM THEIR CONTRACT 
6 OBLIGATIONS IF NEITHER MAKES TENDER BY 
7 THE AGREED CLOSING DATE... 
8 SO AT A VERY MINIMUM, THERE IS NO TENDER-AND THIS IS 
9 ABSOLUTELY UNDISPUTED--OF THE SURVEY BY THE MAY 1 CLOSING 
10 DATE; EVEN UNDER THEIR STRAINED INTERPRETATION OF THE "TIME IS 
11 OF THE ESSENCE" CLAUSE, BY MAY 14TH OF MAY 16TH. THE SURVEY 
12 WAS ABSOLUTELY NEVER OBTAINED. 
13 WHAT'S FURTHER UNDISPUTED, WHEN YOU GO BACK 
14 AND TAKE A LOOK AT THE FACTS IN THIS CASE, IS THAT THE 
15 DOCUMENTS FOR MR. KNIGHTON'S PERFORMANCE WERE NEVER 
16 TENDERED TO THE LOTTS UNTIL AFTER THE MAY 1 CLOSING DATE. 
17 THOSE DOCUMENTS TO TENDER HIS PERFORMANCE 
18 WOULD REQUIRE THE TENDERING OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND 
19 TRUST DEED AND FUNDS, AND THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST DEED 
20 WERE NOT EVEN SENT TO THE LOTTS UNTIL THEY RECEIVED THEM ON 
21 MAY THE 3RD. 
22 WHAT IS FURTHER UNDISPUTED, JUDGE, IS THAT WE 
23 HAVE AN AFFIDAVIT FROM AN EXPERT WITNESS IN THIS CASE. HE'S 
24 SUBMITTED TWO AFFIDAVITS. I BELIEVE YOU HAVE SEEN THEM. THOSE 
25 ARE THE AFFIDAVITS OF CHARLES HAMMOND. CHARLES HAMMOND IS, 
1 WITHOUT QUESTION, AN EXPERT WITNESS IN CLOSING REAL ESTATE 
2 TRANSACTIONS, BOTH RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL, AND HE 
3 PERSONALLY HAS CLOSED THOUSANDS OF TRANSACTIONS AND IS 
4 RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE CLOSED TENS 
5 OF THOUSANDS OF TRANSACTIONS. 
6 BUT IT'S FURTHER NECESSARY IN TERMS OF A TENDER 
7 IN THIS SITUATION, WE HAVE A SELLER FINANCING, IT IS IMPERATIVE 
8 FOR THE BUYER TO DELIVER TO THE LOTTS IN THIS CASE, AS 
9 ESTABLISHED BY MR. HAMMOND'S AFFIDAVIT, AND ASSUMING THAT 
10 THAT IS UNREFUTED, BOTH THE TRUST DEED AND THE PROMISSORY 
11 NOTE. 
12 NOW THOSE DOCUMENTS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE 
13 INITIAL DOCUMENTS THAT WERE SENT TO THE LOTS. THEY WERE 
14 LATER FORWARDED UNDER COVER OF MR. MARSH'S LETTER DATED 
15 MAY THE 6TH OF 1994, AND THIS IS--THIS LETTER IS DATED MAY THE 
16 6TH. IT'S NOT RECEIVED BY THE LOTTS--BECAUSE THEY LIVE IN 
17 PENNSYLVANIA, IF THE COURT RECALLS--UNTIL MAY THE 9TH OF 1994, 
181 AND THAT IS WHEN THE VERY FIRST TIME IS THAT THE LOTTS RECEIVE 
19 THE DEED, THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND THE TRUST DEED. 
20 MR. MARSH'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LEGAL EFFECT 
21 OF THOSE DOCUMENTS, IN HIS MAY 6TH, 1994 LETTER, IS VERY 
22 IMPORTANT, BECAUSE THIS IS WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY CAUSING THE 
23 ENTIRE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
24 HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE EARNEST 
25 MONEY AGREEMENT AND THE EFFECT OF THE ENCLOSED TRUST DEED, 
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1 WHICH HAS NOT BEEN RECORDED AT THIS TIME, IS THIS: 
2 FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE OWNER'S 
3 ASSESSMENT IS A LIEN AGAINST THE PROPERTY 
4 ITSELF AND IS DUE FROM THE CURRENT OWNER 
5 OF THE PROPERTY. THEREFORE, ONCE THE DEED 
6 FROM YOU IS RECORDED, ALL FUTURE 
7 ASSESSMENTS WILL BE DUE FROM THE NEW 
8 OWNER AND YOU WILL NO LIABILITY THEREFOR. 
9 NOW WHAT'S HAPPENING, IN TERMS OF BACKGROUND OF THIS CASE, IS 
10 THAT THERE IS AN EMINENT WATER ASSESSMENT, AND MR. KNIGHTON 
11 IS AWARE OF THAT. MR. KNIGHTON'S AWARE THAT THE LOTTS ARE 
12 EXTRAORDINARILY CONCERNED ABOUT CLOSING THIS TRANSACTION 
13 QUICKLY, ARE RELUCTANT TO DELAY CLOSING THE TRANSACTION 
14 BECAUSE OF SELLER FINANCING MAY 1, BUT DO SO RELUCTANTLY TO 
15 CLEAR THIS EMINENT, ONE-TIME, ONE-SHOT, SUBSTANTIAL WATER 
16 ASSESSMENT THAT REPRESENTS ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE PURCHASE 
17 PRICE. 
18 NOW YOUR HONOR, I MOVE FOR THE PUBLICATION-
19 WE'VE CITED IT IN OUR MEMORANDUM ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS-THE 
20 DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF RALPH MARSH AND OF KERRY KNIGHTON. 
21 DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION. 
22 MR. MARSH: I HAVE NO OBJECTION EXCEPT TO 
23 QUESTIONS ASKED IN THIS DEPOSITIONS TO WHICH WE OBJECTED; THAT 
24 IS, QUESTIONS RELATING TO CONVERSATIONS THAT TOOK PLACE AS 
25 PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING UP TO THAT CONTRACT. 
1 AND THE CONTRACT CONTAINS A CLAUSE, AN 
2 1 INTEGRATION CLAUSE, WHICH SAYS THAT ANY NEGOTIATIONS OR 
3 REPRESENTATIONS OR DISCUSSIONS BEFORE-HAPPENING WILL NOT BE A 
4 PART OF AND THAT THIS OVERRIDES ALL OF THOSE. 
5 SO I MADE AN OBJECTION TO THOSE AT THE 
6 DEPOSITION, BUT I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO ANYTHING ELSE IN THE 
7 DEPOSITION. 
8 I MR. LARSEN: NATURALLY. YOU HAVE TO RULE ON 
9 OBJECTIONS. 
10 THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. THEY MAY BE 
11 RECEIVED. 
12 MR. LARSEN: DO I NEED TO SUBMIT AN ORDER FOR 
13 THE CLERK TO ACCEPT THOSE FOR FILING? 
14 THE COURT: I DON'T THINK SO. 
15 MR. LARSEN: I'M SLIGHTLY DISTRACTED HERE, BUT 
16 LET ME ADDRESS THAT PARTICULAR POINT. FIRST OF ALL, IN TERMS OF 
17 THE INTEGRATION CLAUSE, AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, WE HAVE 
18 1 THINK MADE VERY REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION AND PREFERRED 
19 CONSTRUCTIONS BASED UPON THE LANGUAGE OF THE "TIME IS OF THE 
20 ESSENCE" CLAUSE, AND THAT CONSTRUCTION ESSENTIALLY IS THAT 
21 WHEN YOU LOOK AT THAT "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE" CLAUSE, IT 
22 ALLOWS THE DELAY OF THE CLOSING BEYOND THE CLOSING FOR A 
23 SPECIFIED CLOSING DATE ONLY IN THE EVENT OF THESE OCCURRENCES; 
24 BUT NO, YOU CANT EXTEND IT MORE THAN 15 DAYS. 
25 SO IF THERE IS A FLOOD THAT DELAYS THE CLOSING, 
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1 IT CAN'T DELAY IT FOR MORE THAN 15 DAYS. AND THERE IS NO FLOOD, 
2 AND OUR INTERPRETATION OF THAT IS TIME BECOMES OF THE ESSENCE 
3 AS OF THE RECEIPT OF THE SURVEY, OR MAY 1, 1994, WHICHEVER 
4 OCCURS EARLIER. 
5 AND THE POINT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IS THAT IF 
6 THERE IS SOME OTHER CONSTRUCTION OF THAT, THAT COMES INTO 
7 QUESTION, THEN THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY IN THIS CONTRACT WHICH 
8 ONE SHOULD CONSTRUE AGAINST THE DRAFTER. 
9 BUT THEN, NO. 2, IT REQUIRES THE COURT TO TAKE A 
10 LOOK AT THE INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES, AND PAROL EVIDENCE, IN 
11 FORMING A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THAT PARTICULAR 
12 CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE. 
13 NOW THIS WATER ASSESSMENT'S VERY IMPORTANT TO 
14 THE PARTIES, BECAUSE IT'S A ONE-SHOT ASSESSMENT. IT'S NOT AN 
15 ANNUAL ASSESSMENT. AND IF THAT OCCURS PRIOR TO THE TIME OF 
16 THE CLOSING, THEN THE LOTTS ARE VERY CONCERNED THAT THEY 
17 WILL STUCK WITH IT. THEY LOOK AT THE LETTER THAT MR. MARSH 
18 HAS SENT TO THEM IN CLOSING DOCUMENTS, AND THEY'RE CONFUSED 
19 ABOUT WHETHER THEY'RE GOING TO HAVE TO PAY FOR THE 
20 ASSESSMENT WHICH IS LOOMING OUT THERE, AS EVERYONE KNOWS. 
21 AND THEY CONTACT AN ATTORNEY, AND CALL BACK 
22 AND SAY, "NO, YOU HAVE TO MODIFY THIS SO THAT IT COVERS THE 
23 WATER ASSESSMENT." 
24 NOW A VERY CONVENIENT INTERPRETATION OF THE 
25 CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE HAS ARISEN DURING THE COURSE OF 
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1 DISCOVERY, AND THAT IS, "OH, MR. KNIGHTON WILL JUST PAY FOR 
2 THAT WATER ASSESSMENT; NO BIG DEAL." 
3 WELL, IT IS A BIG DEAL, BECAUSE THAT'S A 
4 CONVENIENT INTERPRETATION AFTER THE FACT. IT'S CONTRARY TO 
5 THE TRANSMITTAL LETTER OF MR. MARSH. ITS CONTRARY TO THE 
6 TRUST DEED WHICH MAKES MR. KNIGHTON RESPONSIBLE FOR 
7 ASSESSMENTS ONLY AFTER THE TRUST DEED IS RECORDED, AND IT IS IN 
8 FACT CONTRARY TO THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT ITSELF. 
9 SO FOR TWO REASONS-ONE, THE EARNEST MONEY 
10 AGREEMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE APPORTIONMENT OF ONE-SHOT 
11 ASSESSMENTS. IF THEIR ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS HAD COME IN ON A 
12 REGULAR BASIS, LIKE TAXES OR, YOU KNOW, ASSESSMENTS THAT ARE 
13 RECURRING, ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS, THOSE REQUIRE THE 
14 APPORTIONMENT. 
15 THE COURT: MR. LARSEN, I HAVE TO INTERRUPT YOU. 
16 I HAVE A TRIAL AT 9:00 O'CLOCK. YOU GENTLEMEN HAVE ONE HOUR--
17 WELL, IN FACT REALLY IT'S TEN MINUTES TO NINE. YOU HAVE ONE 
18 HALF THE TIME, AND YOU STARTED AT ABOUT FIVE AFTER, SO YOU 
19 HAVE, FOR BOTH OPENING AND CLOSING--. 
20 MR. LARSEN: TWENTY-SEVEN MINUTES. 
21 THE COURT: YES. 
22 MR. LARSEN: WHAT I'M SUGGESTING TO YOU IS THAT 
23 THIS WATER ASSESSMENT IS NOT COVERED BY THE EARNEST MONEY 
24 AGREEMENT. THE LOTTS HAVE A VERY REAL CONCERN, BASED UPON 
25 WHAT MR. MARSH IS TELLING US, AND WHAT THE ATTORNEYS ARE 
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1 TELLING THEM IN PENNSYLVANIA, "LOOK, YOU HAVE A PROBLEM. 
2 THEY WANT THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT MODIFIED. THEY WANT 
3 THE TRUST DEED MODIFIED." 
4 NONE OF THOSE MODIFICATIONS OCCURRED, UNTIL 
5 GEEZ, JUNE THE 17TH. NOW WE'RE WAY PAST THE CLOSING DEADLINE, 
6 AND BY THAT POINT IN TIME, THE MODIFICATIONS THAT OCCURRED--IF 
7 YOU TAKE A LOOK AT THE MODIFICATIONS, THEY DON'T SOLVE THIS 
8 PROBLEM. 
9 AT THAT POINT IN TIME, THE LOTTS ARE SAYING, "NO, 
10 WE'RE NOT GOING TO DO THIS." BY JUNE THE 7TH, 1994, THE FIRST 
11 PAYMENT ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE IS DUE. IT IS NOT MADE. IT IS 
12 NOT TENDERED. IT IS NOT DEPOSITED INTO MR. MARSH'S ESCROW 
13 ACCOUNT. IT'S NOT DONE. 
14 FURTHERMORE, JUDGE--AND THIS IS THE SECOND 
15 TELLING POINT-IS THAT THE WATER ASSESSMENT, ONCE LEVIED, ALL 
16 WE HAVE IN THE RECORD EVEN A YEAR LATER IS MR. KNIGHTON'S 
17 UNSUPPORTED CLAIM THAT HE'LL PAY THE ASSESSMENT. IT'S NEVER 
18 BEEN PAID. IT'S NEVER BEEN PAID INTO ESCROW. WE'RE NOW A YEAR 
19 INTO THIS AND WE HAVE A YEAR PAST DUE ON THE PAYMENTS ON THE 
20 PROMISSORY NOTE, AND THOSE HAVE NEVER BEEN MADE. 
21 NOW THE IMPORTANT POINT HERE IS THAT IT WAS 
22 CONTEMPLATED BY THE PARTIES THAT MR. MARSH WILL BE THE 
23 CLOSING AGENT, AND THAT CONTEMPLATION OCCURS IN FEBRUARY OF 
24 1994. 
25 AS THE CLOSING AGENT, AS ESTABLISHED BY 
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1 AFFIDAVIT OF MR. HAMMOND, HE'S RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING THE 
2 TITLE INSURANCE. THE LOTTS LIVE IN PENNSYLVANIA. THEY'RE NOT IN 
3 A POSITION TO OBTAIN TITLE INSURANCE FROM THAT DISTANCE. 
4 HE'S RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING TITLE INSURANCE. 
5 HE'S RESPONSIBLE FOR DRAFTING THE DOCUMENTS. HE'S RESPONSIBLE 
6 FOR FORWARDING THOSE DOCUMENTS TO THE LOTTS WITH SUFFICIENT 
7 TIME FOR THEM TO REVIEW THEM SO THAT THEY CAN CLOSE THIS ON 
8 MAY 1, 1994. 
9 AND ANY DELAYS BY MR. MARSH ON THE 
10 RESPONSIBILITY OF MR. KNIGHTON. MR. MARSH HAS CONSISTENTLY 
11 CLAIMED THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THIS PROCEEDING THAT HE IS 
12 MR. KNIGHTON'S ATTORNEY. AS HIS ATTORNEY, HE IS WORKING AS MR. 
13 KNIGHTON'S AGENT. AND BECAUSE MR. MARSH IS MR. KNIGHTON'S 
14 AGENT, ANY DELAYS CAUSED BY MR. MARSH IN THIS MATTER 
15 NATURALLY ARE ATTRIBUTABLE SOLELY TO MR. KNIGHTON. 
16 THE DOCUMENTS WERE NOT PREPARED ON TIME. THE 
17 PARTIES DID NOT CLOSE BY MAY 1. MR. KNIGHTON, FOR SEVERAL 
18 REASONS, DID NOT TENDER HIS PERFORMANCE BY MAY 1, DID NOT 
19 TENDER HIS PERFORMANCE BY MAY THE 16TH, STILL HAS NOT 
20 TENDERED HIS PERFORMANCE IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE. 
21 WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS SITUATION IS THAT, IF TIME 
22 IS OF THE ESSENCE, HE DOESN'T REACH THAT CLOSING DATE PREPARED 
23 TO PERFORM. HE LIES ABOUT THE SURVEY. THE SURVEY HAS NEVER 
24 BEEN OBTAINED, AND IT IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE CLOSING 
25 OF THIS PARTICULAR AGREEMENT. 
14 
1 THE COURT: WHY IS IT--WHAT IS THE SURVEY? WHY 
2 IS IT SO IMPORTANT TO MR. LOTT? 
3 MR. LARSEN: IT'S VERY IMPORTANT TO THE LOTTS 
4 FOR TWO REASONS. ONE, THERE IS A CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. 
5 KNIGHTON AND MR. AND MRS. LOTT THAT BASICALLY-WHERE HE'S 
6 TELLING THEM A STORY ABOUT HOW A FRIEND DIDN'T UNDERSTAND 
7 WHEN HE'D PURCHASED PROPERTY, DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHERE THE 
8 PROPERTY LINES WERE, AND A LAW SUIT RESULTED OUT OF THAT. SO 
9 MR. KNIGHTON WANTS TO GET THE SURVEY. 
10 THE COURT: MR. KNIGHTON WANTED THE SURVEY, 
11 AND THAT'S FINE. 
12 MR. LARSEN: HE WANTED IT, AND THE LOTTS WANTED 
13 THE SURVEY SO THAT THEY'RE PROTECTED AGAINST ANY CLAIM ABOUT 
14 THE REPRESENTATION OF THE BOUNDARIES OF THIS PARTICULAR 
15 PROPERTY; IF THE PROPERTY DOESN'T COME UP TO THE ROAD, IF IT IS 
16 SHORT, IF IT IS NOT EXACTLY WHERE MR. KNIGHTON CLAIMS IT SHOULD 
17 BE. THAT CERTAINLY IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE LOTTS, AND IT 
18 PROTECTS THE LOTTS FROM ANY RESULTING LITIGATION, ANY 
19 RESULTING LIABILITY. THEY WANT THIS THING TO BE CLOSED AND 
20 THEY WANT TO CLOSE CLEANLY AND THEY DON'T WANT TO HAVE ANY 
21 EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF PROPERTY LINES, THEY DON'T WANT TO 
22 HAVE ANY EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THE WATER ASSESSMENT. 
23 WHAT I'D LIKE TO POINT OUT, TOO, IS THAT THE 
24 CHANGES THAT THE LOTTS REQUESTED ON MAY 16TH, 1994 WERE NOT 
25 MADE UNTIL JUNE THE 7TH, 1994. THAT'S A THREE-WEEK DELAY. THERE 
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1 IS NO REASON FOR THAT PARTICULAR DELAY. 
2 AND EVEN WHEN THEY RECEIVED THAT, IT DIDN'T 
3 CORRECT THE PROBLEM, AND BY THAT POINT IN TIME THE WATER 
4 ASSESSMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE. 
5 AND THE POSITION THERE IS THAT THERE IS NO 
6 QUESTION THAT THE LOTTS--AND EVEN IN THE DISCOVERY AS 
7 REVEALED--THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE LOTTS ARE 
8 LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO PAY THAT ASSESSMENT. THEY CAN LOOK TO 
9 MR. KNIGHTON FOR REIMBURSEMENT, BUT WHEN THEY LOOK TO HIM 
10 FOR REIMBURSEMENT, YOU GO INTO THE MURKY AREA OF THIS 
11 AGREEMENT, AND THERE IS NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION ON THEIR 
12 PART THAT THEY'RE GOING TO BE REIMBURSED FOR THAT ASSESSMENT. 
13 OUR POSITION, JUDGE, IS THAT MR. KNIGHTON DID 
14 NOT TENDER HIS PERFORMANCE BY MAY 1, BY MAY 16TH, OR EVEN AS 
15 OF TODAY; AND, AS A RESULT, ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
16 SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
17 THE COURT: THANK YOU, COUNSEL. 
18 MR. MARSH: QUICKLY ON THAT LAST POINT, YOUR 
19 HONOR, CONCERNING CONVERSATIONS REGARDING THE SURVEY, AGAIN 
20 THESE CONVERSATIONS ALL ARE BARRED BY THE INTEGRATION 
21 CLAUSE AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. NOT THAT I CONSIDER THAT 
22 TO BE OVERLY IMPORTANT, BUT THOSE THINGS ARE NOT IN EVIDENCE. 
23 THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THAT CONVERSATION TO WHICH MR. LARSEN 
24 JUST REFERRED, NOR WOULD THAT BE ADMISSIBLE INTO EVIDENCE. 
25 THE COURT: ARE YOU DISPUTING IT? 
16 
1 MR. MARSH: NO, I'M NOT, BUT I TfflNK-I'M SAYING IT'S 
2 NOT RELEVANT, NOR IS IT ADMISSIBLE. 
3 LET ME, IF I MAY, QUICKLY TALK ABOUT THE FACTS, 
4 BECAUSE WHAT HAPPENED HERE I THINK IS IMPORTANT. 
5 YES, THIS CONTRACT WAS PREPARED BY ME. WHEN 
6 MR. KNIGHTON CAME IN TO SEE ME, HE SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE AN 
7 OFFER ON THIS PROPERTY. HE USED THE STANDARD FORM AGREEMENT, 
8 THE ONE USED IN THIS STATE, APPROVED BY THE STATE, AND WE 
9 FILLED IN THE BLANKS WITH THE TERMS HE WANTED TO OFFER. 
10 MY NAME WAS PUT IN THERE AS THE PERSON WHO 
11 WOULD HOLD THE EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT. IT WAS SENT OFF TO BE--
12 SIGNED BY MR. KNIGHTON, SENT OFF TO THE LOTTS IN PENNSYLVANIA. 
13 THEY SENT IT BACK A COUPLE OF WEEKS LATER WITH 
14 A COUNTER PROPOSAL INDICATING THEY WANTED TO CHANGE THE 
15 AMOUNT OF THE EARNEST MONEY TO $1,000. MR. KNIGHTON APPROVED 
16 THAT, SIGNED IT, SENT IT OFF TO THEM; SIGNED--DEPOSITED THE OTHER 
17 $800 WITH ME IN MY TRUST ACCOUNT TO COVER THAT EARNEST MONEY 
18 DEPOSIT. 
19 NO FURTHER CONVERSATION ESSENTIALLY UNTIL 
20 APRIL THE 25TH. 
21 THE COURT: WHEN WAS IT DECIDED YOU WERE GOING 
22 TO BE THE CLOSING AGENT? 
23 MR. MARSH: IT WAS NOT DECIDED. AND THE 
24 STATEMENT BY MR. LARSEN THAT IT WAS KNOWN I WAS TO BE THE 
25 CLOSING AGENT IN FEBRUARY IS NOT TRUE. AND A READING OF MY 
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1 DEPOSITION WILL SHOW THAT WHAT HAPPENED WAS ON APRIL THE 
2 25TH, MR. KNIGHTON, NOT HAVING HEARD FROM THE LOTTS-AND I 
3 POINTED OUT THAT THIS CONTRACT REQUIRES THE LOTTS, AS SELLERS, 
4 TO PROVIDE MR. KNIGHTON WITH A TITLE INSURANCE COMMITMENT 
5 FIVE BUSINESS DAYS AT LEAST BEFORE THE SCHEDULED CLOSING; ALSO 
6 TO DESIGNATE THE PLACE OF THE CLOSING. 
7 HE HAD NOT HEARD FROM THEM. ON APRIL THE 25TH 
8 HE CALLS THEM IN THE EVENING, WHEN HE TALKS TO THEM LATE IN 
9 PENNSYLVANIA, AND THEY SAY, "WE'LL CALL YOU BACK TOMORROW." 
10 THEY CALL BACK THE NEXT DAY, APRIL THE 26TH, IN THE EVENING. 
11 THE CONVERSATION IS, "I HAVEN'T RECEIVED THESE THINGS. WHAT 
12 ARE WE GOING TO DO?" 
13 THEY BASICALLY SAY, "WELL, YOU HAVE YOUR 
14 ATTORNEY OBTAIN THE TITLE REPORT, BECAUSE WE HAVEN'T 
15 OBTAINED IT. WILL YOU HAVE YOUR ATTORNEY PREPARE THE CLOSING 
16 PAPERS, BECAUSE WE'VE DONE NOTHING, AND IT'S CLOSE TO THE TIME 
17 FOR CLOSING. WE HAVE TO MOVE AHEAD." 
18 THERE'S A LITTLE CONVERSATION ABOUT THE SURVEY 
19 AND PERCOLATION TESTS. MR. KNIGHTON HAD, IN THE MEANTIME, HAD 
20 AN ENGINEER, WHO ACTUALLY SHOT SURVEY LINES, AND TOLD HIM, 
21 "YOU WON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE PERCOLATION TEST TO 
22 SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF A SEPTIC SYSTEM, AND THIS 
23 CERTAINLY LOOKS OKAY TO ME." 
24 SO IN THAT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, HE TOLD 
25 THEM THAT NO SURVEY HAD BEEN DONE, THAT AN ENGINEER HAD 
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1 BEEN OUT THERE, AND WHAT HE HAD LEARNED WAS SATISFACTORY TO 
2 HIM, AND THAT INCIDENTALLY, IN PART OF MR. LOTT'S OWN AFFIDAVIT, 
3 I WOULD POINT OUT, THERE WAS NO LIE AS MR. LARSEN STATED. IT'S 
4 PARAGRAPH 5 OF MR. LOTT'S AFFIDAVIT WHICH SAYS, "MR. KNIGHTON 
5 INFORMED ME AND MY WIFE THAT THE SURVEY WAS NOT YET 
6 COMPLETE, AND THAT HE WOULD WAIVE THE PERCOLATION TEST." 
7 THIS IS ON APRIL THE 26TH, HIS OWN AFFIDAVIT. 
8 WELL, THE NEXT DAY, WEDNESDAY, APRIL THE 27TH, MR. KNIGHTON 
9 CALLS ME IN THE AFTERNOON AND ASKS ME TO SEE IF I CAN GET THE 
10 TITLE REPORT AND PREPARE THE CLOSING PAPERS. 
11 I IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE TITLE COMPANY AND 
12 ORDERED ONE. IT WAS AT THE END OF THE MONTH, AND THEY WERE 
13 CLOSING MONTH-END DEALS, AND THEY TOLD ME THY WOULD DO 
14 WHAT THEY COULD TO GET IT TOM ME, BUT THEY DIDN'T THINK THEY 
15 COULD GET IT TO ME BEFORE FRIDAY OF THAT WEEK. THEY ACTUALLY 
16 DELIVERED IT ON MONDAY, MAY THE 2ND. 
17 ASSUMING THAT THE TITLE WORK WOULD BE OKAY, I 
18 WENT AHEAD AND PREPARED THE CLOSING PAPERS ON FRIDAY, MAY 
19 THE 29TH. MR. KNIGHTON CAME IN, SIGNED THE CLOSING STATEMENT, 
20 SIGNED A NOTE AND TRUST DEED TO THE LOTTS, DEPOSITED THE 
21 BALANCE OF THE DOWN PAYMENT IN MY TRUST ACCOUNT. 
22 THE COURT: DO YOU STILL HAVE THAT? 
23 MR. MARSH: I STILL HAVE THAT. I'VE PREPARED A 
24 CLOSING STATEMENT AND A DEED, SENT THOSE OFF TO THE LOTTS IN 
25 THE MAIL WITH A COVER LETTER WHICH SAID THAT MR. KNIGHTON 
II 
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1 HAD DEPOSITED THE DOWN PAYMENT, HE HAD SIGNED A NOTE AND 
2 TRUST DEED, "PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN THESE DOCUMENTS AS SOON 
3 AS YOU CAN AND I'LL DISBURSE THE FUNDS TO YOU." 
4 I ALSO SAID, "IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE 
5 CALL ME." 
6 THE NEXT THING WE HEAR--WELL, THE NEXT THING 
7 THAT HAPPENS IS ON MONDAY, MAY THE 2ND, WHEN I RECEIVED THE 
8 TITLE REPORT; INTERESTINGLY, THAT TITLE REPORT, WHICH I 
9 ATTACHED TO OUR MEMORANDUM, SHOWS THAT TITLE IS NOT IN THE 
10 LOTTS. IT'S IN ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK. 
11 NOW IT WOULD THE LOTTS* OBLIGATION TO CLEAR 
12 TITLE. BUT BECAUSE I HAD HAD PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH PROPERTY IN 
13 HIGH-COUNTRY ESTATES, I KNEW WHAT THAT PROBLEM WAS. I CALLED 
14 ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL AND ARRANGED TO GET A DEED FROM THEM IN 
15 ORDER CLEAR UP THAT TITLE. I DIDN'T TELL THE LOTTS ABOUT THIS 
16 PROBLEM BECAUSE I KNEW IT COULD BE CLEARED UP. BUT IT WAS 
17 THEIR OBLIGATION. 
18 I WAS STEPPING IN TO TRY TO ACCOMMODATE THEM 
19 AND GET THIS THING CLOSED. 
20 THE COURT: BUT DID THEY HAVE TO HAVE CLEAR 
21 TITLE AT THAT POINT, AS LONG AS THEY WERE SELLING ON CONTRACT? 
22 COULDN'T THEY WAIT UNTIL THE END OF THE PAYMENT TO CLEAR 
23 TITLE? 
24 MR. MARSH: IT'S POSSIBLE THAT THEY COULD DO 
25 THAT IF THEY ENTERED INTO-WELL, NOT IN THIS CASE, NO. IF YOU 
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1 ENTER INTO A CONTRACT WHICH SAYS, "WE WILL DELIVER TITLE UPON 
2 FINAL PAYMENT," THAT IS TRUE. 
3 BUT THIS CLOSING WAS TO BE WITH A DEED FROM 
4 THEM TO MR. KNIGHTON, WITH A NOTE AND TRUST DEED BACK TO THE 
5 LOTTS. SO YES, THEY HAD TO PROVIDE CLEAR TITLE AT THE CLOSING. 
6 ALL I DID WAS HELP THEM OUT BY CLEARING TITLE. I 
7 WAS DOING THEM A FAVOR. 
8 WELL, ON MAY THE 3RD, THEY GET THE PAPERS IN 
9 THE MAIL, THEY CALL NOT ME--AND, INCIDENTALLY, IF THEY HAD 
10 CALLED ME AS MY LETTER REQUESTED, AND INFORMED ME, AS WE 
11 LEARN A MONTH LATER, THAT THEY HAD A FAX MACHINE IN THEIR 
12 HOME, I COULD HAVE MADE THE CHANGES THEY WANTED, FAXED 
13 THEM TO THEM, AND WE COULD HAVE CLOSED THAT THING WITHIN A 
14 DAY OR TWO AFTER. 
15 MR. LARSEN: AND I OBJECT. THERE'S NOTHING--
16 THERE'S NO EVIDENCE IN THIS RECORD OF THAT FACT. THERE'S NO 
17 AFFIDAVIT BY MR. MARSH, AND THIS IS NOT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
18 THE COURT: WHAT'S YOUR OBJECTION? 
19 MR. LARSEN: THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE 
20 RECORD TO SUPPORT THIS PARTICULAR CLAIM. 
21 THE COURT: WHAT CLAIM? 
22 MR. LARSEN: WHAT HE COULD HAVE DONE IF 
23 SOMETHING ELSE HAD HAPPENED. 
24 THE COURT: OKAY. I UNDERSTAND. 
25 MR. LARSEN: OR WHAT HE WOULD HAVE DONE. 
II 
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1 MR. MARSH: THERE IS EVIDENCE IN MY DEPOSITION 
2 THAT THEY TOLD ME THAT THEY HAD A FAX MACHINE ON MAY THE 
3 25TH. IF THEY TOLD ME THAT ON MAY THE 3RD, WE COULD HAVE 
4 SOLVED THAT WITHIN A DAY'S TIME. I JUST POINT THAT OUT. 
5 NOTICE ALSO THAT THEY DO NOT TELL MR. 
6 KNIGHTON, "WE OBJECT THAT YOU HAVEN'T CLOSED BY MAY THE 1ST." 
7 THEY DIDN'T TELL HIM, "WE OBJECT BECAUSE YOU HAVEN'T GOT A 
8 SURVEY." 
9 THEY SAY NONE OF THOSE THINGS. WHAT THEY DO 
10 SAY IS, "WOULD YOU PLEASE CHANGE THE CLOSING STATEMENT TO 
11 TAKE OUT THE CLOSING FEE? WE DON'T WANT TO PAY THAT; AND TO 
12 TAKE OUT THE PRORATED HOME OWNERS' ASSESSMENT? WE DON'T 
13 WANT TO PAY THAT." 
14 WELL, IT WAS THEIR OBLIGATION TO PAY THOSE, BUT 
15 MR. KNIGHTON SAID, "OKAY, I'LL PAY THOSE." 
16 THE COURT: WHEN WAS IT AGREED THAT THEY WERE 
17 NOT GOING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CLOSING COSTS? WHEN WAS IT 
18 FIRST AGREED THAT THE SELLERS WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE 
19 CLOSING COSTS? 
20 MR. MARSH: IN THAT CONVERSATION ON MAY THE 
21 3RD? 
22 THE COURT: THAT'S THE FIRST TIME? 
23 MR. MARSH: THAT'S THE FIRST TIME. THEY SAID, "WE 
24 DON'T WANT TO PAY THOSE." THEY SAW THEM ON THE CLOSING 
25 STATEMENT, AND THEY SAID, "WE DON'T WANT TO PAY THOSE." 
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1 MR. KNIGHTON SAID, "OKAY, I'LL PAY THEM," AND THE 
2 NEXT DAY HE CALLED ME AND ASKED ME TO MAKE THOSE CHANGES IN 
3 THE CLOSING STATEMENT AND SEND THOSE OFF WITH A COPY OF THE 
4 NOTE AND TRUST DEED, WHICH I DID. 
5 THEY GET TO THOSE DOCUMENTS, AND I SENT 
6 ANOTHER COVER LETTER, BY THE WAY, WHICH SAID, "IF YOU HAVE 
7 ANY QUESTIONS, CALL ME." 
8 ON MAY THE 9TH, THEY RECEIVED THOSE 
9 DOCUMENTS. THAT'S A MONDAY. THEY DO NOTHING FOR ONE WEEK, 
10 THOUGH THEY CLAIM IN THAT WEEK'S PERIOD OF TIME THEY WERE 
11 CONSULTING AN ATTORNEY BOTH IN PENNSYLVANIA AND IN UTAH. 
12 AND THAT'S SIGNIFICANT, TOO, BECAUSE IF THEY 
13 WERE CONSULTING AN ATTORNEY, AND WE HAVE THOSE ARGUMENTS 
14 THAT THEY DIDN'T LIKE WHAT THE TRUST DEED SAID, THE LANGUAGE 
15| IN THE TRUST DEED, WHY DIDN'T THEY HAVE THEIR ATTORNEY MODIFY 
16 THE TRUST DEED OR DRAFT A NEW TRUST DEED OR DRAFT DEED AND 
17 SEND IT TO US AND SAY, "THIS IS WHAT WE WANT, SIGN THIS"? 
18 INSTEAD, THEY CALL MR. KNIGHTON ON MAY THE 
19 16TH AND SAY, "WE WANT THE LANGUAGE IN THE TRUST DEED 
20 MODIFIED, WILL YOU CALL YOUR ATTORNEY AND HAVE HIM DO THAT?" 
21 AND AGAIN, NO COMPLAINT THAT IT WASN'T CLOSED 
22 BY MAY THE 1ST, NO MENTION THAT THERE IS NO SURVEY; JUST, 
23 "WOULD YOU MAKE THESE CHANGES FOR US?" 
24 WELL, THOSE CHANGES WERE MADE. LATER IN MAY, I 
25 HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH THE LOTTS WHERE THEY CALLED ME 
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1 AND THEY WERE LOOKING AT THE TRUST DEED, AND THEY SAID, "WE 
2 WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT WE DON'T HAVE TO PAY THIS WATER 
3 ASSESSMENT THAT'S GOING TO BE PAID. WILL YOU CHANGE IT SO THAT 
4 IT STATES THAT CLEARLY?" 
5 WELL, I SAID, "I'LL BE HAPPY TO MAKE THOSE 
6 CHANGES. I CAN EITHER INTERLINEATE THOSE CHANGES AND HAVE 
7 MR. KNIGHTON INITIAL THEM, OR WE CAN PREPARE A NEW TRUST DEED 
8 AND HAVE HIM SIGN IT AND SEND YOU A COPY OF THAT." 
9 MR. LOTT SAID, "PLEASE PREPARE A NEW TRUST DEED 
10 AND HAVE MR. KNIGHTON SIGN THAT." WELL, THAT CREATED MORE 
11 DELAYS. 
12 THE COURT: IS THIS WATER ASSESSMENT DISCUSSED 
13 PRIOR-ANY TIME PRIOR TO THIS, YOUR SENDING THE INITIAL PAPERS 
14 TOTHELOTTS? 
15 MR. MARSH: NEVER WITH ME. MR. KNIGHTON WAS 
16 AWARE FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE HOME OWNERS' PEOPLE OUT 
17 THERE THAT A WATER ASSESSMENT WAS PENDING AND WOULD BE 
18 MADE AND SOME POINT IN TIME. 
19 THE COURT: IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN LOTTS 
20 AND KNIGHTON OR DO YOU KNOW? 
21 MR. MARSH: THERE MAY HAVE BEEN, BUT I DON'T 
22 KNOW. 
23 MR. LARSEN: YOUR HONOR, THAT'S ADDRESSED IN 
24 MR. KNIGHTON'S DEPOSITION. 
25 THE COURT: OKAY. 
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1 MR. MARSH: WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT WHEN THE 
2 LOTTS CALLED MR. KNIGHTON TOWARD THE END OF MAY, AND TALKED 
3 ABOUT THIS WATER ASSESSMENT, MR. KNIGHTON TOLD THEM, "I WILL 
4 PAY THAT WATER ASSESSMENT." BY THEN THEY HADN'T YET RECEIVED 
5 IT, AND THEY HADN'T PAID IT. THEY RECEIVED IT SOMETIME AFTER 
6 MAY THE 25TH, AND APPARENTLY PAID IT, THOUGH WE HAVEN'T SEEN 
7 EVIDENCE OF THAT. BUT IF THAT'S THE CASE, WHAT THEY SHOULD 
8 HAVE DONE IS SENT THAT ASSESSMENT TO MR. KNIGHTON AND SAID, 
9 "YOU PAY THIS ASSESSMENT," OR THEY SHOULD HAVE SENT IT TO ME 
10 AND SAID, "MAKE SURE THIS GETS PAID OUT OF THE CLOSING." THAT'S 
11 STANDARD PROCEDURE IN A CLOSING, IF YOU HAVE A PENDING 
12 ASSESSMENT AND THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED AS TO HOW TO HANDLE 
13 IT. 
14 INSTEAD, FOR THEM TO PAY IT, AND THEN TO SAY, 
15 "WELL, WE CHANGED OUR MINDS, WE PAID THIS ASSESSMENT, AND WE 
16 WANT OUT OF THIS DEAL," IS--WELL, IT'S BAD FAITH, YOUR HONOR. IT'S 
17 INAPPROPRIATE. 
18 NOW LET ME QUICKLY ADDRESS SOME OF THE ISSUES, 
19 IF I MAY, THAT MR. LARSEN RAISED. WHY WASN'T THIS DEAL CLOSED 
20 BY MAY THE 1ST? ASSUMING THAT MAY THE 1ST WAS AN ABSOLUTE 
21 DEADLINE, WELL, MAY THE 1ST WAS A SUNDAY, WHICH NOBODY KNEW 
22 UNTIL IT ARRIVED. THE LAW PROVIDES THAT YOU CAN GO TO THE 
23 NEXT DAY IF THAT'S THE CASE, IF IT'S ON A SUNDAY. 
24 BUT IT WASN'T CLOSED, BECAUSE THE LOTTS HAD NOT 
25 PROVIDED TITLE COMMITMENT IN ADVANCE, AND THEY HAVE NOT 
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1 DESIGNATED THE PLACE FOR A CLOSING. 
2 WE DID NOT STEP IN AND ASSUME THEIR OBLIGATION 
3 TO DO THAT. THEY REQUESTED THAT WE GO AHEAD, BECAUSE THEY 
4 WERE IN PENNSYLVANIA: "WOULD YOU GO AHEAD AND GET THOSE 
5 DONE?" "SURE." WE WANTED TO GET IT CLOSED, SO WE DID WHAT WE 
6 COULD TO GET THE CLOSING PREPARED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HAD 
7 THEY PERFORMED, THIS COULD HAVE BEEN CLOSED BY MAY 1ST. 
8 NOW THE INTERPRETATION OF THE "TIME IS OF THE 
9 ESSENCE" CLAUSE, IT SAYS THAT--ON THE FRONT, OR ON PAGE 3, NO 
10 LATER THAN MAY 1ST," BUT THE "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE" CLAUSE IS 
11 IN THE STANDARD FORMS ON THE BACK PAGE WHICH SAYS: 
12 IN THE EVENT...(OF) STRIKES, FIRE, FLOOD, 
13 EXTREME WEATHER, GOVERNMENTAL 
14 REGULATIONS...ACTS OF GOD... 
15 OR OTHER KINDS OF THINGS, YOU DON'T HAVE TO CLOSE ON MAY 1ST, 
16 BUT IT SAYS, "IN NO EVENT MORE THAN 15 DAYS," AND IT SAYS, 
17 "THEREAFTER, TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE." 
18 NOW THE CLEAR MEANING OF THAT IS THAT AFTER 15 
19 DAYS, TIME BECOMES OF THE ESSENCE. THERE'S NOTHING SAID ABOUT 
20 TIME BEING OF THE ESSENCE BEFORE THAT. 
21 THAT CLAUSE HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY THE 
22 SUPREME COURT BY THE STATE OF UTAH IN KRANTZ V. HOLT. WHICH 
23 WE HAVE CITED TWO OR THREE TIMES IN OUR MEMOS, IN A CASE 
24 WHERE THIS SAME STANDARD FORM AGREEMENT WAS USED THE 
25 ONLY DIFFERENCE WAS THAT INSTEAD OF 15 DAYS, AND AT 
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1 THEREAFTER TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE, IT SAID 30 DAYS AND 
2 THEREAFTER TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. 
3 THAT CASE CLEARLY SAYS THAT TIME IS NOT OF THE 
4 ESSENCE UNTIL AFTER THE 30 DAYS, IN THAT CASE; AND OF COURSE 15 
5 IN THIS CASE. 
6 IN THAT CASE, IT ALSO GOES ON TO SAY THAT IF THE 
7 PARTIES THEMSELVES DELAY THE CLOSING BY THEIR OWN MUTUAL 
8 AGREEMENT, THEN THE "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE" CLAUSE IS NOT IN 
9 EFFECT. 
10 WELL, THE REQUEST BY THE LOTTS TO MAKE 
11 CHANGES IN THE DOCUMENT IS A REQUEST TO DELAY THE CLOSING 
12 UNTIL WE HAVE THE CHANGES MADE. THE AGREEMENT BY MR. 
13 KNIGHTON, TO MAKE THOSE CHANGES, IS AN AGREEMENT BY HIM TO 
14 DELAY THE CLOSING UNTIL THESE CHANGES ARE MADE. THOSE 
15 REQUESTS WENT ON FOR THREE DIFFERENT TIMES DURING THE MONTH 
16 OF MAY, AND EACH TIME THEY REQUESTED THE CHANGES BE MADE IN 
17 THE DOCUMENTS. THAT CONSTITUTES AN AGREEMENT TO DELAY THE 
18 CLOSING UNTIL THOSE CHANGES ARE MADE. 
19 AND THE CASES WE'VE CITED SUPPORT THAT; THE 
20 CASES ARE EXACTLY ON POINT ON THAT ISSUE. 
21 FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE THOSE CASES WHICH ALSO 
22 SAY THAT IF ONE PARTY WANTS TO CLAIM THAT THE OTHER IS IN 
23 DEFAULT, HE MUST TENDER HIS OWN PERFORMANCE BEFORE HE CAN 
24 ASSERT THAT THE OTHER PARTY IS IN DEFAULT. 
25 NOW THE LOTTS HAVE NEVER, NOT TO THIS DAY, 
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1 TENDERED THEIR OWN PERFORMANCE OF THIS CONTRACT. THEY HAVE 
2 NOT RETURNED THE DEED NOR THE CLOSING STATEMENT. 
3 IF THEY WANTED TO DECLARE MR. KNIGHTON IN 
4 DEFAULT, THEY SAID HAVE SAID, "WE ARE SENDING TO YOU THE 
5 CLOSING STATEMENT AND DEED SIGNED BY US TO BE RECORDED, UPON 
6 PERFORMANCE BY MR. KNIGHTON, AND THEY COULD HAVE SAID, "WE 
7 WILL GIVE YOU 10 DAYS TO DO THIS OR 30 DAYS TO DO THIS OR 
8 WHATEVER." 
9 BUT THEY DIDN'T EVER DO THAT. INSTEAD, ON JUNE 
10 THE 7TH, WHEN I CALLED THE LOTTS AT THEIR REQUEST TO FAX A 
11 COPY OF THE REVISED TRUST DEED TO THEM, MRS. LOTT AND 
12 ANSWERED THE PHONE AND SAID SIMPLY TO ME, "I'M SORRY, I DON'T 
13 KNOW HOW TO TURN ON THE FAX MACHINE." 
14 APPARENTLY IT WAS A COMPUTER FAX MODEM, AND 
15 SHE SAID, "YOU'LL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL MY HUSBAND COMES HOME." I 
16 SAID, "FINE, HAVE HIM CALL ME." 
17 INSTEAD OF CALLING ME THAT NIGHT, HE CALLED MR. 
18 KNIGHTON, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME SAID, "WE WANT OUT OF THIS 
19 DEAL. WE'VE PAID A WATER ASSESSMENT, WE WANT OUT OF THIS 
20 DEAL; WE'RE NOT GOING TO CLOSE." 
21 THAT'S THE FIRST WORD THAT WE HAVE THAT THEY 
22 DO NOT INTEND TO CLOSE. 
23 THE COURT: WHAT WAS THAT DATE? 
24 MR. MARSH: JUNE 7, 1994. THE NOTICE IN THE 
25 DOCUMENTS-THERE ARE SOME ARGUMENTS BY MR. LARSEN ABOUT 
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1 THE WORDING IN THAT TRUST DEED THAT I MADE AT MR. LOTT'S 
2 REQUEST, AND HIS INTERPRETATION OF THOSE WORDS BEING THAT IT 
3 STILL DOESN'T COMPLY WITH WHAT MR. LOTT WANTED; THAT IS, HE 
4 CLAIMS HE STILL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THOSE WATER ASSESSMENTS, 
5 AND THAT THAT WAS THE REASON THEY DIDN'T CLOSE. 
6 WELL, I POINT OUT THAT IS A BOGUS ISSUE, BECAUSE 
7 THEY DID NOT SEE THE LANGUAGE IN THE TRUST DEED UNTIL AFTER 
8 JUNE THE 7TH. THAT'S THE DAY THEY SAID, "WE DON'T WANT TO 
9 CLOSE." 
10 WHEN THEY SAID THAT, MR. KNIGHTON CALLED ME 
11 THE NEXT DAY AND SAID, "I HAD A CALL FROM MR. LOTT LAST NIGHT 
12 AND HE SAID HE DOESN'T WANT TO DO THIS." I SAID, "I'LL SEND OFF TO 
13 THEM THE REVISED TRUST DEED SO THEY CAN SEE IT, WITH A FURTHER 
14 LETTER THAT SAYS, 'PLEASE SIGN THE DEED AND RETURN IT."' 
15 THEY GOT THAT LETTER SOMETIME AFTER JUNE THE 
16 9TH. THEY COULD NOT HAVE SEEN THE LANGUAGE IN THAT REVISED 
17 TRUST DEED UNTIL SOMETIME AFTER JUNE THE 9TH, BUT THEY 
18 TERMINATED ON JUNE THE 7TH; THE POINT BEING THAT THE LANGUAGE 
19 IN THE TRUST DEED HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THEIR DECISION NOT TO 
20 CLOSE. ALL OF THE ARGUMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THAT ARE SIMPLY 
21 BOGUS. 
22 THEY CLAIM THAT THE SURVEY WAS FOR THE BENEFIT 
23 OF THE LOTTS SIMPLY IS NOT TRUE. IT WAS MR. KNIGHTON WHO 
24 WANTED THE SURVEY. IT WAS FOR HIS BENEFIT. THE SURVEY COULD 
25 NOT BENEFIT THE SELLERS IF THE DEAL CLOSED, BECAUSE MR. 
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1 KNIGHTON WOULD BE THE OWNER OF THE PROFIT, AND IT WOULD BE 
2 ENTIRELY FOR HIS BENEFIT. 
3 IF THE SALE FAILED, I DON'T THINK THE SURVEY 
4 COULD BENEFIT THE SELLERS UNLESS THE CONTRACT REQUIRED THAT 
5 THAT SURVEY BE DELIVERED TO THE SELLERS UPON THE FAILURE OF 
6 THE SALE. IT DOESN'T PROVIDE THAT ANYWHERE. 
7 AND AGAIN I REPEAT THAT ON NO OCCASION, IN ALL 
8 THE CONVERSATIONS THAT WERE HAD BETWEEN THESE PARTIES, DID 
9 THE LOTTS EVER SAY, "YOU DIDN'T GET A SURVEY, AND THEREFORE WE 
10 DON'T WANT TO CLOSE." THEY NEVER MENTIONED THAT UNTIL LONG 
11 AFTER THIS SUIT WAS FILED, AND IT WAS AFTER THE FACT, NOT IN 
12 THEIR MIND. THEY WERE ONLY REQUESTING CHANGES IN THE 
13 DOCUMENTS FOR THEIR BENEFIT. 
14 LET ME JUST MAKE REFERENCE TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
15 MR. HAMMOND, THE SO-CALLED EXPERT IN THIS CASE. HE IS 
16 APPARENTLY AN OFFICER OF A TITLE COMPANY AND HAS SOME 
17 EXPERIENCE IN CLOSINGS. 
18 I, FOR 25 YEARS, WAS ALSO AN OFFICER IN A TITLE 
19 COMPANY, AND I HAVE SOME EXPERIENCE, BUT--. 
20 MR. LARSEN: OBJECTION, TO THIS, YOUR HONOR. 
21 ONCE AGAIN, THERE'S NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
22 THE COURT: THAT'S FINE. 
23 MR. MARSH: THE OPINION OF A TITLE COMPANY 
24 EMPLOYEE, WHO KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT THE FACTS IN THIS CASE, 
25 WHO HAS NOT SEEN NOR REFERRED TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
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1 PARTIES, DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE LAW WHICH IS APPLICABLE IN THIS 
2 CASE. THIS CONTRACT IS WHAT IS BINDING BETWEEN THESE PARTIES, 
3 AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CONTRACT IS 
4 FOR THIS COURT. IT IS NOT FOR MR. HAMMOND TO DETERMINE WHAT 
5 "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE" MEANS IN THIS CASE. 
6 IF I HAD THE CHANCE TO CROSS-EXAMINE MR. 
7 HAMMOND, I WOULD PUT THIS CONTRACT IN FRONT OF HIM AND SAY, 
8 "WHAT ABOUT THESE WORDS?" HE SAID NOTHING ABOUT THOSE 
9 THINGS. HE ALSO IS NOT FAMILIAR WITH KRANTZ V. HOLT CASE. AND 
10 IS ALSO NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE FACT THAT THERE WERE REQUESTS 
11 TO REVISE THE DOCUMENT, WHICH IS REQUESTED TO DELAY THE 
12 CLOSING. HE'S ALSO NOT FAMILIAR WITH--. 
13 MR. LARSEN: OBJECTION TO SPECULATION. THERE'S 
14 NOTHING IN THE RECORD AS TO WHAT--AS TO SUPPORT--. 
15 MR. MARSH: AND THAT'S MY POINT. 
16 THE COURT: AND I WOULD OVERRULE. HE'S MAKING 
17 A PROPER ARGUMENT. 
18 MR. MARSH: I THINK I MADE MY POINT. LET ME 
19 MAKE REFERENCE TO THE MAY 6TH LETTER, WHICH MR. LARSEN 
20 CLAIMS WAS SIGNIFICANT TO THE LAWSUIT. 
21 I SENT THIS LETTER TO THEM, AND I DID SAY, "FOR 
22 YOUR INFORMATION"-THIS IS BECAUSE MR. KNIGHTON HAD A 
23 CONVERSATION ABOUT THE ASSESSMENTS, AND HE ASKED ME TO 
24 EXPLAIN TO HIM WHAT WOULD HAPPEN. 
25 SO I SAID, "FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE OWNERS' 
II 
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1 ASSESSMENT"-AND WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT A WATER ASSESSMENT, 
2 BECAUSE THAT DIDN'T COME UP AT THIS POINT. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT 
3 A REGULAR HOME OWNER'S ASSESSMENT OF $300 A YEAR THAT'S MADE 
4 EVERY YEAR, THAT THAT, "IS A LIEN AGAINST THE PROPERTY ITSELF 
5 AND IS DUE FROM THE CURRENT OWNER OF THE PROPERTY. 
6 THEREFORE, ONCE THE DEED FROM YOU IS RECORDED FROM YOU IS 
7 RECORDED, ALL FUTURE ASSESSMENTS WILL BE DUE FROM THE NEW 
8 OWNER AND YOU WILL HAVE NO LIABILITY THEREFOR." 
9 IN OTHER WORDS, THE HOME OWNERS' ASSOCIATION 
10 OUT THERE ASSESSES IT AGAINST THE PROPERTY, AND IT LOOKS TO THE 
11 CURRENT OWNER TO PAY THAT ASSESSMENT. 
12 IF THEY HAD SENT THE DEED BACK, AND IT WERE 
13 RECORDED, ANY ASSESSMENT MADE FROM THAT POINT ON WOULD BE 
14 MR. KNIGHTON'S OBLIGATION. 
15 AND SO MY STATEMENT IN THAT LETTER IS EXACTLY 
16 TRUE. NOW LATER, WHEN IT COMES TO THE WATER ASSESSMENT, WE 
17 HAVE THE SAME SITUATION LEGALLY. THE HOME OWNERS' 
18 ASSOCIATION MAKES THAT ASSESSMENT. IF IT'S MADE WHILE THE 
19 LOTTS ARE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY, THE LOTTS ARE OBLIGATED TO 
20 THE HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION. 
21 BUT AS BETWEEN MR. KNIGHTON AND THE LOTTS, MR. 
22 KNIGHTON HAS AGREED TO PAY THAT ASSESSMENT, AND SO HE IS 
23 OBLIGATED TO MAKE SURE THAT IT'S PAID. IF THEY HAD SENT THAT 
24 ASSESSMENT TO HIM, HE WOULD HAVE PAID IT. IF THEY WOULD HAVE 
25 SENT IT TO ME, I WOULD HAVE MADE SURE THAT IT WAS PAID OUT OF 
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1 THE CLOSING, IN ANY EVENT. 
2 THE OBLIGATION IS ULTIMATELY MR. KNIGHTON'S, 
3 BECAUSE HE AGREED TO PAY IT. WE JUST WANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
4 PAY IT, AND IF THEY WOULD HAVE SENT IT TO US, AND SHOWN US 
5 EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAD PAID IT, WE WOULD REIMBURSE THEM. WE 
6 JUST WANT TO COMPLETE THIS CLOSING. 
7 MR. LARSEN ASKED, "WHY HADN'T MR. KNIGHTON 
8 PAID THAT EVEN TO THIS DAY?" 
9 WELL, THE QUESTION--THE ANSWER IS BECAUSE THEY 
10 HADN'T TENDERED THE DEED. UNTIL WE HAVE A DEED THIS DEAL ISN'T 
11 CLOSED. BUT AS SOON AS WE GET THAT DEED, THAT WATER 
12 ASSESSMENT WILL BE PAID. 
13 LET ME JUST CONCLUDE, YOUR HONOR, BY SAYING 
14 THAT MR. KNIGHTON DID EVERYTHING HE COULD POSSIBLY DO TO 
15 CLOSE THIS DEAL ON APRIL THE 29TH, WHICH WAS BEFORE THE 
16 SCHEDULED CLOSING DATES. THE LOTTS DID NOTHING TO COMPLETE 
17 THEIR END OF THIS TRANSACTION, OR DID NOT SEND BACK THE DEEDS, 
18 DIDN'T SEND BACK THE CLOSING STATEMENT. ALL THEY DID WAS 
19 REQUEST CHANGES IN THE DOCUMENTS TO MEET THEIR SATISFACTION, 
20 WHICH WAS NOT REQUIRED BY THE DEAL, BUT WHICH MR. KNIGHTON 
21 SAID, "I WILL AGREE TO DO THAT, JUST SO WE GET IT CLOSED." 
22 FINALLY, AFTER A MONTH OF THAT, THEY SAY, "WE'VE 
23 CHANGED OUR MINDS, WE DON'T WANT TO SELL." 
24 THERE IS ONLY ONE CONCLUSION WE CAN COME TO: 
251 MR. KNIGHTON PERFORMED. THEY HAVE NOT. HE IS ENTITLED TO 
33 
1 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT. HE'S PREPARED TO PAY 
2 WHATEVER IS REQUIRED TO BRING THE NOTE WHICH WOULD HAVE 
3 BEEN SIGNED THEN UP TO DO AS SOON AS WE CAN COMPLETE THIS 
4 CLOSING, AND WE ASK THE COURT TO HELP US DO THAT. 
5 MR. LARSEN: JUDGE, I'LL BE VERY BRIEF, MAKING 
6 JUST A FEW KEY POINTS. 
7 FIRST OF ALL, THERE'S TWO REQUIREMENTS IN THE 
8 EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT. ONE IS FOR THE SURVEY. ONE IS FOR 
9 THE PERCOLATION TEST; WHICH YOU TAKE AND READ THE EARNEST 
10 MONEY AGREEMENT, AND YOU'LL NOTICE THAT THEY'RE REFERRED TO 
11 IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS. THE PERCOLATION TEST IS FOR MR. 
12 KNIGHTON'S BENEFIT. IT IS TYPED IN, IN PARAGRAPH 7. OKAY? 
13 AND I'M NOT DISPUTING TO THE COURT THAT THAT IS 
14 NOT FOR MR. KNIGHTON'S BENEFIT. THE SURVEY IS A STANDARD 
15 PROVISION. IT'S REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 1(D) AND IT IS A TYPED, 
16 IT IS A STANDARD PROVISION, AND THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING IN 
17 EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THAT PROVISION IS SOLELY TO MR. 
18 KNIGHTON'S BENEFIT. NOTHING. 
19 THAT IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE CLOSING OF 
20 THIS PARTICULAR TRANSACTION. MR. KNIGHTON, IF YOU READ MR. 
21 LOTTS AFFIDAVIT, WHAT MR. LOTT IS SAYING IS THAT HE SAID IT 
22 WASN'T COMPLETED BY THAT TIME. HE'S NOT SAYING THAT IT 
23 WOULDN'T BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE CLOSING, THAT MR. KNIGHTON 
24 NEVER COMPLETED THE SURVEY, NEVER COMPLIED WITH THE TERMS 
25 OF THE EARNEST MONEY MONEY AGREEMENT. 
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1 AND FRANKLY THIS IS A SITUATION WHERE AN 
2 ATTORNEY AND A REAL ESTATE AGENT, AND THAT'S WHAT MR. 
3 KNIGHTON IS--A CERTIFIED REAL ESTATE AGENT-ARE ATTEMPTING TO 
4 TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE LOTTS. 
5 NOW IF YOU TAKE THAT ARGUMENT TO IT'S LOGICAL 
6 CONCLUSION, AND YOU SAY THE PERCOLATION TEST ISN'T NECESSARY, 
7 THE SURVEY ISN'T NECESSARY, IT'S A SELLER-FINANCED DEAL, WHY DO 
8 WE HAVE SUCH EXTENDED DELAY IN THE CLOSING? 
9 AND THAT'S WHERE MR. MARSH IS CONTEMPLATED TO 
10 BE THE CLOSING AGENT AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN 
11 THE PARTIES. BUT IF TOOK A LOOK AT MR. MARSH'S DEPOSITION 
12 TRANSCRIPT, TOO, JUDGE, HE NEVER BILLED MR. KNIGHTON FOR THE 
13 PREPARATION OF THAT DOCUMENT, BECAUSE HE ASSUMED HE WAS 
14 GOING TO CLOSE THE DOCUMENTS. HE WAS GOING TO CLOSE THE 
15 TRANSACTION, AND THAT'S WHAT HIS DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT SAYS. 
16 NOW THERE WOULD REALLY BE NO REASON IF NONE 
17 OF THOSE THINGS WERE NECESSARY, AND KNIGHTON WAS GOING TO 
18 WAIVE ALL THOSE THINGS; WE DON'T NEED A DELAY FROM FEBRUARY 
19 16TH TO MAY 1. WE COULD CLOSE THAT DEAL ANYTIME DURING THOSE 
20 PENDING MONTHS. AND KNIGHTON KNOWS THAT THE LOTTS ARE 
21 EXTRAORDINARILY CONCERNED ABOUT THAT WATER ASSESSMENT. 
22 HE SAID THAT IN HIS DEPOSITION. HE KNOWS THAT'S 
23 PENDING, AND HE'S CONTACTING THE HOME OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, 
24 AND THEY TELL HIM IT'S ON THE WAY. 
25 WHEN YOU LOOK AT MARSH'S LETTER, MARSH'S 
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1 LETTER-IT'S THE HOME OWNERS' ASSOCIATION THAT'S MAKING THE 
2 ASSESSMENT, AND MARSH'S LETTER REFERS TO--MARSH DIDN'T READ 
3 THE LETTER TO YOU, HE DIDN'T QUOTE IT VERBATIM. THE VERBATIM 
4 QUOTE IS, "...THE (HOME) OWNERS' ASSESSMENT IS A LIEN AGAINST THE 
5 PROPERTY ITSELF AND IS DUE FROM THE CURRENT OWNER OF THE 
6 PROPERTY." 
7 IT IS THE HOME OWNERS WHO ARE MAKING THE ONE-
8 TIME, ONE-SHOT WATER ASSESSMENT. NOW IT IS THE LOTTS WHO 
9 WANT TO CLOSE THIS DEAL. IT IS THE LOTTS WHO WANT THIS THING 
10 TAKEN CARE OF, AND WANT THIS THING TAKEN CARE OF BY MAY 1, '94. 
11 THE CONTRACT SAYS THAT IT WILL CLOSE, AND THAT'S AN 
12 ALTERATION OF THE CONTRACT; "CLOSE NO LATER THAN MAY 1, '94." 
13 THE DELAYS IN THIS CASE, THEY'RE ATTEMPTING TO 
14 FOCUS ON THE LOTTS, BUT I'M TELLING YOU THAT THE CONTROLLING 
15 CASE LAW IS THAT IF YOU HAVE A "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE" CLAUSE, 
16 AND THE CLOSING DATE-NEITHER PARTY PERFORMS; LOTTS' 
17 PERFORMANCE ISN'T RELEVANT HERE. IF NEITHER PARTY PERFORMS BY 
18 MAY 1, THEN THE DEAL'S OFF. 
19 AND WHEN YOU TAKE A LOOK AT THE KRANTZ CASE, 
20 KRANTZ V. HOLT, THAT'S NOT SUPPORTIVE OF THAT INTERPRETATION. 
21 WHAT IT SAYS IS, AND I'LL QUOTE, "THAT CLAUSE, HOWEVER, IS NOT 
22 EFFECTIVE UNLESS THE CLOSING DATE WAS DELAYED MORE THAN 30 
23 DAYS BEYOND AUGUST THE 20TH," WHICH IS THE CLOSING DATE, 
24 "BECAUSE OF UNCONTROLLABLE FACTORS SUCH AS INTERRUPTION OF 
25 TRANSPORT, STRIKE, FIRE, FLOOD, EXTREME WEATHER, GOVERNMENTAL 
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1 REGULATIONS, ACTS OF GOD OR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES BEYOND THE 
2 CONTROL OF THE BUYER AND THE SELLER." 
3 YOU CAN READ THAT CASE, BUT IT'S AMBIGUOUS AS 
4 TO WHETHER THEY'RE SAYING THAT Y O U JUST H A V E A STANIDARD 30= 
5 DAY EXTENSION OR WHETHER YOU NEED ONE OF THOSE THINGS TO 
6 OCCUR, AND THAT HAS OCCURRED IN THIS CASE, AND THAT'S THE 
7 REASON THAT THE DELAY WAS--. 
8 THE COURT: IT SAID IT DIDN'T OCCUR IN THAT CASE. I 
9 READ THE CASE. 
10 MR. LARSEN: WHEN I READ THE CASE--AND I MAY BE 
11 WRONG-BUT WHEN I READ THE CASE, I DIDN'T SEE ANY REFERENCE 
12 EITHER WAY AS TO WHAT THE REASON FOR THE DELAY WAS. 
13 BUT IF YOU HAVE READ THE CASE, I OBVIOUSLY--. 
14 THE COURT: I HAVE READ IT. 
15 MR. LARSEN: WHAT I'M SUGGESTING TO YOU IS THAT 
16 THE CONTROLLING CASE ISN'T KRANTZ V. HOLT IT'S THE CENTURY 21 
17 CASE. THAT CENTURY 21 CASE SAYS THAT IF NEITHER PARTY 
18 PERFORMS BY MAY 1, THEN WE HAVE A SITUATION WHERE THE 
19 CONTRACT IS OFF. 
20 BUT THE REASON FOR THESE DELAYS ARE THE 
21 REASONS FOR--THE REASON FOR THESE DELAYS ARE SOLELY , 
22 ATTRIBUTABLE TO MARSH AND KNIGHTON. THE HAMMOND AFFIDAVIT, 
23 JUDGE, IS SUBMITTED BECAUSE IF THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY IN THIS 
24 CONTRACT, FIRST OF ALL YOU SHOULD NOT-WHAT THE CUSTOM IN 
25 USAGE IS IN TERMS OF INTERPRETATION OF THIS CONTRACT, HAMMOND 
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1 SAYS THAT CUSTOM IN USAGE IS WHEN YOU SAY, "THIS IS THE CLOSING 
2 DATE," THAT'S IT. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AS OF THE CLOSING DATE. 
3 IF YOU BELIEVE THAT THIS PARTICULAR VERSION OF 
4 THE CONTRACT IS AMBIGUOUS, THEN WHAT HAMMOND PROVIDES YOU 
5 WITH IS THE CUSTOM IN USAGE AS ESTABLISHED IN UTAH. 
6 AGAIN, THE BACKGROUND OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF 
7 CLOSINGS THAT HE HAS, THE CUSTOM IN USAGE IN UTAH IS THAT WHEN 
8 YOU WRITE DOWN THE CLOSING DATE, IF YOU FILLED IN THE 
9 STANDARD FORM, THAT'S WHEN TIME BECOMES OF THE ESSENCE, AS OF 
10 THAT CLOSING DATE. THE DELAYS HERE ARE OCCASIONED BECAUSE 
11 KNIGHTON RUNS THIS THING UP TO THE VERY LAST MINUTE, DOESN'T 
12 OBTAIN THE PERC TEST AND DOESN'T OBTAIN THE SURVEY. 
13 THE COURT: WHEN DID THE SELLER FIRST OBJECT TO 
14 NOT RECEIVING THE SURVEY? OR DID HE EVER OBJECT? 
15 MR. LARSEN: I'M TRYING TO THINK. WHAT I'M TRYING 
16 TO DO IS CONFINE MYSELF TO THE EVIDENCE THAT'S IN THE CASE, AND 
17 1 DON'T KNOW THAT THAT IS ADDRESSED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER IN 
18 THE EVIDENCE. 
19 THE COURT: THAT'S MY POINT. I DON'T RECALL 
20 READING AFFIDAVIT OR ANY OF YOUR MEMORANDA WHERE ANYTIME 
21 THAT THE SELLER OBJECTED TO NOT RECEIVING THE SURVEY. OF 
22 COURSE I'LL TAKE THAT BACK: YOU DID SAY SOMETHING ABOUT IT IN 
23 YOUR MEMORANDUM, AS I RECALL. WELL, I DO-EITHER THIS MORNING, 
24 OR I REMEMBER SEEING SOMETHING ABOUT IT, BUT I KNOW THIS 
25 MORNING IT'S BEEN MADE QUITE PROMINENT IN YOUR ARGUMENT. 
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1 MR. LARSEN: SEE WHAT HAPPENED IS THAT THE 
2 LOTTS WERE MISLEAD INTO BELIEVING THAT THE SURVEY EXISTED, 
3 AND THAT IT WAS COMPLETED, AND THEREFORE THEY DIDN'T OBJECT 
4 TO IT. THEY--IT WASN'T UNTIL DISCOVERY, JUDGE, IT WASN'T UNTIL 
5 THE KNIGHTON DEPOSITION THAT THE LOTTS, FOR THE VERY FIRST 
6 TIME, DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS NO SURVEY. 
7 THE COURT: THAT'S MY POINT. IF THAT SURVEY HAD 
8 BEEN SO IMPORTANT, THEY CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE OBJECTED TO IT 
9 RIGHT OFF THE BAT: "NOW WAIT A MINUTE, WE WANT TO MAKE SURE 
10 THIS PROPERTY CLOSES. WHERE IS THE SURVEY?" 
11 MR. LARSEN: THAT'S TRUE. BUT SEE THE-AND IF 
12 THEY HAD BEEN TOLD, "THERE IS NO SURVEY," THEN THEY WOULD 
13 HAVE DONE THAT, BECAUSE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO THEM. BUT WHAT 
14 THEY WERE TOLD WAS THE OPPOSITE, THAT THERE WAS A SURVEY. 
15 YOU CAN'T EXPECT THEM, WHEN THEY'RE BEING 
16 MISLEAD INTO BELIEVING THAT THERE WAS A SURVEY, TO OBJECT 
17 ABOUT THE SURVEY NOT BEING THERE. THEY ASSUMED THAT THAT 
18 HAD BEEN COMPLETED. DO YOU SEE WHAT I MEAN? 
19 THE COURT: WELL, I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU'RE 
20 SAYING, YES. 
21 MR. LARSEN: WHAT I'M SUGGESTING TO YOU IS THAT 
22 IF THEY HAD KNOWN THERE WAS NO SURVEY, THEN CERTAINLY, 
23 BECAUSE OF THE CONCERNS THEY HAD, THEY WOULD HAVE OBJECTED. 
24 KNIGHTON NEVER SAID TO THE LOTTS, AND THERE'S NO EVIDENCE TO 
25 SUGGEST THAT HE WOULD SAY, THAT THIS ASSESSMENT AND--THE 
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1 CHALLENGE I GAVE TO MR. MARSH ON MY ARGUMENT WAS, "SHOW US 
2 IN THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT." IF YOU WANT--MR. MARSH 
3 KEEPS TALKING ABOUT THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. ALL RIGHT. LET'S 
4 TAKE A LOOK AT THE EARNEST MONEY. WHERE DOES IT SAY IN THERE 
5 THAT KNIGHTON IS GOING TO PAY THAT ASSESSMENT IF IT'S INCURRED, 
6 IF THE ASSESSMENT IS INCURRED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF CLOSING? 
7 THE ASSESSMENT LANGUAGE TALKS ABOUT ANNUAL, 
8 PRORATED ASSESSMENTS THAT ARE RECURRING, IT DOESN'T TALK 
9 ABOUT ONE-SHOT ASSESSMENTS. 
10 AND EVEN FOR THOSE ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS, WHAT 
11 IT TALKS ABOUT IS PRORATING THEM. MR. KNIGHTON WOULD BE 
12 PRESENTING TO THIS COURT AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ARGUMENT IF 
13 THE LOTTS HAD SIGNED THE TRUST DEED BEFORE THE TRUST DEED IS 
14 RECORDED AND THE ASSESSMENT COMES CRASHING IN. THEN HE 
15 WOULD SAY, "OH, WE'RE GOING TO GO BY THE TERMS OF THE 
16 CONTRACT." NOW--. 
17 THE COURT: SUM IT UP, COUNSEL. YOU'RE WAY OVER 
18 TIME. I HAVE PEOPLE WAITING OUT IN THE HALL. 
19 MR. LARSEN: THIS IS THE LAST POINT, JUDGE. JUNE 
20 7TH, THEY SAY, "WE STILL DON'T HAVE A TRUST DEED. WE'RE NOT 
21 GOING TO CLOSE THIS. THESE DELAYS ARE INTOLERABLE. WE'VE BEEN 
22 HIT WITH THIS WATER ASSESSMENT," WHICH MR. MARSH SAYS THEY'RE 
23 UNDER A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO PAY. 
24 THEY DON'T RECEIVE THE TRUST DEED UNTIL JUNE 
25 THE 9TH. THAT'S TRUE. BUT SEE BY JUNE 7TH, WHEN THEY SAY, "WE'RE 
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1 NOT GOING TO GO ANY FURTHER WITH THIS," THEY STILL HAVEN'T 
2 RECEIVED THE CORRECTED TRUST DEED, AND THAT'S BECAUSE AT THAT 
3 POINT IN TIME THEY HAVE BEEN STUCK WITH THIS WATER 
4 ASSESSMENT, AND THERE'S NOTHING IN THIS CONTRACT TO ASSURE 
5 THEM THAT THEY'RE NOT GOING TO HAVE TO PAY THIS WATER 
6 ASSESSMENT. 
7 THE COURT: THANK YOU, COUNSEL. BE VERY BRIEF, 
8 MR. MARSH. LET ME ASK YOU ONE QUESTION: WHEN DID MR. 
9 KNIGHTON, OR YOURSELF, TELL THE BUYERS THAT THE SURVEY HAD 
10 BEEN COMPLETED OR HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED? 
11 MR. MARSH: ON APRIL 26TH, TUESDAY, I BELIEVE, THE 
12 CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. KNIGHTON AND MR. LOTT WHEREIN THE 
13 SURVEY WAS DISCUSSED. MR. LOTT'S AFFIDAVIT SAYS ON APRIL THE 
14 26TH, 1994, MR. KNIGHTON INFORMED HIM AND HIS WIFE THAT THEY 
15 SURVEY WAS NOT YET COMPLETED AND HE WOULD WAIVE THE 
16 PERCOLATION TEST. 
17 MR. LARSEN: WELL--. 
18 THE COURT: COUNSEL--. 
19 MR. MARSH: THOUGH WE NEVER RECEIVED SUCH 
20 WAIVER IN WRITING. THAT'S WHAT MR. LOTT SAID ABOUT THAT. 
21 THE COURT: WHEN WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT MR. 
22 LOTT OBJECTED TO THE SURVEY NOT BEING THERE, OR DO YOU KNOW? 
23 MR. MARSH: I DO KNOW. IT WAS AFTER THIS LAW 
24 SUIT WAS COMMENCED. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ANY WHERE IN THE 
25 RECORD THAT THE OBJECTION FOR THE LACK OF SURVEY WAS MADE, 
II 
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1 AND IF YOU READ MR. KNIGHTON'S DEPOSITION, WHAT HE SAID ABOUT 
2 THAT APRIL 26TH CONVERSATION WAS THAT THE ENGINEER HAD BEEN 
3 OUT ON THE PROPERTY. HE WAS--HE HAD SHOT SOME LINES, AND HE 
4 WAS SATISFIED WITH WHAT THE ENGINEER HAD DONE. THAT'S MR. 
5 KNIGHTON'S VIEW OF THAT CONVERSATION; NOTHING FURTHER SAID 
6 ABOUT THE SURVEY UNTIL THIS LAW SUIT WAS FILED. 
7 MR. LARSEN: AND WE DISPUTE THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
8 MR. MARSH: TO CORRECT ONE POINT, MR. LARSEN 
9 CLAIMS THAT KNIGHTON WAS A REAL ESTATE AGENT. FOR A PERIOD 
10 OF SIX MONTHS IN '88, HE WAS IN TRAINING, ACTUALLY GOT HIS REAL 
11 ESTATE LICENSE. HE IS NOT CURRENTLY LICENSED, AND HAS NOT 
12 DONE IN ANYTHING IN REAL ESTATE SINCE '88; IF THAT HAS ANY 
13 EFFECT ON THE MATTER. WE'LL SUBMIT IT, YOUR HONOR. 
14 THE COURT: COUNSEL, LET ME INDICATE TO YOU 
15 THAT I'VE READ YOUR MEMORANDA, LISTENED TO YOUR ARGUMENTS 
16 HERE TODAY, AND THE COURT IS AWFUL CONCERNED. I'M READY TO 
17 MAKE MY DECISION ON THIS CASE, BUT I'M ALSO CONCERNED THAT 
18 THERE ARE FACTUAL QUESTIONS. I AM GOING TO MAKE MY DECISION, 
19 BUT I'M ALSO CONCERNED; I THINK THERE ARE FACTUAL QUESTIONS 
20 THAT MAY VERY WELL BE KICKED BACK HERE FOR FURTHER FACTUAL 
21 FINDINGS, BECAUSE I DO THINK THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHICH 
22 BOTH PARTIES ARE ALLEGING WHICH ARE SOMEWHAT IN DISPUTE. 
23 AND I GUESS EVEN WITH BOTH OF YOU MAKING A 
24 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, I KNOW THE COURT IS NOT 
25 COMPELLED TO ISSUE ONE YET, BUT I FEEL COMPELLED TO DO SO: I 
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l| SEE THESE PARTIES GOING ON HERE INCURRING MORE EXPENSE, AND IF 
21 IT'S TAKEN UP AND BROUGHT BACK, IT WILL BE MORE EXPENSIVE; BUT 
31 I DON'T KNOW THAT. 
4 I CAN READILY SEE THAT THERE ARE FACTUAL 
5 QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE, AND IT MAY VERY WELL GO UP AND BE KICKED 
6 BACK FOR THOSE FACTUAL QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED. 
7 BUT ANY WAY, I'M OF THE OPINION, AND I SO FIND, 
8 THAT THE EARNEST MONEY SET FORTH--OR, THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES 
9 THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SELLER TO PROVIDE THE CLOSING AGENT 
10 AND THE CLOSING PLACE, THE CLOSING COSTS; BUT I AM PERSUADED 
11 AND FIND THAT AT A LATE TIME-AND OF COURSE THE BEST EVIDENCE I 
12 HAVE RECEIVED IS APRIL THE 26TH--THAT THE SELLER AGREED THAT 
13 MR. MARSH WOULD BE THE CLOSING AGENT, AND IT WOULD BE AT HIS 
14 OFFICE, OR HE WOULD PREPARE THE PAPERS AND TRANSPORT THEM OR 
15 SEND THEM BACK AND FORTH FROM UTAH TO PENNSYLVANIA, AND 
16 THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING-WELL, I GUESS EVEN AT THE FIRST THEY 
17 WERE NOT GOING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CLOSING COSTS THEMSELVES. 
18 THAT WAS A LATER SITUATION. 
19 I'M PERSUADED, AND FIND, THAT THE WATER 
20 ASSESSMENT, A GREAT DEAL HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT THAT, BUT THAT 
21 WAS AN ASSESSMENT, THAT IF IT HAD BEEN CLOSED, IF THE PAPERS 
22 HAD BEEN SIGNED, IF THE LOTTS HAD BROUGHT THAT UP AT AN 
23 EARLIER STAGE, THAT OF COURSE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN CARE 
24 OF WITHOUT ANY QUESTION. 
25 AND IT REALLY WASN'T A QUESTION, BECAUSE OF THE 
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1 FACT THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN ASSESSED. I THINK THEY WERE ENTITLED 
2 TO MAKE SURE OF IT, BUT I THINK IT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE IN A 
3 MUCH MORE EXPEDITED MANNER. 
4 AS FAR AS THIS SURVEY IS CONCERNED, THE COURT, 
5 AS I READ THE DOCUMENTS, AND AS I'VE LISTENED TO THE 
6 ARGUMENTS, I AM PERSUADED THAT THE SURVEY WAS FOR THE 
7 BENEFIT OF THE BUYERS, THAT THE SELLER DID NOT WANT, NEED OR 
8 FEEL THE NEED FOR THE SURVEY, AND THIS MATTER HAS BEEN 
9 BROUGHT UP AT A LATER DATE, AND I THINK THAT IT IS NOT AN 
10 OBJECTIONABLE SITUATION. 
11 I THINK THAT THE REQUEST TO CHANGE THE 
12 DOCUMENTS WERE PROPER BY THE BUYER--THE SELLER, BUT I ALSO 
13 THINK THAT WITH HIM AGREEING THAT MR. MARSH WAS GOING TO BE 
14 THE CLOSING AGENT HERE IN UTAH, THAT HE HAD TO EXPECT THAT 
15 THERE WAS GOING TO BE SOME TIME IT WAS GOING TO INTERVENE AS 
16 FAR AS CHANGING OF THE DOCUMENTS. 
17 I THINK BOTH PARTIES, BOTH THE BUYER AND THE 
18 SELLER, AND THE CLOSING AGENT, COULD HAVE EXPEDITED THIS 
19 MATTER, BUT NOBODY SEEMED TO BE CONCERNED AT THE FIRST PART. 
20 I DON'T THINK ANYBODY WAS WORRIED ABOUT IT 
21 UNTIL ALL OF A SUDDEN THE BUYER, ON JUNE--IN JUNE--ON JUNE THE 
22 7TH I BELIEVE IT WAS, SAYS THAT HE DOESN'T WANT TO CLOSE. 
23 OTHERWISE, I THINK THE PARTIES HAVE JUST BEEN 
24 GOING ALONG AND TAKING THEIR TIME AND NEITHER ONE OF THEM 
25 WAS IN A RUSH TO DO IT. 
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1 I DO FIND THAT THE BUYER DID TENDER HIS 
2 PERFORMANCE TO THE CLOSING AGENT. I ALSO FIND THAT THE 
3 AFFIDAVIT OF THE EXPERT, MR. HAMMOND, IS WELL TAKEN, THAT HE 
4 DOES HAVE THE--AS AN EXPERT, THE RIGHT TO GIVE HIS OPINION 
5 STATEMENT AS TO HOW HE CLOSES THINGS. 
6 I DO NOT THINK THAT HE IS QUALIFIED, NOR DO I 
7 THINK HIS AFFIDAVIT--WELL, HE DOES SOMEWHAT-BUT HE IS NOT 
8 QUALIFIED TO INTERPRET THE LAW. 
9 THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT TIME WAS NOT OF THE 
10 ESSENCE IN THIS CONTRACT, AND UNTIL THE EXPIRATION OF THE 15 
11 DAYS. 
12 IN OTHER WORDS, I'M OF THE OPINION THAT KRANTZ 
13 V. HOLT. THAT CASE, SAYS THAT THE "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE" DOES 
14 NOT COME INTO PLAY, AND IT WAS NOT SO IN THIS CASE. 
15 AND BASED ON THAT, I WOULD FIND IN FAVOR OF THE 
16 DEFENDANT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF, AND GRANT THEIR MOTION FOR 
17 SUMMARY JUDGMENT. AGAIN I SAY TO YOU BOTH, THAT I 
18 UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS HERE, AND THIS MAY 
19 BE BACK, SO I HOPE SOMETHING CAN BE DONE TO RESOLVE IT. 
20 MR. LARSEN: THANK YOU, JUDGE. 
21 MR. MARSH: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
22 (WHEREUPON, AT THE HOUR OF 9:10 A.M., THE 
23 PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.) 
24 
25 (TRANSCRIBED BY ALISON HOLLADAY) 
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2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
3 STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
4 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
5 I, ED MIDGLEY, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE THIRD 
6 JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
7 ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME 
8 STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET 
9 FORTH; THAT SAID REPORT WAS, BY ME, SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED TO BE 
10 REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 45, 
11 BOTH INCLUSIVE; THAT SAID REPORT SO TRANSCRIBED CONSTITUTES A 
12 TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE 
13 ADDUCED AND PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
14 TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS 
15 7TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1996, AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
16 
17 
18 
ED MIDGLI 
19 OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
(UTAH CSR NO. 22-104249-7801) 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940904735PR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs1 
Motion for Summary Judgment having been set for hearing before 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on the 22nd day of June, 1995, 
at 8:00 a.m., Ralph J. Marsh of Backman, Clark & Marsh appearing 
for defendants and Mark A. Larsen of Campbell Maack & Sessions 
appearing for plaintiffs, and the Court having heard and 
considered the arguments of the parties and having examined and 
considered the affidavits and memoranda submitted by the parties 
and having determined that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and that defendants are entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law, and, specifically, the Court having determined 
the following facts to be undisputed: 
1. Plaintiffs, as seller, and defendant Knighton, as 
buyer, signed the Earnest Money Sales Agreement in January and 
February, 1994, providing for the sale of the property known as 
Lot 113, Hi-Country Estates, Phase II, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and providing that plaintiffs, as Seller, were 
to provide a preliminary title report to Knighton five business 
days before the closing and to designate a place for closing. 
2. On April 26, 1994, plaintiffs, through Knighton, 
either requested or gave their permission for Mr. Marsh to 
obtain a preliminary title report and prepare the closing 
3. Knightoni delivered an executed promissory note and *U 
Trust Deed to Marsh on April 29, 1994. f^*^* 
A. Mr. Charles Hammond, plaintiffs' expert witness, is 
not qualified to interpret the law nor the contract between 
these parties. 
5. Time was not the essence of the agreement between 
these parties until after fifteen days following the May 1, 
1994, closing date. 
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6. The survey required by the agreement was solely for 
the benefit of Knighton, although the survey was never 
performed. 
7. Plaintiffs, as seller, did not ever tender their 
performance of the agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED 
as follows: 
1. Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
2. Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against 
plaintiffs ordering plaintiffs to specifically perform the 
agreement between the parties by signing and returning to 
defendants the warranty deed conveying to defendant Knighton the 
property known as Lot 113, Hi-Country Estates, Phase II, legally 
described as follows: 
Beginning South 870.83 feet and East 2499.13 
feet from the West Quarter Corner of Section 21, 
Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence North 71°22T15" 
West 582.27 feet; thence North 18°37f45" East 
353.01 feet; thence Easterly along a curve to 
the right 704 feet; thence South 53°48f29" East 
304.13 feet; thence South 36°ll131" West 649.01 
feet to the point of beginning, containing 
10.48 acres. 
Marsh shall record the warranty deed and shall record the Trust 
Deed from Knighton to plaintiffs securing the promissory note 
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signed by Knighton to plaintiffs and delivering that promissory 
note to plaintiffs. 
4. Before the Warranty Deed is recorded, Defendant 
Knighton shall pay to plaintiffs the amount of the water 
assessment and all other assessments incurred after May 1, 1994, 
and paid by plaintiffs upon submission to Knighton of a copy of 
the assessment and evidence that it has been paid by plaintiffs. 
5. If the foregoing acts have not been performed by the 
parties within thirty days from the signing and entry of this 
judgment, the Court will enter an order vesting title to the 
property as specified herein pursuant to U.R.C.P. 70. 
6. Defendants are hereby awarded their reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter in the sum of 
$ 
DATED: 5u^"_/^T^1995. 
HOMER F. WILKINSON, Judge 
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 940904735PR 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs Dennis A. Lott and 
Francine G. Lott, by and through their counsel of record, hereby 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the final Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment of The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
entered in this matter on August 18, 1995. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED: September 14, 1995. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Mark A. Larsen la
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the {£ " day of September, 1995, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was 
served via United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
wp51\mal\lott\appeal.not 
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Appellants 
F I L E D 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
(Subject to Assignment 
to the Court of Appeals) 
No. 950407 
Priority No. 15 
Pursuant to U.R.A.P. 9 Plaintiffs/Appellants Dennis A. and 
Francine G. Lott (the "Lotts") respectfully submit the following 
Docketing Statement: 
1. DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND ORDER APPEALED FROM: The 
Lotts seek review of the entry of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants/Appellees Kerry Knighton and Ralph J. Marsh dated August 
18, 1995 and the denial of the Lott's Motion for Summary Judgment 
dated August 18, 1995. 
2. DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL: September 15, 1995. 
3. JURISDICTION: This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1995). 
4. NAME OF THE TRIAL COURT: Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County. 
5. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS: The Lotts are property owners 
who entered into Earnest Money Sales Agreement (the "Agreement") with 
Knighton on January 27, 1994. The sale was to close on May 1, 1994. 
Marsh was the closing agent and counsel for Knighton. 
The Agreement states clearly that after May 1, 1994, time becomes 
of the essence except under certain narrow circumstances. The Lotts 
requested a closing date no later than May 1, 1994, so they could 
avoid paying large assessments which were to be levied against the 
property at the end of May 1994. Knighton agreed to close by May 1, 
1994. He also agreed to obtain a title report and title insurance 
prior to the closing. He failed to do this in a timely manner. 
Knighton failed to obtain a percolation test or a survey on the 
property; at a minimum, obtaining the survey was a pre-condition for 
closing. 
The sale did not close on May 1, 1994, because Marsh did not send 
the necessary documents to execute the closing to the Lotts until 
after May 1, 1994. Moreover, Marsh did not enclose copies of the 
requisite Note and Trust Deed which were integral to the agreement. 
The Lotts did not receive the note and Trust Deed until eight days 
after the scheduled closing. 
The Note and Trust Deed Marsh sent to the Lotts after the closing 
contain a significant, but easily remedied, error concerning the 
Lott's liability for certain assessments which were to be levied on 
the property and which Knighton agreed to pay. 
On May 16, 1994, the Lotts, after retaining counsel, requested 
that the Note and Trust Deed be changed to reflect that Knighton was 
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responsible for assessments after May 1, 1994. Marsh did not make the 
requested, minor changes for over three weeks, until June 7, 1994, 
despite the undisputable fact that time was of the essence. 
Knighton promised the closing would occur on June 1, 1994, the 
date the first payment on his Note to the Lotts was due. The 
transaction did not close on June 1, 1994, nor has Knighton made a 
single payment on the Promissory Note or for any assessments. 
6. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL ISSUES: 
a. Even though none of the events enumerated in the 
Agreement allowing a postponement of the closing date occurred, 
was the District Court correct in its legal interpretation of 
the "time is of the essence" clause contained in the Agreement 
so that time did not become of the essence until fifteen days 
after the agreed upon closing date? 
b. Even if the District Court was correct in its legal 
interpretation of the "time is of the essence" clause, did the 
District Court error in concluding that a three-week delay 
attributable solely to Knighton when time undisputably was of 
the essence did not result in Knighton's breach of the 
Agreement? 
c. Did the District Court error in resolving disputed 
material facts against the non-moving party, the Lotts, 
including but not limited to whether the survey was solely for 
the benefit of the buyer and whether the delays after time 
became of the essence were attributable to the Lotts? 
7. DETERMINATION OF CASE BY SUPREME COURT: This appeal is 
subject to assignment by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of 
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Appeals. In the exercise of its discretion, this Court should not 
pour this case over to the Utah Court of Appeals because the 
interpretation of Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352 (Utah 1991), as it 
applies to this case, and the possibility of either clarifying or 
overruling some of the language in that case, will be critical to the 
resolution of this appeal. The Court of Appeals may conclude that 
certain language in that case constrains it. 
8. DETERMINATIVE LAW: The cases believed to be determinative 
of the respective issues stated in this Docketing Statement are as 
follows: 
a. On the issue of whether time was of the essence: Alex 
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Ut. App. 1987); Cahoon v. 
Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982); Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352 
(Utah 1991). 
b. On the issue of whether the Lotts never tendered 
performance: Century 21 All West Real Estate v. WeJbJb, 645 P.2d 
52 (Utah 1982). 
9. RELATED APPEALS: There are no prior or related appeals in 
this case. 
10. ATTACHMENTS: 
a. The Order Granting Defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffsf Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated August 18, 1995; and 
b. The Notice of Appeal filed September 15, 1995. 
DATED: October 5, 1995. 
CAMPBELL MAACK ^/SESSIONS 
Ma^ Jc A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of October, 1995, I 
caused a true arid correct copy of the foregoing DOCKETING STATEMENT 
to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940904735PR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs1 
Motion for Summary Judgment having been set for hearing before 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on the 22nd day of June, 1995, 
at 8:00 a.m., Ralph J. Marsh of Backman, Clark & Marsh appearing 
for defendants and Mark A. Larsen of Campbell Maack & Sessions 
appearing for plaintiffs, and the Court having heard and 
considered the arguments of the parties and having examined and 
considered the affidavits and memoranda submitted by the parties 
and having determined that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and that defendants are entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law, and, specifically, the Court having determined 
the following facts to be undisputed: 
1. Plaintiffs, as seller, and defendant Knighton, as 
buyer, signed the Earnest Money Sales Agreement .;in January and 
February, 1994, providing for the sale of the property known as 
Lot 113, Hi-Country Estates, Phase II, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and providing that plaintiffs, as Seller, were 
to provide a preliminary title report to Knighton five business 
days before the closing and to designate a place for closing. 
2. On April 26, 1994, plaintiffs, through Knighton, 
either requested or gave their permission for Mr. Marsh to 
obtain a preliminary title report and prepare the closing 
3* Knightoni delivered an executed promissory note and , 
Trust Deed to Marsh on April 29, 1994. £** 
4. Mr. Charles Hammond, plaintiffs' expert witness, is 
not qualified to interpret the law nor the contract between 
these parties. 
5. Time was not the essence of the agreement between 
these parties until after fifteen days following the May 1, 
1994, closing date. 
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6. The survey required by the agreement was solely for 
the benefit of Knighton, although the survey was never 
performed. 
7* Plaintiffs, as seller, did not ever tender their 
performance of the agreement• 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED 
as follows: 
1. Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
2. Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against 
plaintiffs ordering plaintiffs to specifically perform the 
agreement between the parties by signing and returning to 
defendants the warranty deed conveying to defendant Knighton the 
property known as Lot 113, Hi-Country Estates, Phase II, legally 
described as follows: 
Beginning South 870.83 feet and East 2499.13 
feet from the West Quarter Corner of Section 21, 
Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence North 71°22f15" 
West 582.27 feet; thence North 18°37'45" East 
353.01 feet; thence Easterly along a curve to 
the right 704 feet; thence South 53°48f29" East 
304.13 feet; thence South 36°11'31" West 649.01 
feet to the point of beginning, containing 
10.48 acres. 
Marsh shall record the warranty deed and shall record the Trust 
Deed from Knighton to plaintiffs securing the promissory note 
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signed by Knighton to plaintiffs and delivering that promissory 
note to plaintiffs. 
4. Before the Warranty Deed is recorded, Defendant 
Knighton shall pay to plaintiffs the amount of the water 
assessment and all other assessments incurred after May 1, 19.94, 
and paid by plaintiffs upon submission to Knighton of a copy of 
the assessment and evidence that it has been paid by plaintiffs. 
5. If the foregoing acts have not been performed by the 
parties within thirty days from the signing and entry of this 
judgment, the Court will enter an order vesting title to the 
property as specified herein pursuant to U.R.C.P. 70. 
6. Defendants are hereby awarded their reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter in the sum of 
DATED: Jtt^"_/^7~~1995. 
HOMER F. WILKINSON, Judge 
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. 
LOTT, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. 
MARSH, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 940904735PR 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs Dennis A. Lott and 
Francine G. Lott, by and through their counsel of record, hereby 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the final Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment of The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
entered in this matter on August 18, 1995. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED: September 14, 1995. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Ay^tf^. 
A. Larsen 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J£ day of September, 1995, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was 
served via United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS A. LOTT and FRANCINE G. : 
LOTT, : 
: NOTICE OF POSTING OF 
Plaintiffs, : SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
vs. : 
KERRY L. KNIGHTON and RALPH J. : Civil No. 940904735PR 
MARSH, : 
: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants. : 
TO ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, as a result of the Notice of 
Appeal filed on September 15, 1995, Plaintiffs Dennis A. Lott 
and Francine G. Lott have deposited with the Clerk of the Third 
Judicial District Court cash in the sum of $8,845.50 as a 
supersedeas bond in the above-captioned case, the amount 
referenced in paragraph 6 of the Court's Order Granting 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED: September 20, 1995. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS z ^4 & v ^ 
Mark A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of September, 
1995, I caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE OF POSTING OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND to the 
following: 
Ralph J. Marsh, Esq. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
^ ^ ^ ^ { ^ ^e& «s 
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
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OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Mark A. Larsen 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys at Law 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
2 01 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215 
Dennis A. Lott and 
Francine G. Lott, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. No. 950407 
Kerry L. Knighton and 940904735PR 
Ralph J. Marsh, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court, this case 
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to 
that Court. The address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
TabO 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00-
Dennis A. 
G. Lott, 
Lott and Francine 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Kerry L. Knighton and Ralph 
J. Marsh, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER OF PARTIAL 
DISMISSAL 
Case No. 950760-CA 
•^ 1 C 1S96 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood and Wilkins. 
This matter is before the court on appellees' motion to 
dismiss the appeal as moot. Appellee Kerry L. Knighton paid the 
entire purchase price as a result of appellants' election to 
pursue their remedies under the promissory note and trust deed. 
Based upon appellants' acceptance of benefits and acquiesence in 
the judgment, we dismiss the appeal in part. See Trees v. Lewis, 
738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987); Cinaolani v. U.P. & L,. 790 P.2d 1219 
(Utah App. 1990) . That portion of the appeal challenging the 
award of attorney fees and costs is not dismissed based upon 
appellants' filing of the supersedeas bond. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted in part and 
the appeal is dismissed as moot except insofar as it challenges 
the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the request for attorney fees and 
costs pursuant to Rule 3 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure is denied. 
Dated this n day of April, 1996. 
lusse 'llW. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that on April 17, 1996, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
Attorney at Law for Appellant 
201 South Main Street 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Backman, Clark and Marsh 
Attorney at Law for Appellees 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
Third District Court 
Attn Appeals Clerk 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this April 17, 1996. 
By GL 
Robin Hutcheson 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 950760-CA 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Case No. 940904735PR 
&J^~ 
